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ABSTRACT
This thesis is conducted in two parts. The first part investigates expert and lay repre­
sentations of GM food risk using the Carnegie Mellon University approach (Granger 
Morgan at al, 2002) and social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984).
Elite interviews were followed by focus group discussions with lay people to explore 
how GM food risks are understood by both parties. Expert and lay perceptions differ 
on a wide range of issues. In contrast to experts, lay participants are particularly con­
cerned with various non-scientific risk dimensions, such as trust and values. These 
moral and ethical concerns cannot be addressed through the provision of scientific 
information alone as the Carnegie Mellon University approach suggests. Social rep­
resentations theory offers an alternative to this top-down approach by showing that, 
rather than erroneous knowledge, lay participants’ non-scientific concerns express 
ways of understanding GM food.
The second part of the thesis focuses on one particular non-scientific dimension of 
lay GM food representations, namely the concept 'messing with nature ’, and exam­
ines the social construction of nature and naturalness in relation to food. 188 respon­
dents completed an internet-administered free associations task to establish in depth 
what lay people mean when they judge GM food to be *unnatural \
The findings show that the concept of ‘messing with nature ’ can be firmly estab­
lished as a major risk dimension in relation to GM food. Moreover, rather than being 
solely material, both food and nature have significant symbolic and affective dimen­
sions. This indicates that GM food risks are social in part- they are representations 
that have socio-cultural and value dimensions and with all this they are disputed. In 
turn, this has a range of implications for risk communication.
Keywords: risk perception, risk communication, mental models, social representa­
tions, nature, GMfood.
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PREFACE
This thesis investigates expert and lay representations of GM food. From the wide 
array of biotechnological applications the case study of GM foods was chosen be­
cause in the UK (as well as in other European countries) this technology has been 
controversial. For politicians and industrialists alike, the case of GM food has shown 
that the introduction of a new technology can be severely hindered by public resis­
tance and that efforts to persuade the public of a technology’s benefits can fail if 
other factors are neglected. In turn, there are various lessons to be learned for how to 
communicate societal risk and of how to address future technological disputes.
Today it is appreciated that risk communication is more challenging than simply 
communicating experts’ scientific risk estimates to the public, and that lay concerns, 
often dealing with the moral and ethical dimensions of a risk need to be addressed to 
avoid further public controversies. Despite of this, differences in risk perceptions 
have only rarely been comparatively investigated in depth, leading to a failure to un­
derstand how exactly expert and lay people make sense of risk. Hence the present 
thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of expert and lay risk perceptions 
of GM food, with a view of offering some implications for risk communication.
As risk communication has limited theoretical foundations, it benefits from being 
preceded by an examination of risk in general. Thus Chapter One provides an intro­
duction to the theoretical debates about risk, elucidating why western societies may 
increasingly feel at risk despite living longer and in greater safety than before and 
why expert and lay assessments of a risk may differ. In many ways, the kinds of risks 
facing society today cannot be quantified easily via ‘objective’ measures of science. 
Consequently it is increasingly recognised that the objectivist approach to risk per­
ception, usually based on mortality statistics and the de minimis risk principle is gen­
erally unsuccessful when evaluating and communicating about societal risk.
We conclude the first chapter by proposing that while the standard model of scien­
tific investigation remains a necessary form of risk assessment, it is no longer suffi­
cient by itself. Yet it is not quite clear how best to proceed in order to move beyond 
the scientific risk assessment. Considerable work remains to be done to understand 
the underlying reasons, values and cultural assumptions of lay as well as expert
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evaluations of risks. Essentially, as a first step it has to be understood how risk is 
“constructed”, by expert and lay citizens alike in order to be able to effectively com­
municate.
Chapter Two examines communication about risk more specifically. It is argued that 
because risk communication efforts have traditionally been based on the mathemati­
cal theory of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), communications previ­
ously largely consisted of a unidirectional flow of risk information from expert to lay 
people rather than two-way communications between both parties. Yet in relation to 
technological risks that affect society as a whole, one-way communications have 
proved insufficient to alleviate social conflicts.
As risk communication is intimately intertwined with other societal issues, such as 
lack of trust in social institutions, it is ever more recognised that improving risk 
communication is more than merely crafting better messages. Although there are no 
hard and fast answers on how best to communicate about technological risks, in 
agreement with many other scholars (e.g. Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Klinke and 
Renn, 2002) it is concluded that there is a need for greater public participation and 
the democratisation of science. A move away from the prevailing positivist paradigm 
could ensure that alternative rationalities are incorporated and that the concerns of 
the lay public can be efficiently dealt with.
This indicates the need for a more social psychological approach to risk that can ad­
dress the concept in its complexity. Chapter Three presents the framework for the 
present thesis. It is divided into two parts- the first part focusing on mental models, 
specifically the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) approach to risk communication 
(Granger Morgan et al, 2002), and the second section focusing on why we chose to 
synthesise this approach with social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984) in or­
der to study GM food representations.
The CMU approach presents part of the theoretical and methodological basis for the 
current thesis. Essentially, the CMU approach provides a model of the causes of pub­
lic sensitivities to risk, a methodology for diagnosing the roots of public risk con­
cerns and a procedure (i.e. communication) for alleviating these concerns. It pro­
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poses to interview expert as well as lay people in order to find out what both groups 
think about a risk and then compare and contrast these divergent risk perceptions and 
utilise the findings as the basis for developing risk communication interventions.
Acknowledging that the CMU approach can offer a useful framework to characterise 
the understanding and relevance of particular risks to people, this approach can nev­
ertheless be criticised because of its individualistic and top-down orientation and its 
neglect of the origins of risk representations. Hence although the approach is claimed 
to support the design of relevant communication content, it is questionable whether it 
is sufficient to address societal risks such as GM food.
To alleviate these shortcomings we complement the CMU approach with social rep­
resentations theory (SRT) arguing that this constructivist approach can help to ‘so­
cialise’ mental models. Highlighting that representations emerge out of society and 
culture, SRT appreciates the social origins of risk representations. Moreover, because 
SRT deals explicitly with common sense, the theory may provide risk communica­
tion research with a vital new perspective on lay knowledge, which from a positivist 
perspective has traditionally been considered as problematic or “deviant”.
By synthesising both of the above approaches, we essentially aim to find a “middle 
way” between the positivist and constructivist stances on risk. By applying this joint 
framework to the study of GM food risk it is hoped that this thesis can offer a contri­
bution into how a better, in-depth and more complete, understanding of the differ­
ences in expert and lay risk perceptions might potentially be developed.
Moving into Chapter Four we introduce the research design and methodology of our 
study. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on the theo­
retical background of the qualitative methodologies utilised. We make the case for 
qualitative research, arguing that our objective of exploring expert and lay represen­
tations of GM food can be achieved well through the application of individual and 
group interviews, and free association tasks.
We then outline the procedures for the first part of our research, i.e. the elite inter­
views and lay focus groups. This leads us into the first of the three chapters of em-
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pineal results. Chapter Five discusses the findings of the ALCESTE analysis. This 
exploratory analysis shows clear expert and lay divergences in GM food risk repre­
sentations. Although both groups address similar topics, they seem to bring different 
representations to the issue. For example, experts discuss the environmental impacts 
of GM food largely from a physical and agricultural perspective, yet lay participants 
frame the discussion in terms of a broader ‘nature ' debate incorporating various af­
fective and symbolic elements. Thus the particular concern with ‘nature ’ by lay par­
ticipants warrants further investigation.
The Atlas/ti analysis in Chapter Six provides the detail on the particularities of expert 
and lay discourses of GM food risk. In accordance with the CMU approach, expert 
and lay mental models of GM food risk are presented in the form of influence dia­
grams, which show clear divergences in risk representations in relation to a range of 
central concepts, for example health risks, perceptions of benefits, as well as various 
non-scientific issues. The importance of these latter non-scientific dimensions for lay 
risk representations in turn shows up the limitations of the CMU approach to risk 
communication.
As the CMU approach exclusively focuses on the technical and scientific aspects of 
GM food risk it is not equipped to adequately address lay people’s social and moral 
questions such as those about trust and values. Having a rather cognitive perspective, 
it is in many ways too rational to address lay participants’ concerns. While the CMU 
approach may be a useful tool for comparing divergent risk perceptions, the results 
show that, in relation to GM food risk, it confronts a stumbling block of how to deal 
with non-scientific concerns.
A significant non-scientific dimension is lay participants’ perception that GM is 
‘‘messing with nature ”, Our comparison of expert and lay mental models clearly in­
dicates that lay participants’ perceptions of GM food risk are influenced by the way 
they view nature, and more specifically, by the way the natural and the unnatural are 
contrasted. These findings provide the basis for the second part of the research which 
aims to establish what people actually mean when they say that “GM is unnatural”. 
This has previously not been well explained, as the perception that ‘‘GM is unnatu­
ral” usually presents the culmination of an argument against GM. As this concept
17
may attain a particular significance especially in relation to modem biotechnologies, 
some of which may indeed challenge the essence of “our nature”, we investigate this 
concept in more detail.
To put nature into context Chapter Seven provides a brief theoretical background to 
the ways in which psychology has attempted to understand the concept. In psychol­
ogy, nature has generally been approached from an individualistic perspective which 
is only of limited relevance to the present research aims. Rather, our focus is on val­
ues related to nature as well as on the symbolisms of the concept and on the ways in 
which nature and naturalness may be socially and culturally constructed. Thus it is 
argued that a more social psychological approach to nature is needed in order to 
move beyond the material to the important symbolic and affective dimensions of the 
concept. By approaching nature from a more constructivist perspective, it is hoped 
that the present thesis can provide a contribution to the, to date quite limited, social 
psychological literature on “nature”.
Chapter Eight outlines the research procedure for the second part of our study (i.e. 
the free associations tasks) followed by the results. Using a larger sample than in the 
first part of the research, lay participants were asked via an internet survey to freely 
associate to the stimulus words ‘natural things', ‘natural foods’, food in general’ 
and ‘G M food’. The aim was to establish a comparative judgement, contrasting GM 
food against other familiar food and nature related ‘objects’ in order to provide a 
frame of reference. By viewing GM food in the context of other reference points, we 
aimed to see the likely anchors and frames people use when they make the judge­
ment that “GM is unnatural”. Data was analysed with correspondence analysis and 
triangulated with cluster analysis.
The results show that respondents’ judgement that “GM is unnatural” is influenced 
by a range of socio-cultural factors, such as values, taboos, perceptions of contagion 
and so on, rather than the physical aspects of the food per se. In many ways, respon­
dents’ representations of what constitutes the natural versus the unnatural in relation 
to food are moral judgements. The dominant representation of GM food as unnatural 
can be regarded as attempts to construct a clear distinction between the “good” and 
the “bad”, which helps to define the boundaries of acceptability.
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Chapter Nine discusses the results of both research stages putting them into their 
theoretical contexts, and evaluates our synthesis of the CMU and SRT approaches to 
risk perception and risk communication about GM food. It is apparent that the con­
structivist SRT framework can offer some important insights into lay people’s sense- 
making of GM food risk. Only through the combination of both approaches can GM 
food risk be shown as the complex and multi-dimensional concept it so evidently is. 
In turn, this has a range of conceptual implications for risk communication.
Clearly, representations of GM food risk have a societal basis, often reflecting beliefs 
about values, nature, social institutions and moral behaviour. In this way, GM food 
risk, rather than being only a scientific reality, is in part a social construction. Essen­
tially, the risk is both objective and subjective as risk representations incorporate sci­
entific and moral and ethical dimensions at the same time. These cannot easily be 
divided as both together make up the social object “GM food”.
In light of this we conclude the thesis by suggesting some further practical implica­
tions for risk communication. Appreciating that risk is in part a social construct 
means taking lay perceptions seriously. In turn, this raises questions of how to evalu­
ate risk and of how to include non-scientific dimensions in risk assessments. The 
present findings suggest that the deliberation of risks that affect society as a whole 
and the subsequent formulation of policy can no longer be based on purely positivist 
risk assessments provided by scientific experts as novel technologies such as GM 
food raise novel social and ethical questions for which traditional science alone does 
not have the answer.
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1 AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK
The present thesis investigates risk perception and its implications for risk communi­
cation about technologies, using the case of GM food. At least since the nuclear 
power controversy of the 1980s it has become recognised that risk communication is 
more challenging than simply communicating experts’ scientific risk estimates to the 
public. To build a solid foundation for risk communication, it has to be understood 
how risks are perceived by both groups. Thus this thesis focuses on identifying and 
understanding the discrepancies between expert and lay assessments of GM food 
risk.
The practise of risk communication has only limited theoretical foundations. There­
fore to put risk communication into context, it is useful to begin with an examination 
of risk in general. A review of the sociological, anthropological and psychological 
literature on risk elucidates why western societies increasingly feel at risk, despite 
living longer and in greater safety than before, and why scientific risk assessment 
may not accord with public views of risk.
We contextualise the risk debate within the overall frameworks of the competing 
paradigms of positivism and constructivism. These different perspectives show that 
risk can be conceived as both an objective reality and as a social construct.
Today it is becoming increasingly clear that the characterisation of risk as a purely 
objective reality is inadequate as in many cases, different non-technical risk dimen­
sions also constitute an important part of overall risk perceptions. Of these social di­
mensions we highlight the moral and ethical issues, such as concerns about “nature”, 
which have been insufficiently researched to date.
We conclude Chapter One by arguing that the move away from a purely scientific 
perception of risk towards the notion of risk as at least partially a social construct 
poses various challenges to risk evaluation, risk management and ultimately risk 
communication. Hence we put forward a “third way” of risk evaluation, outlining 
two frameworks that embrace both objective and subjective risk dimensions. These
allow for the integration of uncertainty and values, ensuring that lay concerns com­
prising issues apart from the scientific risk per se can be incorporated when commu­
nicating about risk.
1.1 A theoretical background to risk
It is well documented that as society has become safer and healthier, the public has 
become more rather than less concerned about risk (e.g. Slovic, 1993; Kunreuther 
and Slovic, 1996). As society has become more affluent it can afford the luxury of 
risk aversion, thus there is less and less willingness to accept risks (El Feki, 2002). 
Even though the advancement of technology has supposedly provided a sense of 
mastery over the natural world, it coincided with an unprecedented sense of risk 
(Joffe, 1999). In order to understand how the general public perceives risk and why 
people are increasingly sensitive to risks, it is important to comprehend how this es­
calating concern with risk developed. What is it about late modem society that makes 
people feel at risk?
1.1.1 From progress to risk consciousness
The past century was characterised by monumental technological progress, such as 
the harnessing of the atom and the writing of the genetic code. These developments 
went hand in hand with the optimism that scientific and technological progress 
would essentially solve the world’s problems (Jaeger, Renn, Rosa, and Webler, 
2001). For instance, in the 1950s nuclear power promised clean and inexhaustible 
energy that would be “too cheap to meter”.
But apart from significant benefits, progress brought with it a range of unintended 
consequences. Now it is recognised that these unintended consequences are often 
risks of our human making (Jaeger et al, 2001). Thus according to Beck (1986), the 
transition from modernity to late modernity has transformed the collective con­
sciousness so that society is now preoccupied with risk. Rather than being character­
ised by progress, Beck suggests that from the late 20th century onwards, society,
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looking at a world of technological and environmental uncertainty, has been marked 
by risk.
For Beck
“Risk society means an epoch in which the dark sides o f  progress in­
creasingly come to dominate the social debate. ”
(Beck, 1991/95; p.2)
Beck’s risk society has four core developments: (1) Scientific and technological pro­
gress is undermined by its consequences, (2) Risks become uncontrollable as they 
become larger and transcend national boundaries, (3) The conflict over income 
which characterised modernity now becomes a conflict over the distribution of risk, 
and (4) The politicisation of risk requires the participation of the public as new are­
nas for debates about risk distribution are emerging outside government.
Hence today western societies are often disenchanted with technology, or at least 
deeply ambivalent about it (Jaeger et al, 2001). It is recognised that at the beginning 
of the new millennium
“Coping with risks o f our own making has become one o f  the major chal­
lenges faced by humankind. ”
(Jaeger et al, 2001; p. 10)
1.1.2 The nature of post-modern risk
In the “risk society” social, political, ecological, and individual risks created through 
science and technology increasingly elude the control of the traditional protective 
institutions of industrial society. Beck (1986) proposes that science and technology 
have created new risks of catastrophic potential that did not exist in past times. To­
day’s risks- nuclear, chemical, ecological, and those resulting from genetic engineer­
ing- are of a different order from previous industrial risks (Adams, 1995). Many are 
not amenable to the senses. Since people cannot be sure to detect them, risks may 
lurk everywhere (Mol and Spaargarten, 1993).
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Additionally, Beck (1986) argues that in the past, most risks were geographically cir­
cumscribed, often confined within the political boundaries of the nation producing 
the risks. In contrast, in line with the general developments of productive and con­
sumptive globalisation, today many risks are global, meaning that people worldwide 
share a common set of risks. With the further internationalisation of national econo­
mies, technology transfer, and production processes across national boundaries, the 
result is the global diffusion of risks (Mazur, 1981a).
Moreover, in the past, many risks were related to a group’s unique circumstances, 
while today the distribution of risk is no longer a question of social class or status 
(Beck, 1986). The risks of nuclear power or genetic engineering know neither geo­
graphical nor social boundaries.
As post-modern risks are often displaced in time and space, they pose potential dan­
gers to future generations (Jaeger et al, 2001). This raises questions of equity and re­
sponsibility: How can society hold individuals or groups responsible for their actions 
when the future consequences of these actions are not foreseeable? Because they are 
not limited in time and space, today’s risks cannot be compensated for or insured 
against (Jaeger et al, 2001).
In addition, science has also developed increased sophistication and precision in de­
tecting the unwanted risks of the technologies it helped to create. This contributed to 
heightened knowledge and perceptions of risk as uncertainty often multiplies in pro­
portion to the rigour of the analysis (Luhmann, 1993). Consequently, the more im­
portant the new knowledge and the more developed the analytical approaches, the 
greater the degree of uncertainty created (Luhmann, 1993).
1.1.3 The role of science and expertise
But science is not only responsible for the creation and measurement of new techno­
logical risks. Equally science is also responsible for the provision of knowledge 
about these risks (Beck, 1994). Novel technological and environmental risks cannot 
be understood without relying on and trusting in scientific expertise. However, this 
special role of expertise is problematic.
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The role of experts implies the division of (intellectual) labour. Skills and forms of 
knowledge are carried by experts, on behalf of the public. Because experts carry this 
knowledge, the public does not need to (Giddens, 1991). On the one hand, this re­
sults in a gain in efficiency. On the other hand, the price of the efficiency gain is a 
degree of dependence. The public has to trust the expert, both as the bearer and user 
of knowledge (Giddens, 1991).
Yet as the societal division of labour grows more and more complex, the expecta­
tions that someone will perform the necessary calculations in a way that others can 
rely on are increasingly problematic (Freudenburg, 1993). Thus while the current di­
vision of labour results in an unprecedented level of prosperity, proficiency, physical 
health and safety, at the same time, it increases societal vulnerability to cases where 
duties are not carried out properly (Freudenburg, 1993).
Moreover, expert judgement is often shrouded in doubt, and the media compel peo­
ple to witness the uncertainty that characterises experts’ assessments of risk (Joffe, 
1999). There is increasing awareness of the ubiquity of expert controversy in modem 
society, and of the extent to which experts have lost their independence to patrons 
and employers (Barnes, 1988), giving rise to the phenomenon known as “captive 
consultants” (Otway and Ravetz, 1984). Also, since today’s human-made risks, such 
as those from nuclear power, have spin-offs, which even surpass the know-how of 
the experts who created them, it further undermines the trust that can be placed with 
the experts (Joffe, 1999).
Today the fallibility of expertise1 has been repeatedly shown (e.g. in relation to BSE) 
contributing to a lack of societal trust. And if trust is lacking it can result in changes 
to the way in which people think about potentially risky issues, often meaning that 
behaviour which presupposes trust will be ruled out (Luhmann, 1979).
Hence paradoxically, the division of labour that fostered many of the scientific- 
technological achievements also has the potential to make people more exposed to
1 Empirical research on experts’ performance repeatedly demonstrated that experts know a lot but pre­
dict poorly (e.g. Meehl, 1954; 1986; Johnson, 1988), and that experts use simplifying heuristics and 
have biases similar to those held by lay people (Freudenburg, 1992).
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risk. Because people recognise their dependency, inter-dependency, and vulnerability 
they increasingly feel at risk.
1.1.4 Reflectiqns on the risk consciousness
In essence, from a sociological perspective, changes in the social fabric of society, 
the particular nature of technological and environmental risk and the lack of trust in 
the experts who might be relied upon for protection have created an area of uncer­
tainty and unease, threatening people’s ontological security, i.e.
“The confidence that most human beings have in the continuity o f  their 
self-identity and in the constancy o f  the surrounding social and material 
environments o f  action. ”
(Giddens, 1991; p.92)
But Beck’s risk society approach can be criticised on several grounds. First, with ref­
erence to Beck’s conceptualisation of post-modern risks, Rothstein, Hubert and Gas- 
kell (2006) draw a distinction between societal risks, as proposed by Beck, and insti­
tutional risks which refer to “threats to regulatory organizations and/or the legiti­
macy o f  rules and methods o f regulation” (Rothstein et al, 2006; p.91). Institutional 
risks are created through the pressures towards greater coherence, transparency and 
accountability of the regulation of societal risks, inevitably exposing the limitations 
of regulation. Thus not only is society increasingly concerned with novel risks, but 
equally with the risks of risk management2.
Consequently, Rothstein et al (2006) argue that the concern with risk in post- 
modernity is less the result of the growth of societal risks as argued by Beck, but is 
rather a consequence of the growth of the regulatory frameworks to control these 
risks, as well as of the need to manage the increasing institutional risks.
2 This focus on the management of institutional risks can in turn shape the perception and manage­
ment of societal risks. For example, focusing of institutional risks can highlight different societal risk 
dimensions for which regulators could be held responsible. On the one hand, this may lead to better 
management o f societal risks. On the other hand, it could also lead regulators to focus on the man­
agement of institutional risks (such as meeting performance targets) at the expense of efficiently man­
aging societal risks (Rothstein et al, 2006).
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Second, Wynne (1996) criticises Beck’s risk society approach for focusing almost 
exclusively on expert knowledge, containing a top-down dynamic. As such, the so­
ciological work on the risk society fails to specify the dynamics of the lay dimension, 
neglecting the ways in which lay people make sense of a risk (Wynne, 1996). Even 
Giddens’ work which deals with the interpersonal dimension of lay knowledge fails 
to elucidate its culturally rooted, collective facet (Wynne, 1996). Wynne’s (1992a) 
case study about sheep-farmers’ confrontation with Chernobyl offers a contrast to 
this by emphasising the agenda-setting potential of lay people. This is valuable since 
it shows that lay people generate issues and act on society rather than constantly re­
sponding to expert agendas.
Finally, Adams (1995) finds Beck’s risk society framework extremely anxiety pro­
voking, and suggests that Beck projects his own personal myth of nature onto the 
whole of modem society, thus presenting a doom-laden view by focusing on the 
darker dimensions of science. Yet the first German edition of the “Risikogesell- 
schaft” was published in 1986, the year of the Chernobyl disaster, giving Beck’s 
view a sinister relevance. In addition, Beck can be credited with initially examining 
the particular dimensions of post-modem risks, which is at least as relevant today as 
it was two decades ago (e.g. in relation to the risks posed by GM or nanotechnology).
Hence even with the above criticisms, the sociological work on risk provides a useful 
theoretical background into how and why the societal concern with technological risk 
may have developed and why today, rather than progress, risk has become the defin­
ing characteristic of our age. As societal conflicts are often about the distribution of 
risks of various kinds, risk has become a political issue which requires political solu­
tions (Beck, 1986). In turn, this means that the social acceptability of those risks 
must be confronted (Homig, 1993).
1.2 Defining risk
Despite the ubiquity of risk in today’s society it is unclear what the concept exactly 
represents. But the importance of adequately defining risk is widely acknowledged: 
the definition of risk is no mere matter of semantics, since it determines what will be
26
studied, and what will not (Hohenemser and Kasperson, 1982). If risk is not properly 
defined, it will be difficult to evaluate.
Because risk has been approached from a wide scope of scientific disciplines, such as 
economics, mathematics, philosophy, and psychology, there are a broad range of 
conceptualisations. Risk research is a transdisciplinary field and Luhmann (1993) 
argues that in relation to definitions, the negative consequences of this are most ap­
parent. This means, for example, that there is no definition of risk that could meet the 
requirements of science as each area of research is satisfied with the guidance pro­
vided by its own particular theoretical context (Luhmann, 1993). Definitions are al­
most never wholly true or false, but instead, are useful as tools for abstraction and for 
bringing intellectual attention to a common focal point (Rosa, 1998). As with other 
discussions about safety and danger, social and physical scientists have been unable 
to agree on the nature and meaning of risk (Adams, 1995).
From a technical perspective, the term risk is often used interchangeably with hazard, 
while from a lay perspective it is often replaced by danger. Definitions of risk and 
danger are ambiguous (e.g. Luhmann, 1993) and frequently overlapping (e.g. Lopes, 
1983).
Likewise, conceptually, the distinction between risk and uncertainty is blurred, but 
Rosa (1998) offers a useful division between both constructs. Risk implies the possi­
bility of some positive, neutral or negative outcome- this possibility is the first indis­
pensable element of risk (Rosa, 1998). Because humans evaluate the uncertain out­
comes of their actions, certain states of the world, which are possible but not prede­
termined, can be identified as risk (Rosa, 1998). This lack of predetermination im­
plies uncertainty. But not all uncertainty is risk- a third essential feature is that risk is 
present only to the extent that uncertainty involves some feature of the world, stem­
ming from natural events or human activities that impacts human reality in some way 
(Rosa, 1998). Thus while not all uncertainty is risk, all risk involves some uncer­
tainty. As such it can be argued that, although not the whole picture, uncertainty 
clearly is a defining characteristic of risk. The significance of this notion is explored 
later on in this chapter in relation to various risk evaluation and risk management ap­
proaches.
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In brief, these various conceptualisations highlight the inherent difficulty in ade­
quately defining a multidimensional and abstract concept such as risk. Thus rather 
than focusing on individual definitions, we refrain from further semantic exercises 
and emphasise the broader paradigmatic debate in which the different ways of under­
standing risk are grounded.
1.3 The conflicting scientific paradigms
We look at risk through two different lenses, positivist and constructivist, to eluci­
date the origins of the potential problems facing risk assessors and risk communica­
tors today. It is important to realise that discussions about what risk is, how it is per­
ceived, and how it can be evaluated and communicated are part of a much wider de­
bate involving other subject areas. The objective/subjective risk controversy (of 
which more later) is grounded in two opposing worldviews: the Cartesian and the 
Hegelian paradigms.
On the one hand, the Cartesian paradigm with the ‘cogito’ “I think, therefore I  am ” 
has been the basis for the natural science model and is reflected in positivism and 
realism. It assumes that a reality exists independent of our knowledge of it and that 
formal logic can produce objective knowledge. The mind is seen as passive in the 
acquisition of knowledge. True knowledge is believed to be independent of context, 
with scientific laws being universal.
As a consequence of the Cartesian paradigm, there is a dualism between mind and 
body (the mind is thinking and the body is unthinking), between subject and object 
(the ‘world-in-itself and the ‘world-for-consciousness’ are separated), and between 
self and other (the lone thinker against society) (Markova, 1982). Methodologically, 
the Cartesian paradigm has been the dominant scientific paradigm, favouring con­
trolled experiments and surveys to induce general laws, from the observation of 
facts. Hereby, it is assumed that research can study individuals in isolation. As such, 
the paradigm can be criticised for being essentially reductionistic and individualistic, 
neglecting the wider social context.
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On the other hand, the Hegelian paradigm provided the foundation for the social sci­
ence model, which is holistic and anti-positivist. It presumes that reality can only be 
known through our consciousness of it, i.e. that it is constructed. In that way there is 
not only one reality but many realities. Therefore we can never produce certain 
knowledge as in the Hegelian paradigm knowledge is a dynamic process, being con­
structed in the relationship between the subject (the knower) and the object (the 
known) (Markova, 1982). In contrast to the Cartesian paradigm, the Hegelian para­
digm assumes that all knowledge is situational, and that scientific laws are contex­
tual. Individual components cannot be understood by themselves as the sum is bigger 
than its parts.
As a consequence, the mind only emerges in interaction with others. Consensual 
validation determines what passes for truth in a given social group at a particular 
point in time (Gergen, 1973). This shared view of the world is reality. In the words of 
Fleck (1935; p. 156): “Reality is a systematic harmony o f  illusion ”.
There is no objective reality, nor objective facts, as all knowledge is derived from 
looking at the world from a particular perspective (Gergen, 1973). Thus constructiv­
ism proposes to replace the scientific emphasis on the “single best account” with a 
multiplicity of constructions (Gergen and Thatchenkery, 1996). Table 1.1 provides a 
summary of both paradigms and their respective research traditions.
Table 1.1 Paradigm components and the objectivist/constructivist divide (adapted from Hellstroem 
and Jacob, 2001; p.5)
Objectivism Constructivism
View o f science Instrumentalist, essentially 
truthseeking, natural science 
orientated, experimental, ana­
lytical reduction in defining the 
research object
Critical function, socially con­
tingent, socially responsible, 
anti-reductionist in its attempt to 
expand a research problem out­
wards rather then narrowing 
them down
View of reality Realist, essentialist, focus on the 
explanatory properties of repre­
sentations of the causal structure 
of the world, causalist, mecha­
nistic
Images of reality are viewed as 
essentially contingent on so­
cial/cultural factors. Organic 
types of explanatory power are 
sought in human actions as de­
rived from imageries and social 
perceptions
Ethos Strives to emancipate humans 
from nature
Strives to emancipate humans 
from social and political control
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The main problem with constructivism is that it (if taken to extremes) leads to abso­
lute relativism, where there is no reality at all. All extra-discursive phenomena are 
ruled out (Latour, 1994). Abandoning realism altogether is problematic as absolute 
relativism may lead to solipsism, i.e. the claim that all views of the world are equally 
valid (Rosa, 1998). Since everything is a social construction, extreme versions of 
constructivism cannot offer social criticism or direction for change (Jost, 1995). As­
sessments of multiple constructions of reality are not possible since there are no 
‘true’ versions of it. Yet substantiating the truth or falsity of knowledge may be an 
important way to undermine oppressive views (Jost, 1995). Knowledge is power and 
equilibrating all knowledge claims can produce disturbing consequences. For exam­
ple, the claim of equality of knowledge can reinforce existing power relations (Rosa, 
1998). If every knowledge claim about a risk is equally correct, then those individu­
als or institutions with more power need only respond to any objections that their 
claim is as correct as any other claim that can be made (Rosa, 1998).
Regarding both paradigms’ shortcomings, a strong adherence to either is unlikely to 
benefit the study of risk. Instead, as advocated by Adam, Beck and Van Loom 
(2000), it seems most fruitful to try to deconstruct these bipolar oppositions by align­
ing oneself neither with the realist-absolutist stance nor with the constructionist- 
relativist position, transgressing instead the borders between them.
1.4 Risk in the context of the paradigmatic debate
The different paradigms are reflected in the risk debate exemplified in the customary 
distinction between objective and subjective risk3. This distinction has equally been 
described as ‘quantitative’ versus ‘qualitative’ risk (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981), and 
as ‘real’ or ‘actual’ versus ‘perceived’ risk (Freudenburg, 1988; Shrader-Frechette, 
1990). Often the word ‘real’ is used to express norms and values. Real risks are the 
risks as defined by scientific experts and hence are the risks people ought to pay at­
tention to as opposed to ‘seeming’ risks perceived by the lay public (Shrader- 
Frechette, 1990). In the traditional positivist account, real risk is a matter of how
3 Although Thompson (1990) views the dichotomy as theoretically unsound, as there is no reason to 
believe that a risk estimate is objective or more 'real' because it is characterised probabilistically, for 
the purpose o f clarity, we will follow this common distinction.
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things stand in the world, while perceptions are reactions to the world, affecting real­
ity only indirectly in virtue of their influence on human action (Shrader-Frechette, 
1990).
Importantly, the conflicting paradigms incorporate different assumptions about the 
nature of scientific opinion in relation to the determination of levels of risk (Homig, 
1993). The objectivist view assumes that it is theoretically possible, if sufficient data 
could be collected and technical problems of analysis solved, to arrive at an absolute 
measure of the riskiness associated with any given technology (Homig, 1993). In 
contrast, the subjectivist perspective proposes that risk evaluation takes place in so­
cial contexts and involves value judgements, i.e. that risk assessment is a social proc­
ess (Homig, 1993). Thompson (1990) distinguishes between risk objectivism and 
risk subjectivism. Risk objectivism views risk as a function of relative frequency (as 
well as other variables), such as probability of risk per unit. Risk subjectivism views 
risk as a function of confidence, such as trust, faith, and safety. Consequently objec­
tive/real risk is thought to be the object of natural science enquiry, while subjec­
tive/perceived risk is regarded as the object of social science enquiry (Thompson, 
1990).
Accordingly, for both positivist and constructivist perspectives, there are a range of 
risk frameworks. To clarify the main arguments of the paradigmatic debate in rela­
tion to risk and to illustrate why scientific risk assessments may not accord with lay 
perceptions of the same risk, we pick out what might be termed extreme examples of 
both perspectives, before concluding that the concept of risk requires approaches 
which can bridge this gap by incorporating both subjective and objective risk dimen­
sions.
1.4.1 Positivist approaches to risk
Much of the empirical research on risk and uncertainty originates from the theory of 
decision making (e.g. Tversky and Kahnemann, 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Kah- 
nemann and Tversky, 2000). Consequently risk has an essentially objectivist research 
tradition assuming that risk can be measured with adequate scientific instruments.
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One of the original objectivist approaches is Starr’s (1969) revealed preferences ap­
proach which assumes that the existing distribution of risks from natural and human- 
made hazards reveals the nature of societal preferences according to the implicit cal­
culus of risks and benefits that led to such a distribution. Essentially, by trial and er­
ror, society is said to arrive at an optimum balance between the risks and benefits 
associated with any activity. Under this assumption, historical or current risk and 
benefit data is used to reveal patterns of acceptable risk-benefit trade-offs. The level 
of risk that has been tolerated in the past is used as a basis for evaluating the accept­
ability of present risks.
However, the assumption that historically accepted risks are acceptable risks is prob­
lematic. Past risks may have been at a given level not because society judged that 
level acceptable but because greater safety was not obtainable, or because there was 
inadequate knowledge about risks (Shrader-Frechette, 1985). Often data are not 
available to quantify all the adverse consequences that are imaginable and not all ad­
verse consequences can be visualised in advance. Thus Starr’s (1969) approach 
makes strong assumptions about the rationality of people’s decision making, e.g. as­
suming that people have full information and that they can use it optimally. But even 
if society had arrived at a correct decision, it does not follow that those choices ought 
to be taken as normative for the present or future as values and societal norms change 
(Shrader-Frechette, 1985). These concerns motivated the expressed preferences ap­
proach, which asks people directly about their perceptions of risks and benefits (e.g. 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1979).
Another economic perspective is cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Mishan, 1971; Pearce, 
1971) whereby the expected benefits of e.g. a proposed technology are simply 
weighted against its costs. In many risk areas, such as transport, cost-benefit analysis 
has been used successfully. Yet for technological risk evaluation, cost-benefit analy­
sis is inadequate because it relies solely on economic indicators. Because risk is a 
multi-dimensional concept, it cannot be validly represented by a single number. Es­
pecially, when assessing technological risks not all risks and benefits can be easily 
translated into monetary units (Shrader-Frechette, 1985). Using a concept developed 
for the optimisation of market behaviour to describe technological inventions is often
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viewed with unease as what is rational in the first context might not be rational in the 
second (Shrader-Frechette, 1991).
Although not strictly a risk evaluation approach, we also include the classical attitude 
model (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), as in the psychology literature there is obvious 
similarity between attitudes towards risk and risk evaluation. It seems that the rele­
vant issue is not risk per se, but attitudes towards the technology associated with the 
risk (Otway, 1992). Ultimately, it is the technology as a whole that is accepted, rather 
than its risks in isolation (Otway, 1992). Fishbein et al’s attitude model (1975) meas­
ures attitudes in terms of their underlying beliefs of outcomes (probability) and val­
ues (evaluations of outcomes). Attitude measurements from the model can be corre­
lated with an independent, global measure of the same attitude object, thereby ensur­
ing that the set of beliefs and values that people were asked to rate were salient to the 
particular attitude object in question. A serious limitation of much of the scaling 
done in risk evaluation is that it is difficult to know if the beliefs given people to rate 
are indeed salient and that the beliefs are the complete set (Otway, 1992).
1.4.2 Criticisms of positivist approaches to risk
Yet although conceptually clear these positivist approaches share a number of gen­
eral limitations, especially when applied to societal risks.
To begin with, by seeking to reduce risk to a pure scientific reality that can be calcu­
lated probabilistically, the positivist orientation is reductionist. Understanding risk as 
a neutral product of science, devoid of bias, ethics, or of social shaping implies that 
risk assessment is only about facts to the exclusion of values (Rosa, 1998). But this 
claim for value-neutrality has been challenged (Rosa, 1998). Objectivist approaches, 
Rosa argues follow the naturalistic fallacy, a reduction of ethics to science, by as­
suming that a scientific solution is at the same time an ethical solution (Rosa, 1998). 
Especially in relation to today’s high technologies which often pose questions of a 
moral and ethical nature this viewpoint is problematic.
Furthermore, quantifying risk by assigning numbers to it always involves some sub­
jective and intuitive value judgements. For example, the nuclear engineer’s probabil­
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istic risk estimate for a reactor accident is based on theoretical models, whose struc­
ture is subjective, and assumption-laden, and whose inputs are dependent upon 
judgement (Luhmann, 1993). Thus as with all other data, data for assessing risk do 
not exist independently of human observation but always have to be interpreted 
(Stalling, 1990). In that way, there is no purely ‘objective’ risk. Unfortunately, this 
subjective bias in science is not always recognised as assessors often forget their own 
methodological assumptions (O’Riordan, 2000). As a consequence, risk assessment 
results are often presented as objective. In turn, policy conclusions based on the as­
sessment are frequently more controversial and value-laden than is thought (Shrader- 
Frechette, 1985).
Moreover, probabilistic calculations fail from the social point of view. They ignore 
distributional questions such as who defines the risks and who benefits. Much of the 
conflict over acceptable risk arises because risks and benefits are distributed inequi­
tably over space, time, and social class (Luhmann, 1993). Even if one knows that a 
nuclear power station explodes only once every twelve million years, it can neverthe­
less happen tomorrow, and tomorrow it can once again happen tomorrow (Luhmann, 
1993). In contrast, in social calculations the calculus leaves all eventualities open for 
the individual case. Clearly, the assessment of the risk will differ on whether one 
feels that the accident could occur very soon or only at the end of the entire stretch 
(Luhmann, 1993).
Clarke (2005) argues that when it comes to actual disasters, such as Chernobyl, there 
are no ‘average events’ as there simply is no normal distribution of extreme events. 
In such instances, thinking in terms of probabilities makes little sense as it would 
lead to the conclusion that most risks are acceptable. Hence in these cases it is the 
possibly rather than the probability of occurrence that is problematic.
Despite these limitations, at present, positivism largely remains the basis upon which 
risk analysis is conducted (Rosa, 1998). However, there is an alternative perspective 
which suggests that rather than “measuring” risks objectively, one needs to focus on 
how society “constructs” risks.
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1.4.3 A constructivist approach to risk
As a stark contrast to the above approaches and to exemplify the constructivist per­
spective on risk we discuss Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural theory, 
whereby risk is regarded as a purely socially constructed phenomenon. In essence, 
cultural theory postulates that what societies choose to call risky is determined by 
social and cultural factors (such as beliefs about taboos) rather than the objective 
characteristics of risks.
Douglas et al offer a culturally determined perspective of how societies select and 
deal with risks. Here it is assumed that societies selectively choose a few risks for 
attention and ignore a vast array of others. Because people cannot attend to all poten­
tial risks, society must decide which risks to fear most, which risks are worthy of at­
tention and concern, which risks are acceptable, and which risks can be ignored. This 
cultural selection of risks is not linked to the physical and/or scientific reality of the 
risk. Rather, according to cultural theory, the selection of risk is a social process re­
flecting moral, economic, political, and power positions that are all value-laden and 
culturally constructed. Hence it is recognised that physical risks are embedded within 
and shaped by social relations and the continual negotiation of people’s social identi­
ties (Wynne, 1992b).
This constructivist viewpoint can highlight how and why in complex societies it is to 
be expected that there will be considerable disagreement between the members of 
various constituencies, as to what constitutes a technological risk, as well as about 
how such risks should be managed (Rayner, 1987).
By inquiring into the origins of risk-taking decisions, cultural patterns can be dis­
cerned which Douglas et al (1982) condense into four ideal types. This typology 
known as grid/group analysis has two axes. The horizontal axis moves from ‘indi­
vidualised’ to ‘collectivised’ and the vertical axis from ‘prescribed inequality’ to 
‘prescribing equality’. Within this grid, four ‘myths o f  human nature’ can be found: 
individualists, hierarchists, egalitarians, and fatalists. This typology is discussed in 
more detail in relation to nature in Chapter Seven.
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However, cultural theory has yet to be framed as a statistically testable hypothesis. 
There are no agreed units in which individuality or adherence to a collective ethos 
might be measured. Thus the theory remains interesting but essentially irrefutable 
(Adams, 1995).
1.4.4 Criticisms of constructivist approaches to risk
Apart from specific criticisms directed at cultural theory, the constructivist perspec­
tive on risk has a range of further limitations. Adopting a strongly constructivist per­
spective, Shrader-Frechette (1991) argues that there is no distinction between per­
ceived and actual risks, because there are no risks except perceived risks. Although 
conceptually straightforward, this perception is awkward as it is close to absolute 
relativism. Some risks are undeniably real, not merely our cultural judgement about 
them (Rosa, 1998). Rosa calls this the “argument from ignorance” fallacy- if we are 
ignorant of some danger there is little basis for claiming that the danger exists at all, 
i.e. “what you do not know cannot hurt you”, a rather perilous fallacy in light of 
many contemporary risks, such as environmental pollution or radiation.
As such, the social construction of risk viewpoint raises a difficult philosophical is­
sue. It can be interpreted to imply that people are incapable of perceiving what is 
really dangerous since there are no actual or objective risks in the world, as risk is 
only what people choose to say it is (Johnson and Covello, 1987). Taken to such an 
extreme, this perspective calls into question the logical foundations of societal risk 
management (Johnson et al, 1987). Viewing scientific truth as purely relative, i.e. 
context-dependent, may preclude a systematic cross-cultural consensus about the 
natural order that is independent of culture (Agassi, 1984).
All knowledge is socially constructed, but some knowledge accords better with the 
world, or is at least more reliable than other knowledge (Rosa, 1998). Drawing on 
Funtowicz and Ravetz’s (1985) framework which is discussed below in relation to 
risk and uncertainty, Rayner (1987) argues that a case can be made for better and 
worse social constructions of risk depending on the degree of scientific uncertainty in 
the risk estimates and on the importance of the issues to the interested parties. The 
further the issue is from scientific consensus and the greater the importance of the
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issue, the greater will be the significance of cultural variation and the more problem­
atic will be standards of objective reality. Appreciating that risk can comprise both 
objective and subjective dimensions today various frameworks aiming to bridge the 
gap between the two approaches have been developed.
1.4.5 Bridging the objective-subjective divide
The psychometric paradigm (e.g. Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs, 
1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1986; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 1992) was one 
of the first frameworks to investigate both objective and subjective risk perceptions. 
Slovic et al’s seminal studies clearly highlight the shortcomings of purely objectivist 
approaches to risk assessment by firmly establishing the importance of a range of 
subjective elements in risk perception.
To investigate risk perceptions, Slovic et al (1986) asked respondents to evaluate ac­
tivities and technologies according to a number of qualities such as newness, volun­
tariness, and dread. Their results show that lay people possess a rich, qualitative un­
derstanding of risk, which is reproducible over a range of selected populations. Two 
different comparisons of lay perceptions of risk and scientific estimates of risk are 
given. First, lay estimates of annual mortality are compared against scientific esti­
mates. Although estimations are not correct in absolute terms, lay people can provide 
a correct ordering of riskiness. In the second comparison, risk is not defined as an­
nual mortality, but left to each participant’s interpretation. Here, perceived risk does 
not scale as accurately with observed frequencies.
This shows that lay people, when asked in an open-ended way, naturally view risk as 
a multidimensional concept that consists not only of measurable, scientific aspects 
such as expected mortality but several other dimensions. In turn, this implies that 
rather than being irrational, lay people evaluate risk in ways not reflected (and not 
readily measurable) by traditional quantitative risk assessments. While expert judge­
ments are more closely related to annual fatality rates than are lay judgements, lay 
people are shown to incorporate other considerations besides annual fatalities into 
their risk assessment. For example when evaluating technological risk lay people 
take into account the voluntariness of the risk, its familiarity, its delayed effects, and
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its catastrophic potential. Therefore, rather than a probabilistic assessment, a multi­
variate description is required both for defining riskiness in a scientific sense and for 
understanding the structure of subjective judgements of hazards (Johnson et al, 
1993).
Regrettably, the methodology of psychometric studies has some limitations. Labora­
tory experiments and questionnaires assume a clear relationship between non- 
contextualised research results and the socially situated reality of participants. But 
risk estimates outside of the social context are insufficient for providing contextual 
information to the participant in the form of “cues” on which to base judgements 
(Lopes, 1983).
A further approach attempting to bridge the divide between objective and subjective 
perspectives on risk is the social amplification of risk framework (SARF; Kasperson, 
Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson, and Ratick, 1988; Bums, Slovic, 
Kasperson, Kasperson, Renn, and Emani, 1990; 1993). This framework integrates 
micro and macro perspectives to study how risk is mediated through society, and 
how it becomes amplified or attenuated depending on a range of variables. Amplifi­
cation is used as a metaphor describing the ways in which “social agents receive, 
interpret and pass on risk signals” (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon and Slovic, 
2003; p. 15). The framework links technical risk assessment with psychological, so­
ciological, and cultural perspectives of risk perception and risk behaviour, and ac­
knowledges how the interaction of these factors may amplify or attenuate public re­
sponses to risks. Hereby, risk is not only the experience of physical harm but a con­
sequence of interactive social and cultural processes by which groups and individuals 
interpret risk. In essence, this approach highlights the necessity of taking into ac­
count social values and practises when assessing the nature of risk.
However, so far, the authors do not offer a fully developed theory of the social am­
plification of risk, but rather a descriptive framework. The framework could provide 
a theoretical base but still requires the testing and application to actual risk problems.
Nevertheless, by recognising plural rationalities rather than characterising the public 
as irrational and by appreciating the importance of addressing the social context of
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beliefs, both the psychometric paradigm and the SARF were instrumental in helping 
to redefine risk from a purely objective reality to partly a social construction. In par­
ticular Slovic et al’s (1986) approach can be credited with firmly establishing the im­
portance of various other risk dimensions apart from the scientific risk per se, and 
hence showing why a purely positivist approach, based on objective risk assessments 
alone may be insufficient to account for lay concerns.
1.4.6 Value dimensions in risk perceptions
In addition to the non-scientific risk dimensions established through the psychomet­
ric paradigm, it is becoming increasingly clear that a number of value dimensions 
play a major part in people’s risk perceptions. Kortenkamp and Moore (2001) pro­
pose that differences in moral reasoning often account for divergences in risk percep­
tions between expert and lay people. As such, the dominant positivist risk assessment 
methods may fail to reflect, or even recognise, some of the most significant dimen­
sions of public concerns, i.e. those based on particular values.
Regarding risk perceptions of modem biotechnology, values have been shown to be 
correlated with perceived risk and acceptance of various biotechnological applica­
tions (Siegrist, 1999). Concerning the controversy over GM food it has been sug­
gested that value divergences were indeed a main factor underlying public resistance 
because “the technology embodied too many values that were at odds with society” 
(Bruce, 2005; p.21).
In particular, moral issues and value-based perceptions of what is natural versus un­
natural are increasingly recognised as important aspects in shaping public attitudes to 
biotechnology (Wagner, Kronberger, Gaskell et al, 2001). This is unsurprising, since 
biotechnological developments may bring about a fundamental shift of the traditional 
boundaries o f nature and culture due to their ability to change the DNA structure (i.e. 
essence) of all species (Gervais, 1997). Biotechnology puts the known cultural cate­
gories in question, giving new answers to old questions such as what is a human be­
ing, what is nature, and what is culture. By offering new ways of categorising the 
world, biotechnology questions society’s ideas about the boundaries between what is 
natural and unnatural (Wagner et al, 2001).
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Yet empirically, these issues have only recently begun to be studied. Sjoeberg’s 
(2000; 2002; 2003) studies were the first to identify the importance of the dimension 
‘tampering with nature ’ for technological risk perceptions. Rather than being based 
on scientific risk assessments, this dimension has a clear moral component concern­
ing humanity’s relationship with nature. Consequently, Sjoeberg and Winroth (1986) 
propose that lay people’s beliefs about nature and the perceived moral obligations of 
man towards nature may constitute an important facet of technological risk.
1.4.7 Concluding the risk debate
Thus particularly in relation to modem biotechnologies it seems imperative to move 
beyond traditional positivist risk assessments. Positivist approaches to risk likely are 
insufficient to adequately account for lay concerns because they neglect the moral 
and ethical risk dimensions. On the other hand, a strongly constructivist perspective 
may be problematic for risk management and risk communication as it would mean 
that all claims to a risk could be equally valid. Both of these extreme conditions can 
be criticised for being reductionistic because:
“The cultural relativists attempt to reduce risk to a sociological con­
struct, underestimating or dismissing its scientific components. The naive 
positivists attempt to reduce risk to a purely scientific reality, underesti­
mating or dismissing its ethical components. ”
(Shrader-Frechette, 1991; p.58)
Neither the objective, nor the subjective view when presented in their most extreme 
forms describes risk research well, and there are few researchers who embrace either 
as such (Short, 1989). Rather, most researchers treat risk as both a physical attribute 
and as a social construct (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Thus the objective/subjective 
typology is merely an ideal type constmcted for the purpose of identifying risk re­
search against a common analytical framework (Shrader-Frechette, 1991).
Today it is becoming increasingly apparent that the separation of objective and sub­
jective risk can no longer be maintained. A 1992 report by the Royal Society recog-
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nised that the view of a separation between objective and subjective risk is no longer 
a mainstream position. Rather, it is increasingly acknowledged that risk is, at least in 
part, culturally constructed and that both the adverse nature of events and their prob­
ability are subjective to an extent.
Hence in agreement with Hellstroem et al (2001), in the present research, the under­
standing of risk as an objective property of certain processes and situations and of 
risk as the socially constructed outcome of power relations and communications are 
both relevant.
1.5 Uncertainty, science and policy making
By grounding the debates over risk in the competing paradigms positivism and con­
structivism we have highlighted some of the challenges facing risk assessors and risk 
communicators when trying to define and evaluate risk. A particular source of diffi­
culty in risk evaluation, management and communication resides in the inherent un­
certainties of science. The evaluation of uncertainty poses a problem because it 
clearly goes beyond the quantifiable dimensions of a risk and consequently always 
requires a degree of interpretation.
The problems addressed by risk analysis often defer solution because they are out­
side current experience and knowledge (Otway, 1992). They have been discovered 
either as unexpected or unwanted side effects of an existing technology or as theo­
retically projected side effects of a new and untested technology (Otway, 1992). This 
means that in these situations the risks are both unknown and unknowable within the 
current scientific understanding.
Yet politics requires certainty from science for its authority, meaning that severe de­
mands are placed on the scientific community to make aspects of economic or politi­
cal actions that are uncertain less intimidating (Wynne, 1987). The paradox is that 
policy decisions about a risk are likely to be most urgent just where scientific knowl­
edge is the most uncertain (NRC, 1983). In this sense, policy makers often demand 
more definite risk assessments than scientific experts can confidently give.
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This is problematic because uncertainty in risk evaluation leads to uncertainty in pol­
icy and vice versa, meaning that value judgements need to be made at each step in 
the risk policy process, from assessment, over management, to communication 
(Lindblom, 1959). In real life, some uncertainty always remains, and it therefore re­
quires not calculation but judgement.
1.6 The “third way” of risk evaluation
Consequently, assessors and regulators are increasingly required to move beyond the 
quantifiable aspects of a risk. This implies that science, in addition to the usual scien­
tific evidence, may also need to appraise the values that lead scientists towards cer­
tain questions and answers in order to account for the interpretation of uncertainty. 
As uncertainty cannot be readily “measured”, several approaches have been devel­
oped aiming to enrich science to be able to efficiently account for this uncertainty.
1.6.1 The tripartite division of risk
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992) argue that traditional positivist science is unprepared 
for uncertainty and values and consequently is insufficient to evaluate many societal 
risks today. Appreciating that in some cases no amount of resources can provide sci­
entific answers, Funtowicz et al suggest a move towards post-normal science.
Funtowicz et al (1990) divide scientific uncertainty into three categories: a) Inexact­
ness, i.e. significant errors referring to the spread of data, b) Unreliability, i.e. refer­
ring to confidence levels in estimation, and c) Border with ignorance, i.e. denoting 
uncertainty about model completeness and covering emissions due to lack of knowl­
edge. These categories respond to the three sources of uncertainty: a) Data uncer­
tainty, b) Modelling uncertainty, and c) Completeness uncertainty due to lack of 
knowledge4.
4 For a similar, albeit four-dimensional division of uncertainty, please see Rowe (1994). Also, it can 
be argued that when discussing their "four problems o f risk" Douglas et al (1982; p.5) already hint at 
a similar division.
42
On this basis Funtowicz et al (1990; 1992; 1993; 1996) developed the tripartite divi­
sion of risk. As shown in figure 1.1 this approach offers a diagram with the axes sys­
tems uncertainty and decision stakes to use as a heuristic rather than a metric tool.
Figure 1.1 Problem-solving strategies (from Funtowicz and Ravetz; 1996; p. 175)
High
Post-Normal
Science
Decision
Stakes
Professional
Consultancy
Applied
Science
Low
Low HighSystems Uncertainties
Accepting qualitative distinctions, applied science deals with problems low in both 
dimensions, professional consultancy is involved when either is significant. But in 
some cases, either or both dimensions are on the extreme position, so that the tradi­
tional methods are inadequate. This “wild” area lying beyond professional practice is 
termed post-normal science. Problem situations involving post-normal science are 
ones where, typically, facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and deci­
sions urgent. Because applied science and professional consultancy are inadequate, 
something extra must be added onto their practice, which bridges the gap between 
scientific expertise and a concerned public. Thus post-normal science comprises a 
dialogue among all the stakeholders in a controversy. “Normal” science is still cen­
tral, but there must be an extended peer community using extended facts such as an­
ecdotal evidence and lay views. In short, it is a democratisation of science, in the 
sense of bringing science in the public arena.
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Essentially, Funtowicz et al (1990) argue that in many contemporary risk problems, 
the stakes are so high and the uncertainties so great that a new kind of science is 
needed to provide credible and useful answers. This new science must depend on ex­
tended peer communities and extended facts to be able to efficiently address the pol­
icy decisions that lie ahead for risk management.
As a criticism, it can be questioned whether this new sort of practice is still science. 
However, Funtowicz et al (1992) argue that science has continually evolved and will 
evolve further responding to the changing needs of humanity. In their view, the tradi­
tional problem-solving strategies of science, the philosophical reflections on them, 
and the institutional, social, and educational contexts need to be enriched to solve the 
problems created by our science-based society. Although as a post-normal science, 
risk assessment is vulnerable to attacks of subjectivity and arbitrariness, the emphasis 
is on enriching normal science with post-normal science, thus “getting the best of 
both worlds”.
1.6.2 The risk management escalator
Klinke and Renn’s (2002) risk management escalator is a similar, albeit pragmati­
cally more developed approach of a three-step risk assessment specifically address­
ing the challenges of complexity (i.e. the problem of identifying and quantifying 
causal relations), uncertainty and ambiguity in risk management. Interestingly, here 
there is a distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity. Uncertainty refers to a 
situation where factual statements are unclear, comprising different components such 
as statistical variations, measurement errors, ignorance and indeterminacy (WBGU, 
2000). Ambiguity refers to a situation whereby views about the desirability and se­
verity of a given risk are contested, as Klinke et al suggest that most scientific dis­
putes in risk analysis and management are not about differences in methodologies 
and measurements. Rather, the issue is what all of this means for human health and 
the environment (Klinke et al, 2002).
The challenge is now how to effectively include ambiguity into the risk assessment. 
While uncertainty (except indeterminacy and ignorance) can be resolved through 
cognitive advances, ambiguity can be resolved only through discourse, such as legal
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deliberations and public participations (Klinke et al, 2002). Hence risk management 
decisions in this realm must be based on technical assessments combined with social 
evaluations. Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the different resolutions for varying 
risk conflicts when one moves from simple, to complex, uncertain, and ultimately, 
ambiguous risks.
Figure 1.2 The risk management escalator- from simple via complex and uncertain to ambiguous 
phenomena (from Klinke and Renn, 2002; p. 1090).
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Clearly, ambiguous phenomena may result in conflicts of a cognitive, evaluative as 
well as normative nature. The case of agricultural GM often perceived as risky by lay 
people because of social and moral reasons (Hampel and Renn, 2000) offers an obvi­
ous example. Hereby, people disagree for example about the social need for GM 
food, and the moral implications of the technology- concerns which cannot be ad­
dressed by scientific risk assessments alone. Rather, they require some form of par­
ticipatory discourse for conflict resolution because:
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“The risk issues in this debate focus on differences o f  visions about the 
future, basic values and convictions, and the degree o f  confidence in hu­
man ability to control and direct its own technological destiny. These 
wider concerns require the inclusion o f thqse who express or represent 
them ”
(Klinke etal, 2002; p. 1087)
In brief, both Funtowicz et al (1992) and Klinke et al (2002) agree that there are 
some risks, namely those incorporating a high degree of uncertainty/ambiguity, 
which can only be effectively assessed and managed through increased public par­
ticipation and a democratisation of science because the problem of interpreting and 
addressing uncertainty cannot be solved by scientific risk measurements alone.
Both approaches comprise objective as well as subjective risk dimensions, ensuring 
that issues apart from the scientific facts per se are incorporated in a risk assessment. 
This may help to find a balance between the necessary reliance on experts and the 
democratic desire to incorporate public values and preferences. Habermas (1971) ar­
gues that expertise is unduly dominant. To keep expertise in its appropriate place, 
strong, reflexive interactions between lay and expert cultures are required (Haber­
mas, 1971). The above approaches recognise the need for increased public participa­
tion and point to the inevitability of a shift in risk communication. Although still in 
its infancy stage, this ‘third way’ of risk assessment and management looks promis­
ing as it may provide a more complete risk evaluation by allowing both expert and 
lay perspectives to be included. The fact that the gap between expert and lay percep­
tions of risk is widening (Porritt, 2000) despite risk communication efforts indicates 
that new approaches are urgently needed.
1.7 Conclusions Chapter One
In conclusion, despite controversies surrounding the meaning of risk and the ways in 
which it should be evaluated, there is a near consensus over several key issues. Post- 
modernity has brought society risks, which cannot be easily quantified via traditional 
‘objective’ measures of science alone. While the standard model of scientific investi­
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gation remains a necessary form of risk analysis, in many cases it is no longer suffi­
cient.
Thus there is a need to devise better, more inclusive procedures for the democratic 
management of risk in society (Rosa, 1998), which anticipate the, sometimes con­
flicting, interplay of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ issues. As society can be expected 
for some time to struggle with the evaluation and management of technological risk, 
it is essential to find better ways of incorporating the views of lay citizens into the 
decision making process (Hohenemser et al, 1982).
Most scholars agree that this can only be achieved through a paradigm shift incorpo­
rating augmented public participation. Traditional positivist science, embedded as it 
is in its cultural context, can still pursue objectivity as an ideal (Krimsky, 1992), but 
needs to be enriched through a form of post-normal science, that allows for the in­
corporation of uncertainty and values. This need reinforces the importance of con­
tinuing to define the risk field as inherently interdisciplinary because:
“Risk is a topic involving scientific investigation where the philosophical 
dictum o f separating the technical from the moral, and the categorical 
from the normative is relentlessly blurred”
(Rosa, 1998; p. 16)
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2 COMMUNICATING TECHNOLOGICAL RISK
Having introduced the debates over the problems of defining and evaluating societal 
risk, the present chapter examines risk communication more specifically. We put risk 
communication in the wider societal context by providing a background to its emer­
gence in modem society, concluding that there is a need for the experts and a desire 
by the public for improving risk dialogues. However, it is argued that because risk 
communication efforts have traditionally been based on the mathematical theory of 
communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), they previously largely consisted of a 
unidirectional flow of risk information from expert to lay people rather than two-way 
communications between both groups.
A brief historical background is followed by an examination of what defines risk 
communication today, and what are its goals and rules. Although there has been a 
move towards more participative two-way dialogue, risk communication is still 
fraught with difficulties. On the one hand, there are technical challenges related to 
the content and evaluation of a communication. On the other hand, problems are 
connected to the wider societal context of a communication, such as trust, credibility 
and the role of the media. Lastly, it is argued that risk communication may be espe­
cially challenging in relation to food, as food risk may be characterised by dimen­
sions not shared by other hazards, such as its particular social and moral significance.
2.1 Risk communication in the context of the risk debates
Risk communication has to be seen in the wider context of risk debates. In the previ­
ous chapter we established that there is a particular concern with risk in late modem 
society and that societal risk assessment and management are often contentious, 
characterized by polarised views, and pervasive controversies. Hence it is unsurpris­
ing that risk communication today is a developing industry. Reflecting the conflict 
between positivist and constructivist paradigms, the emergence of risk communica­
tion as a research theme is closely linked to various issues that symbolise the discord 
between scientific and lay risk perceptions.
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Problems in communicating risks often originate in the marked differences that exist 
between the two languages used to describe risk: the scientific, statistical language of 
experts and the intuitively-grounded language of the lay public (Powell, 1998). The 
differences between these two languages constitute barriers to dialogue and co­
operative understanding which need to be broken down to facilitate more productive 
exchanges between the two spheres (Powell and Leiss, 1997). While on the one hand 
scientists and industrialists criticise the public for behaviours they judge to be irra­
tional, on the other hand the public feels similarly antagonistic toward industry and 
government (Slovic, 1993).
Consequently risk communication is often framed as an activity intended to close the 
gap between expert and lay perceptions (e.g. Powell et al, 1997; Sandman, 1985). To 
close this gap, there are two competing options. The traditional approach attempts to 
bring the public’s perception in line with that of the experts (Wilson, 1979), while 
the opposing view argues for making the experts into better listeners (Homig, 1990). 
One side proposes a technical, positivist, realist or modernist understanding of truth 
and knowledge, while the other suggests a constructivist, relativist or post-modern 
alternative. In this way, issues surrounding risk and its communication are sympto­
matic of larger culture wars (Thompson, 1999).
In many cases, this gap cannot be closed because scientific and public apprehensions 
of a risk are framed by fundamentally different values (Powell et al, 1997). This is 
problematic as in all risk situations where some public response is called for, what 
occurs in this gap can have significant consequences, such as the emergence of a 
‘risk information vacuum’ (Powell et al, 1997). A risk information vacuum arises 
through the failure to implement good risk communication practises. Since society 
abhors a vacuum, it is therefore filled from other sources, such as the views of certain 
interest groups (Powell et al, 1997).
Clearly, the discrepancy between scientific expertise and lay perceptions and de­
mands is challenging, leading to questions of how to incorporate both groups’ needs 
to best communicate about risk. Although it was traditionally assumed that public 
perception must be brought into conformity with scientific rationality, as a result of 
the developments in risk perception research outlined in the previous chapter, it is
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becoming recognized that deviance may not be the appropriate metaphor for under­
standing differences between “technosphere” and “demosphere” (Plough and Krim- 
sky, 1987). Rather, only with a better understanding of the different rationalities of 
lay and expert people can risk communication be transformed to a communication 
built on mutual understanding and learning (Plough et al, 1987). This may lead not 
only to an improved public understanding of (and engagement with) science but 
equally to scientists better understanding public perceptions. Because of the diver­
gences in expert and lay perceptions, and the heightened sense of risk that many peo­
ple experience, it appears that the public is increasingly keen to have their voices 
heard on issues related to science and technology, and in a democratic society it 
might be argued that government ought to listen.
2.2 Democracy or why communicate about risk
“Citizens o f  a democracy expect to participate in debate about contro­
versial political issues and about the institutional mechanisms to which 
they sometimes delegate decision-making power. A problem formulation 
that appears to substitute technical analysis for political debate, or to 
disenfranchise people who lack technical training, or to treat technical 
analysis as more important to decision-making than the clash o f  values 
and interests is bound to elicit resentment from a democratic citizenry. 
Because o f such reactions to them, problem formulations that attribute 
technological conflict to widespread public ignorance only exacerbate 
the conflict”
(NRC, 1989, p.20)
A central premise of a democratic government- the existence of an informed elector­
ate- implies a free flow of information. Suppression of relevant information is not 
only wrong, but also, in the longer term, usually ineffective (NRC, 1989). Hence 
Powell (1998) suggests that the growth of interest in risk communication is driven by 
four motivations. First, it is driven by a requirement for, or desire by, government to 
inform the public in the participatory democracies of politics, second, by desires to 
overcome opposition to decisions, third, by a desire to share power between govern­
ment and public groups, and fourth, by a desire to develop effective alternatives to 
direct regulatory control (Powell, 1998). Underlying these motivations is the recogni-
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tion that decision-making in democratic societies is becoming more public and inclu­
sive and increasingly driven by non-experts.
Public concerns need to be taken seriously, because in a democratic society, at least 
in theory, the mandate for science to operate comes from the public, through tax­
payer funded research, consumer purchases and political support (Powell, 1996). 
More pragmatically, the public can stop operations that are perceived to pose a threat 
to health and safety. In the case of GM foods, public opposition significantly slowed 
and in many instances hindered the market introduction of the technology. The fact 
that decisions formerly exercised solely by scientists and politicians are now often 
subject to extensive public debate, indicates that public opinion in defining policy for 
technological issues is taken increasingly seriously.
Because of the nature of decisions over technological risk, its discussion inevitably 
leads to the issue of power relations in society. Thus the issue of power, specifically, 
of knowledge merging with power, is central to the risk debate (Ravetz, 1990). Who­
ever has the power to select the technologies that will be developed and deployed is 
also implicitly shaping the future of society (Ravetz, 1990). Likewise, those who 
control the discourse on risk will most likely also control societal power distributions 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944).
Recent catastrophic events (such as BSE) have graphically demonstrated the fallibil­
ity of experts and undermined confidence in the UK government, that uncritically 
used expert advise while often neglecting public concerns. Thus much of the opposi­
tion to technological developments can be interpreted as public demands for more 
democratic control of technology (Otway, 1992). Technical issues “often serve as 
surrogates for even more contentious questions ofpolitical and social control” (Hil- 
gartner and Nelkin, 1987; p.45). Similarly, Wynne (1982) stresses the importance of 
acknowledging the social relations of technology. Thus risk communication needs to 
be contextualised, incorporating the broader issues of how authority is generated and 
maintained, and how conflicts about risks should best be interpreted.
Evidently, expert assessments of risk are essential to the making of informed choices 
in everyday life. To ignore the results of scientific risk assessments (ever-changing as
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they are) is to merely substitute an informal deliberative process for a formal one 
(Granger Morgan et al, 2002). But because citizens in a democracy increasingly want 
to have their say in decisions about societal risk management, Powell et al (1997) 
suggest that the public’s informed consent must form the basis for the collective allo­
cation of resources for risk control and reduction. Unfortunately, past risk communi­
cation efforts often failed to empower the public in risk debates, neglecting their per­
spective, focusing instead primarily on information transmission from expert to lay 
people.
2.3 A background to risk communication
One of the reasons for the prevalent top-down approach can be found when looking 
at the background to communication. Research on communication gained promi­
nence in the 1920’s. Since Laswell’s (1927) research on propaganda the audience has 
predominantly been seen as a passive target, blindly responding to stimuli. The me­
dia were thought to act like a ‘hypodermic needle’, showing their direct, undifferen­
tiated impact on atomised individuals. With his formula “Who says what in which 
channel to whom with what effect?” Laswell provided a lasting conceptual frame­
work for communications research (Mattelart et al, 1998). However, it is the mathe­
matical theory of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) which, as the original 
linear communication model, underlies much contemporary risk communication. 
With this model, the social sciences adopted the assumption of the neutrality of the 
transmitting and receiving instances (Mattelhart et al, 1998).
2.3.1 The mathematical theory of communication
Shannon et al (1949) symbolically represented the communication system in five 
parts, as reproduced in figure 2.1. An information source produces a message or se­
quence of messages to be communicated to the receiving terminal. The information 
source selects a desired message out of a set of possible messages. A transmitter op­
erates in the message in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over 
the channel. The channel is the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter 
to receiver. The transmitter changes this message into the signal, which is sent over
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the communication channel from the transmitter to the receiver. The receiver is a sort 
of inverse transmitter, changing the transmitted signal back into a message, and 
handing this message on to the destination. The receiver performs the inverse opera­
tion of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the signal. The 
destination is the person/thing for whom the message is intended. Thus the function 
of the transmitter is to encode, and that of the receiver to decode, the message. In the 
process of being transmitted, certain unintended things are added to the signal, which 
are called noise.
Figure 2.1 The communication system according to Shannon and Weaver (from Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949; p.6)
Information
Source Transmitter Receiver Destination
Received
SignalSignal
Message Message
Noise Source
The word information here must not be confused with meaning. Two messages, one 
which is loaded with meaning, and the other which is pure nonsense, can be exactly 
equivalent as regards information (Shannon et al, 1949). Perhaps the mathematical 
theory of communication should rather be called a ‘theory of information’. The ne­
glect of any form of meaning is a serious limitation, since most significant messages 
do have meaning. Thus the theory also fails to account for how messages are under­
stood by the receiver or the intention behind their transmission. Further, it neglects 
the context in which the communication occurs. Hence unsurprisingly, risk commu­
nication efforts based primary on the mathematical theory generally proved ineffec­
tive.
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2.3.2 The move towards two-way communication
Today, it seems that there has been a move away from such top-down models of 
communication which neglect the social context and tend to rely on one-way me­
chanical causality. For instance, abandoning the linear model, systems theory (e.g. 
Laswell, 1963; Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1964) aimed to understand the totality and 
interaction between elements rather than linear causal sequences, and to grasp the 
complexity of systems as dynamic wholes made up of many changing relationships. 
Similarly, Mattelhart et al (1998) argue that the notion of isolated communication as 
a deliberate, conscious act has been replaced by the idea of communication as an on­
going social process, whereby the role played by the receiver is just as important as 
that of the transmitter. This finally acknowledges the relational and interactive proc­
esses of communication.
Hence it is appreciated that entering into communication with someone creates the 
expectation of a social relationship, and it is this expectation that allows information 
to become communication (Otway and Wynne, 1989). In like manner, entering into 
communication with the public about the risks to which they are exposed may lead 
them to assume that they will play a more significant role in shaping the decisions 
about these risks (Otway et al, 1989). Thus it is insufficient to interpret risk commu­
nication requirements solely as a matter of providing credible information that the 
public will believe and passively accept. As the mathematical theory of communica­
tion shows there is a difference between providing information and communicating. 
Genuine communication involves sustained relationships in which mutual trust and 
respect are nurtured (Otway et al, 1989). In this sense, risk communication is not an 
end in itself- but rather only an important means to facilitate the continual develop­
ment of relationships.
2.4 Communicating the risks of new technologies
To lessen societal conflicts about new technologies there is an evident need for im­
proved risk communication efforts. As discussed in the previous chapter despite a 
considerable effort, many people in industrialised nations see themselves as increas­
ingly vulnerable to technological risks and believe the worst is still to come. Gov-
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eminent regulators are caught between a fearful and dissatisfied public on the one 
side, and frustrated industrialists and technologists on the other (Slovic, 1992). An 
urgent need to communicate is generally perceived by all but it is still unclear how 
exactly to proceed. Hence what characterises technological risk communication, and 
what its goals, rules and potential problems are first needs to be clarified.
2.4.1 Definitions of risk communication
How risk communication is defined, what it should contain and how it is structured 
depends on what its goals are and what the audience is supposed to do with it. Over­
all, in accordance with the findings of the risk perception literature, definitions of 
risk communication have evolved from being quantitatively driven and scientifically 
orientated to integrating qualitative factors and lay perspectives.
Risk communication is a subset of the overall field of risk analysis. The NRC (1989) 
distinguishes between three stages of risk analysis: risk assessment (the scientific as­
sessment of the risk), risk management (the incorporation of non-scientific factors to 
reach a policy decision) and risk communication (traditionally the communication of 
a policy decision and related advice to the public). Although these are often treated 
as distinct areas in the literature, figure 2.2 indicates that these fields are in many 
ways closely related.
Figure 2.2 The interacting fields o f risk analysis
How risk is perceived influences how 
it will be managed, e.g. in relation to 
uncertainty. In turn, how risk is man­
aged may influence how it is per­
ceived, e.g. in relation to trust
Risk
management
Risk assessment 
(or perception)
From a constructivist perspec­
tive, risk perception and risk 
communication are not separate. 
It is a chicken and egg situation- 
what comes first the risk or the 
communication?
- V:
V co
5 -----
Risk
mmunicati
Risk communication and 
risk management often 
cannot be separated as 
managing a risk today in 
many ways implies com­
municating about it.
55
Emphasising the importance of connecting these three fields, Glickman and Gough
(1990) propose that good risk communication practice is of equal importance to the 
other key elements in the overall risk analysis process as it has become clear that 
without good communication, risk assessment and risk management may be mostly 
in vain. Nevertheless, we focus predominately on risk perception and risk communi­
cation, as an in-depth investigation of the often technical risk management aspects is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis.
Risk communication has previously been narrowly characterised as an intentional 
information transfer designed to respond to public concerns about risk. Hereby, in­
formation is channelled from experts to the general audience. Conventional defini­
tions of risk communication center on the intentionality of the source of information 
and the quality of information. For example, risk communication has been defined as
“Any purposeful exchange o f  scientific information between interested
parties regarding health or environmental risks. ”
(Covello, von Winterfeld, and Slovic, 1986; p. 172)
This definition has five components: Intentionality, content, audience directed, 
source, and flow. But limiting risk communication to scientific information raises 
questions: Are claims of lay people in news reports about environmental hazards ex­
cluded? What relevance has the term interested parties? For instance, while the pub­
lic may not react to government warnings about the risks of smoking, few would dis­
qualify these messages as risk communication (Plough et al, 1987).
Today, the definition of risk communication has widened to incorporate a two-way 
dialogue between experts and the public (e.g. Krimsky and Plough, 1988; Kasperson 
and Stallen, 1991), whereby experts recognise the validity of citizens’ view. Risk 
communication is increasingly viewed as a reciprocal process of interactive ex­
change of information, providing the content of risk messages as well as balance in 
views and accuracy of the message (Glickman et al, 1990). In essence, risk commu­
nication can refer to any public or private communication that informs individuals 
about the existence, nature, form, severity, or acceptability of risks. For the present 
thesis, we adopt the NRC’s (1989) definition of risk communication as
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“An interactive process o f  exchange o f information and opinion among 
individuals, groups and institutions. It involves multiple messages about 
the nature o f  risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express 
concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages or to legal and institu­
tional arrangements for risk management. ”
(NRC, 1989; p.21)
This definition emphasises reciprocal communication, and includes what Plough et al 
(1987) term the symbolic element of risk communication, i.e. the recognition that 
communication is not necessarily only about risk but could also be about responsibil­
ity and accountability for certain events. The following section explains in more de­
tail the possible aims of a risk communication.
2.4.2 The goals of risk communication
At the most basic level, risk communication is hoped to balance out or at least reduce 
the differences between expert and lay perceptions. This overall aim can be broken 
down into a range of objectives concerned with the goals, and the processes by which 
to achieve those.
Zimmerman (1987) argues that effective risk communication is hampered by uncer­
tainties with regard to both goals and processes. A goal-oriented framework focuses 
on end-results, i.e. what should the communication achieve. In contrast, a process 
framework focuses on how to structure the risk message and communicate the risk. 
Renn et al’s (1991) approach outlined in table 2.1 addresses both perspectives.
Table 2.1 Objectives for a risk communication (adapted from Renn and Levine, 1991; p. 178).
1. Enlightenment function (to improve risk understanding among target groups)
2. Right-to-know function (to disclose information about hazards to potential victims)
3. Attitude change function (to legitimate risk-related decisions, to improve the acceptance o f a spe­
cific risk source, or to challenge such decisions and reject specific risk sources)
4. Legitimation function (to explain and justify risk management routines and to enhance the trust in 
the competence and fairness of the management process)
5. Risk reduction function (to enhance public protection through information)
6. Behavioural change function (to encourage protective behaviour or supportive actions toward the 
communicating agency)
7. Emergency preparedness function (to provide guidelines for emergencies)
8. Public involvement function (to educate decision-makers about public concerns and perceptions)
9. Participation function (to assist in reconciling conflicts about risk-related controversies)________
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This extensive list demonstrates the variety of goals that can be associated with risk 
communication programs. Overall, avoiding all conflict is not a realistic goal for risk 
communication- rather the more moderate goal should be to have fewer and better 
conflicts (Fischhoff, 1995). Also, although increasing trust and credibility certainly is 
not the sole objective of risk communication, many objectives, such as behavioural 
changes or fair participation, rely on a minimum of trust among the communicators 
in order to be effective (Renn et al, 1991).
There is no general agreement in society about when the objective of risk communi­
cation should be to inform so people can make their own independent decisions, and 
when it should be to manipulate, so as to induce behaviour desired by the communi­
cator. There is wide, if not universal, agreement that attempts to manipulate behav­
iour are appropriate when people are faced by large, immediate dangers, such as a 
volcanic eruption (Granger Morgan and Lave, 1990). But there is much less social 
agreement about the legitimacy of trying to change behaviour in the face of less im­
mediate risks (Granger Morgan et al, 1990). Evidently, risk communication has dif­
ferent goals in different contexts. Problems may arise because what is ethical in one 
context may be unethical in another.
2.4.3 Ethical issues of communicating risk
Because risk communication carries the potential for both good and harm (Kasperson 
and Stallen, 1991) the ethical status of risk communication is contentious. Whether 
risk communication is ethical depends on what it aims to achieve in a particular 
situation and how these aims are to be achieved. Pessimistically, Jasanoff (1987) ar­
gues that risk communication is often a code for brainwashing by experts or industry 
trying to persuade the public that the risk of a technology is small and should be ig­
nored. In contrast, Sparks and Shepherd (1994) propose that rather than manipulating 
public opinion, the goals of risk communication are policy decisions and public dis­
cussions based on the best information available. In essence, it is a vital activity if lay 
people are to make informed decisions regarding risks (Granger Morgan et al, 1990).
Clearly, risk communication efforts need to be seen as committed to the public 
(rather than say, industry) interest in order to establish and maintain public trust.
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Still, ethical problems can arise when there is a mismatch between the objectives of 
the communicator and recipient of a message. Also, covert motivations are more 
likely to present ethical problems than overt ones, because recipients may not know 
how to decode the message (Granger Morgan et al, 1990). Selfish motivations are 
problematic because recipients have to disentangle what is good for them from what 
is good for the communicator (Granger Morgan et al, 1990). Yet successful ethical 
risk communication is not just a matter of good intentions and a thoughtful analysis 
of motivations. Risk messages must be understood by recipients and their impacts 
and effectiveness must be understood by communicators.
2.4.4 Evaluating risk communications
In order to assess the impact of its efforts, any risk communication needs to be 
evaluated. How to evaluate the success of a risk communication depends largely on 
its goals. If the goal is behavioural change, the most demanding criterion of evalua­
tion is whether the recipients do what the communication recommends, what Shan­
non et al (1949) termed the effectiveness problem. However, this would require re­
cipients not only to understand the message but also to see it as relevant to their per­
sonal circumstances. Clearly, when evaluating the success of communications, it is 
important to be realistic about the path from understanding to action (Granger Mor­
gan et al, 2002). This path is notoriously difficult as a change in attitude does not 
automatically lead to a change in behaviour but may be mediated, for instance by so­
cial normative beliefs (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).
In the past, the success of a communication has often been measured by the degree to 
which the public’s attitudes reflect technical rationality, attributing a lack of conver­
gence to a failure of risk communication (Plough et al, 1987). But this proved to be 
an unrealistic expectation. Risk communication cannot be expected to always reduce 
conflict and smooth risk management. It may not result in a consensus over contro­
versial issues, which are often clashes of values and competing interests (NRC, 
1989). Instead, communication is in the first place only an operation bringing a dif­
fuse world into focus on a statement, which in the further course of communication 
can encounter a positive or negative response, i.e. acceptance or rejection (Luhmann,
1993). The more people know about a technology, the more they will like or dislike
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it (Maharik and Fischhoff, 1993). Hence risk communication can be considered suc­
cessful only to the extent that it, first, increases the base of accurate information that 
decision-makers use, and second, satisfies those involved that they are adequately 
informed with the limits of available knowledge (NRC, 1989). To achieve these 
aims, there are several established rules of risk communication.
2.4.5 The rules of risk communication
For the most part, the literature on risk communication is rather descriptive, domi­
nated by approaches instructing “how to do risk communication” providing guide­
lines for communicating about risk (e.g. Covello and Allen, 1988; Covello, 
Fischhoff, Kasperson, and Morgan, 1993; Powell et al, 1997).
Most approaches stress the importance of honesty, public inclusion, of admitting un­
certainty as well as of placing risk communication into context. Risk messages 
should avoid risk comparisons which trivialise the concern and ensure completeness, 
including the nature of the risk, the nature of the benefits that might be affected if the 
risk were reduced, the available alternatives, and management issues (NRC, 1989). A 
communication must be clear, interesting, and useful to lay readers, as well as bal­
anced, correct, and understandable to technical experts (NRC, 1989). The key to ef­
fective message development is the recognition that individuals respond to risk mes­
sages based on their previous knowledge and experience (Needleman, 1987).
In order to make messages understandable communicators need to present informa­
tion in a familiar way, as unfamiliar language such as technical terminology, can be 
difficult to understand. Commonly, wording problems arise with issues involving 
scientific controversy or uncertainty5. When the scientific community is divided, the 
different views may need to be explained (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). Further­
more, the wider societal climate (e.g. of trust) has to be understood. Also, it is impor­
tant to capture and focus the public’s attention, and to stimulate interest as interested
5 Thompson (1999) proposes that when people believe that there is no risk associated with e.g. food 
consumption, they do not believe that there is zero probability of harm. What they believe is that un­
der normal circumstances there is no reason to be particularly mindful of vague possibilities that lurk 
in the background. While experts talk about risk in the sense o f probability as degree of harm, the 
public is talking about risk in the sense of problems that deserve further consideration and monitoring.
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people take up information more readily (Covello et al, 1988). Since the mass media 
has a powerful role in constructing lay people’s understandings of and attitudes about 
risk, media interactions are vital (Covello et al, f988).
Thompson (1999) criticises these procedural approaches, arguing that the more these 
techniques are deployed as a way of limiting the distorting effects of information re­
liability, the more people tend to think of them as ethically questionable. Stressing 
the differences in expert and lay discourse Thompson recommends four rules for 
ethical risk communicators. First, never say ‘risk’ when you mean ‘probability’. Sec­
ond, never say ‘there is no zero risk’ because although there are no circumstances in 
which the future holds zero probability of harm it does not follow that everything 
involves risk. Third, empower when possible. And fourth, recognise that everyone is 
responsible for public trust (Thompson, 1999).
Jasanoff (1987) condemns the term ‘risk communication’ as dangerously misleading 
because it suggests that communication by experts is the key to trust. The weakness 
of the top-down approach is exactly its tendency to view things from the perspective 
of the scientific community rather than the audience, as well as its concentration on 
technological benefits rather than risks (Durant, 1995). Desvousges and Smith (1988; 
p.480) agree:
“Too often, risk communicators are more concerned with educating the 
public, rather than first listening to them and then developing communi­
cation policies. ”
2.5 From risk communication to risk democratisation
Our brief review of general communication theories shows how these have moved 
away from one-way to two-way communication. Evidently theories of communica­
tion have conceptually advanced during the past decades, and it can be argued that 
risk communication has followed this pattern. Looking at the historical developments 
in risk communication indicates a move towards more participative communications, 
and a possible democratisation of risk issues.
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In the past, risk communication has commonly been thought of as consisting only of 
one-way messages from experts to non-experts. The assumption was in line with the 
information deficit model: if the public better understood the technology and the sci­
ence of risk calculations, they would be more accepting of the risk/technology in 
question. But as societal conflicts about risk have shown, this focus on one-way mes­
sages proved too limiting. Hence today, risk communication is becoming a more in­
teractive process of exchange of information and opinion among various stake­
holders. While in the “old” risk communication experts simply tried to persuade lay 
people of the validity of their risk assessments, the “new” risk communication mod­
els, such as Funtowicz et al’s (1990; 1992) and Klinke et al’s (2002) approaches, 
emphasise active dialogue and public participation.
The developments in risk communication practise show the usefulness of grounding 
the discussion in the theoretical debates about risk as the appreciation of divergent 
risk perceptions was a necessary basis for improved risk communication efforts. 
Changes in the risk communication paradigm went hand in hand with the recognition 
that ‘subjective’ lay perceptions are not necessarily ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. Look­
ing at the "Historical stages in risk perception ” in table 2.2 shows how the risk 
communication framework has advanced until the current 7th stage.
Table 2.2 Historical stages in risk communication (from Fischhoff, 1995; p. 140)
1. All we have to do is get the numbers right.
2. All we have to do is to tell them the numbers.
3. All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers.
4. All we have to do is show them that they have accepted similar risks in the past.
5. All we have to do is show them that it is a good deal for them.
6. All we have to do is treat them nicely. Non-verbal cues are also important when communicating.
7. All we have to do is make them partners.________________________________________________
The last stage takes on the public as partners in risk management opening a two-way 
communication channel, implying a democratisation of expertise. This is in line with 
Funtowicz et al’s (1992) framework outlined in the previous chapter. The democrati­
sation of political life is now commonplace and its hazards are accepted as a small 
price to pay (Funtowicz et al, 1992). Hence as suggested by Funtowicz et al a parallel 
democratisation of knowledge could be achieved through enhanced participation in 
decision-making. Facilitating democratic dialogue about the deployment of certain 
technologies calls for responsiveness to public concerns. Hereby, accurate reporting
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of risk information alone may be insufficient (Homig, 1993). Rather the social con­
text influencing risk evaluations needs to be included, as no amount of information 
on probabilities of harm will serve to create a favourable climate of public opinion 
unless the broader issues are also addressed (Homig, 1993). Although clearly pre­
senting a challenge to the prevalent status quo, Funtowicz et al (1992) regard this 
democratisation of science as the most effective system for avoiding future public 
controversies.
But the acceptability of the wider public involvement is dependent upon risk asses­
sors abandoning the notion of risk estimation as a pure science (Hurst, 1998). It ap­
pears that with the recognition of informal subjective aspects as essential dimensions 
as discussed in Chapter One, risk assessment is moving away from being solely a 
matter of science. Once it is accepted that two inconsistent decisions can be rational 
and consistent on their own grounds, it is possible to reach beyond the deviant model 
of risk communication (Funtowicz et al, 1992). It is only when risk assessment is 
considered as a “post normal science” that the new frameworks (e.g. Funtowicz et al, 
1991; 1992; Klinke et al, 2002) make sense as an approach to risk-based decision 
making.
2.5.1 Current developments in risk communication
Moving away from one-way communications, recent development of risk communi­
cation strategies show that the validity of lay risk perceptions is being increasingly 
recognised and appreciated. The seminal House of Lord’s report on Science and So­
ciety (2000) advocates direct, open and timely public dialogue, appreciating that it is 
vital for lay perceptions and values to be recognised, respected and weighted along 
with the scientific risk dimensions in order to gain public acceptance for scientific- 
technological issues.
Thus it appears that risk communication is moving in an inclusive direction. For in­
stance, recent GM debates (e.g. GM Nation?6) indicate attempts at widening risk 
communications to incorporate increased public participation. It could be argued that
6 It is appreciated that this event was flawed in several aspects, such as the translation of the findings 
into the report and the unrepresentative sample (Rowe, 2005). However, GM Nation can be credited 
with being the first event of its kind in the UK, with lessons to be learned for the future.
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we are already seeing the occurrence of post-normal science, with the increasing 
number of public debates, consensus conferences and in the consultations of ethic 
committees. As debates on technological developments touch fundamental ethical 
considerations, policy makers have begun to incorporate ethics into the decision 
making of science and technology policy. However, so far, the form and method by 
which ethics are incorporated varies greatly between countries, and importantly, its 
actual impact on policy making is highly ambiguous. Nevertheless, there is an in­
creasing institutionalisation of ethics committees, and it needs to be resolved whether 
this should be followed by the institutionalisation of other alternative stakeholders 
such as the lay public.
At present, there are a range of innovative and exciting ideas for the involvement of 
lay people to bring a broader range of views into scientific decision-making. For in­
stance, advocating more openness and dialogue between scientists, policymakers and 
the public, the governmental think-tank Demos proposes “upstream engagement” to 
involve non-specialists in setting research priorities. Their "See-through Science” 
approach argues that public engagement needs to move upstream, to an earlier stage 
in science funding and research (Willis and Wilsdon, 2004). Yet it remains to be seen 
whether public engagement can take place at an early stage in R&D processes and, 
equally how the reflective capacities of scientists can be strengthened to address so­
cial, ethical and political questions.
With this is mind, it is also increasingly recognised that there are potential barriers 
that may discourage scientists from taking part in science communication activities. 
For instance, Baroness Greenfield (2005) argues that it is particularly difficult to get 
scientists to communicate because:
“They get resentful- they are defined by their corpus o f  knowledge, and i f  
you suggest that they could share this out they see it as a threat to their 
identity. ”
(Greenfield, 2005; p.604)
Thus paralleling the advocates, the advance of public participation has its critics. 
Luhmann (1993) argues that the semantics of ‘participation’ are largely ideological
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in appeal, providing a kind of self-satisfaction in demanding participation, thus plac­
ing the opposing side in a position where it cannot reject the demand, or only with 
difficulty. From a political point of view it is above all a weapon, an instrument for 
forcing the political opponent to justify himself (Luhmann, 1993).
The wider public involvement is also controversial because it raises questions of who 
the new participants would be, how interactions would be managed and how con­
flicts would be resolved (Hood and Jones, 1996). Thus far, no exact frameworks ex­
ist for public participation and its subsequent evaluation. Public participation is fur­
ther impeded by the lack of, or difficulty in, establishing participatory institutions 
(Kasperson, 1986). Lastly, communicating with the public about risk can increase 
their desire to participate in or otherwise influence decisions about the control of 
those risks, thereby making risk management even more cumbersome (NRC, 1989).
Therefore it remains to be seen whether and how these developments in public en­
gagement are going to meet their demands. As such it can be questioned whether so­
ciety, in response to the previous one-way risk communication strategies, may be 
moving too far or too fast in the participatory direction as so many problems remain 
unresolved.
2.6 Challenges of risk communication
Today risk communication is still fraught with dilemmas. Apart from lacking a theo­
retical basis, risk communication presents practical problems. On the one hand, these 
are related to technical issues such as the content of a risk communication. On the 
other hand, challenges are connected to the social context of communicating, for in­
stance the climate of trust in society, and the role of the media.
2.6.1 Message and communication problems
The NRC (1989) distinguishes two major types of problems in risk communication: 
problems deriving from the institutional and political systems and problems of risk 
communicators and recipients. The first category includes problems of legal consid­
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erations, such as statutory mandates and informed consent or the ‘right-to-know’ re­
quirements, which influence the options available to risk managers and thus the con­
tent of their risk messages, and potential biases in the provision of information. 
Those most strongly motivated to communicate about risk are often also those with 
the strongest interest in the decision (NRC, 1989).
The second category describes problems encountered by the sources and recipients of 
risk messages. These include for example problems of capturing and focusing the 
public’s attention. Moreover, a message may not be regarded as accurate if, for in­
stance, the communicator is (or is perceived to be) advocating a position, or has a 
reputation for deceit (NRC, 1989). Even if communicators are honest, “telling it like 
it is” is not easy, and may not ensure a risk being understood like it “is” (Granger 
Morgan et al, 1990). Telling a risk in any one way may mean telling it in a biased 
way. Yet trying to correct this problem by presenting several stories that use different 
framings may lead to confusion (Granger Morgan et al, 1990).
Risk messages can be controversial for many reasons. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, the risks they describe are often themselves controversial, incorporating 
enough uncertainty in the underlying knowledge to allow different experts to draw 
contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, more thorough explanation of uncer­
tainty surrounding technological risk may enhance trust and citizen decision-making 
(e.g. Johnson, Sandman and Miller, 1992). On the other hand, presentations of uncer­
tainty have been found to have little effect on risk perception (e.g. Sandman, Miller, 
Johnson, and Weinstein, 1993; Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic, 1990). Therefore regu­
lators and society are in difficult positions. Communicators must balance scientific 
uncertainty and quantitative assessments about risk, and also appreciate the concerns 
and potentially different value judgements of the lay public.
While experts may be accused of hiding their subjective preferences behind technical 
jargon, often a message that is precise must be so complex that only an expert can 
understand it (NRC, 1989). Messages that non-experts can understand necessarily 
present selected information and are thus subject to challenge as being inaccurate and 
incomplete (NRC, 1989).
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In sum, risk messages are difficult to formulate in ways that are accurate and clear 
and able to satisfy all parties. But even if the message content is technically well 
structured, a range of (social) problems may remain. Therefore, whereas an under­
standing of risk characterisation and of both expert and lay biases in judgement is 
important for effective risk communication, the broader social factors also need to be 
considered. Neglecting social and political arenas is prejudicial, as risk messages are 
not created and transmitted in a vacuum.
2.6.2 Trust and credibility
An important aspect of the social context of communication is concerned with the 
special role of trust. Trust is important for all forms of human social interaction and 
an essential dimension of social life and institutional viability (Garfinkel, 1963). 
What the public expects of experts is reliable advice, what the experts expect of the 
public is trust. We are required to trust experts because under the conditions of mod­
ernity none of us can ever have access to all the specialist knowledge on which ex­
pertise depends but the flip-side of the coin of trust is doubt (Giddens, 1990). How­
ever today, there is a well documented crisis of confidence in business and govern­
ment institutions (e.g. Lipset and Schneider, 1987; Pharr and Putnam, 2000). More­
over, scepticism is endemic in public attitudes towards science and technology 
(Slovic, 1992).
This is problematic for risk communication as copious studies cite the lack of trust as 
a critical factor underlying the divisive controversies that surround the management 
of technological hazards (e.g. Slovic, Flynn and Layman, 1991; van Ravenswaay, 
1995; Siegrist, 2000). Numerous surveys point to the importance of trust in risk man­
agement and document the extreme distrust that lay people now have in many of the 
individuals, industries, and institutions responsible for risk management (e.g. Slovic 
et al, 1991; Flynn, Bums, Mertz, and Slovic, 1992). It has been suggested that the 
heart of risk perceptions and conflicts is not the issue of technological risk magni­
tudes, but rather trust in institutions (e.g. Wynne, 1980; van Ravenswaay, 1995).
If trust is a significant predictor of risk perceptions, it needs to be established what 
factors influence perceptions of tmst. As this concept has been well researched, it is
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addressed here only in a few words. A useful summary is provided by Renn et al
(1991). Briefly, credibility is a precondition of trust and can be generated by (among 
other issues): good performance, fast responses to public requests, two-way commu­
nication, consonance with social values, highly focused information transfer, avail­
ability for communication, addressing of public expectations, and flexibility to re­
spond to new demands (Renn et al, 1991).
Trust is a multidimensional concept and thus cannot be predicted by single items or 
psychological constructs in the absence of context. It is linked with perceptions of 
accuracy, knowledge, and concern with public welfare. People are adverse to am­
biguous risks and trust is all the more important where there is a perception that ac­
curate estimates of the risk are not available (Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, and Shep­
herd, 1996). While admitting to uncertainty could increase communicators’ trustwor­
thiness, the most important determinant of gain or loss of trust in a source is whether 
the information is subsequently proven right or wrong, and that the source is demon­
strated to be unbiased (Frewer et al, 1996).
Thus the issue of trust has to be taken seriously. Trust is the crucial medium of ex­
change in society, with it, almost anything is possible, without it, almost nothing can 
be done (Luhmann, 1979). Trust is never granted as of right and cannot be de­
manded, rather it has to be earned in the course of a relationship (Luhmann, 1979). 
Therefore the creation of genuine expert-lay relationships is of paramount impor­
tance.
2.6.3 The role of the media
A further challenge to risk communication may be posed by the media which effec­
tively ‘mediates’ between science and society. Although the exact influence of the 
media on public opinion is disputed (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Gamson and Modi­
gliani, 1989) the media is associated with various risk communication problems. For 
example by focusing on controversies among experts, public scepticism is height­
ened, increasing lay people’s sense of risk (Mazur and Lee, 1993; Mol et al; 1993). 
The public is bombarded daily with media accounts describing new, previously un­
suspected technological threats to human health and wellbeing (Hohenemser et al,
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1982). By having ever increasing levels of expert knowledge relayed to them by the 
mass media, lay people are constantly surrounded by images and words which make 
them aware of risk (Joffe, 1999).
Apart from often being accused of covering risks in a biased or sensationalised way 
scientists and journalists both use explanatory devices to convey the meaning of their 
work (Kunreuther and Slovic, 2001). Science is about models, explanation, and rep­
resentation, while journalists often resort to metaphors. Metaphor is not just a rhe­
torical flourish, but a basic property of language used to define experience and to 
evoke shared meanings (Layoff and Johnson, 1980). Nelkin (1987) regards the use of 
metaphors in science writing as particularly important in the explanation of technical 
detail, to define experience, to evoke shared meanings, and to allow individuals to 
construct elaborate concepts about public issues. Yet often, Schanne and Meier
(1992) argue, journalism constructs a universe of its own, a ‘media reality’, which 
does not mirror actual reality.
Moreover, through the process of social amplification of risk the media is frequently 
an immense contributor to the development of stigma. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, social amplification can be triggered by the occurrence of an adverse event, 
and reflects the fact that the adverse impact of such an event can extend far beyond 
the direct damages to victims (Kunreuther et al, 2001). Extensive media coverage of 
an event can contribute to heightened perceptions of risk, as well as propagation of 
stigmatising images (Bums et al, 1993). Unfortunately, to date there is little research 
on the stigmatisation of technologies. However, we look at this concept in more de­
tail when discussing the challenges of food risk communication in the following sec­
tion.
2.7 Food risk communication
It can be argued that food risk may be a special issue for risk communication because 
a communication may need to address a range of important social dimensions not 
necessarily shared by other hazards. In the UK the case of GM foods may be a par­
ticular concern as the public has been sensitized to food risk since the BSE contro-
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versy which contributed to lack of trust in regulators and communicators. In addition 
to (lack of) trust, as indicated in the previous chapter, at the heart of the GM contro­
versy may be social and cultural issues such as values, often those related to “nature” 
in its broadest sense.
Moreover, food risk communication may prove particularly challenging because is­
sues related to its social and moral significance need to be attended to. Although 
there have always been concerns with food ethics, modem agricultural and industrial 
practises can potentially result in ideological and societal conflicts on a much 
grander scale. For a traditional risk communication it might prove challenging to ad­
dress these non-scientific issues.
2.7.1 The case of GM foods
In the UK the need for better risk communications between expert and lay people has 
become particularly apparent since the GM food controversy of the 1990s. Prior to 
the BSE scare, Britain was often cited as a country where expert opinions on risk is­
sues enjoyed a great deal of public support (Jasanoff, 1995). After BSE, the British 
are among the most aggressive in opposing the production and distribution of GM 
foods (Jasanoff, 1997). Food scares such as BSE brought out national sensitivities 
and may have changed perceptions of food risk. Although this shift in attitudes can­
not be definitely attributed to an increase in scepticism as a result of the BSE scare, it 
is consistent with the hypothesis that trust affects estimates of risk (Thompson,
1999).
Today, GM foods are the most rejected biotechnological application in all surveys 
(Wagner, Kronberger, Gaskell, Allum et al, 2001). This rejection has been described 
as the expression of a denunciation of the industrialisation and globalisation of food 
production, and a rediscovery of the social significance of food to healthy lifestyles 
(Wagner at al, 2001). The introduction of GM foods may have occurred at times of 
significant value changes in Europe and thus may be a surrogate for concerns emerg­
ing from other issues. The controversy over GM food served as a platform for many 
debates, such as the industrialisation of agriculture, the treatment of farmers and rural 
communities, and third world and equity issues. Especially in view of today’s abun­
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dance of food in the west, GM food is widely regarded as unnecessary, even anti- 
cultural (Wagner et al, 2001). This indicates a social and societal basis of concerns 
over GM foods, and hence the need to incorporate broader factors than purely ‘tech­
nical’ risk dimensions in communication strategies.
Indeed, it is increasingly recognised that public concerns often focus on non­
technical or intrinsic concerns, such as whether GM crops constitute a non-natural 
interference with nature, or whether they amount to “playing God” (INRA, 1993;
2000). The controversy surrounding GM can be regarded as moral insofar as it ex­
presses a moral and ethical criticism of biotechnology, rather than a mere utilitarian 
concern solely in terms of safety and health. This presents a major challenge to risk 
communication based on the scientific facts of GM, and to date, from a rational sci­
ence perspective su ch concerns are often still interpreted as making little sense 
(Macnaghten, 2004).
2.7.2 The particularities of food risk
With reference to the above, it needs to be questioned whether food in general may 
be a special issue in the way its risks are perceived. Many of the topical issues of 
food safety are likely to have features in common with other sorts of risks that have 
been subject to more detailed examinations. For example, the public’s perception of 
the risks of GM food, share many of the features with the risk perceptions of nuclear 
power: both risks are perceived to be unknown and potentially catastrophic. But as 
well as certain commonalities, food risk perceptions have characteristics not shared 
by other hazard domains which may need to be acknowledged in a risk communica­
tion. These, it is argued, are related to its social and moral significance, and its poten­
tial for contagion and stigma.
2.7.3 The social significance of food
“Eating is one o f  the great sensual pleasures o f life, the place where 
mystical at-oneness with the world meets, demystifies and celebrates bio­
logical necessity. ...Eating is more than bodily nourishment, a meal is 
more than food. ...Eating is an essential ingredient in our understanding
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o f ourselves, a literal coming to our senses. For this reason, eating is in­
timately bound up with our sense o f  being, individually and culturally. ”
(Waltner-Toews, 1992; p.7)
With regards to Waltner-Toews’ (1992) statement, it is not surprising that in many 
ways food presents a special application area for risk communication. The social sig­
nificance of food has been apparent since Brillat-Savarin (1926) exclaimed: "Tell me 
what you eat and I  will tell you who you are. ”
This implies that food does not only have health-, energy-, and life-giving properties, 
but that it can also represent identities (Crouch and O’Neill, 2000). Eating is far more 
than nutrition (indeed in many ways nutrition may not be the most important aspect) 
and eating a meal is far more than “feeding”. From birth, food is a central part of life 
(Rozin, 1999). The great frequency of eating, the preparation of food, and the com­
pany of eating together render eating into a social and affective act (Rozin, 1999).
In the social domain, food is the center of family interaction around the dinner table, 
a means of welcoming others through hospitability, and a means of establishing eth­
nic identity and distinctiveness. Sharing food is one of the fundamental ways in 
which we can display, establish and maintain interpersonal intimacy (Rozin, 1999). 
Food is not “just food” as it is intimately bound up with social relations, including 
those of power, of inclusion and exclusion, as well as cultural ideas about classifica­
tion, the human body and the meaning of health (Caplan, 1997). For instance, how 
and where we eat can reflect ideological and value commitments as well as our so­
cialisation and status. Hence there are always individual and social contexts of eating 
that need to be considered as eating habits are a matter of culture, a product of codes 
of conduct and of the structure of social relationships (Murcott, 1983).
2.7.4 Food is a moral issue
Furthermore, eating can be a matter of morality. Commonly, there is an equation of 
nutritional with social values. For example, “eat up, it’s good for you”, connotes not 
only nutritional virtues but also that this is the right and proper way to behave (Mur­
cott, 1983). Food becomes a moral entity in that what one eats, the past history and
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preparation of one’s foods, and the contexts in which they are eaten, become state­
ments about one’s worth (Rozin, 1999). Rozin proposes that today, after drug use 
and smoking have attained an immoral status, we now see the beginning of the mor- 
alisation of food indulgence, such as that eating junk food has negative moral impli­
cations.
Yet there has always been a moral concern with food, often reflecting religious and 
cultural values. For example, Jewish morality formed a distinction between what was 
allowed and what was disallowed. This dichotomy between legitimate and illicit food 
was developed through divine legislation. Thus the individual could acquire a dis­
tinct moral identity (Zwart, 2000). Here the idea developed that certain food products 
are to be regarded as contaminated in view of their origin, and that they are unlawful 
in themselves, not because they are actually unhealthy or tasteless. Hence rejected 
products are regarded as contaminated not in a literal but in a moral sense7.
Similarly, Douglas’ (1966) suggests that the Jewish and Islamic categories, of clean 
(halal) and unclean (haram) bridge physical and logical aspects. For instance, fish 
with scales are halal, fish without haram, because fish without scales transgress an 
archetypal definition of fish. Rather than a measurable difference, the contradiction 
between the clean and unclean articulates inherent ontological contradictions be­
tween order and disorder, and in transcending boundaries of order these issues also 
signal risk (Douglas, 1966).
Therefore it would be mistaken to view all food prohibitions, such as the injunction 
in the Old Testament against eating pork, simply as forerunners of modem food 
regulations. Rather, such food prohibitions often served a variety of purposes, includ­
ing the affirmation of ethical norms, distinguishing one group from another and sym­
bolically bringing order into a chaotic world through classification (Johnson et al, 
1987). Still today people’s concerns and fears about different types of food risks can 
often be more accurately seen as ways of maintaining social and moral solidarity
7 For example, today adherents to vegetarianism regard meat products as contaminated, not because of 
health reasons but because they are made from animals. In that way it is a form of intrinsic contamina­
tion (Zwart, 2000).
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rather than as solely reflecting health or environmental concerns (Johnson et al, 
1987).
2.7.5 Challenges of modern agriculture
Whereas pre-modem food ethics often centred on issues relating to food consump­
tion, contemporary food ethics tend to focus on issues relating to food production 
(Zwart, 2000). Significant changes in the system of food production, such as the in­
troduction of pesticides or GM, produced a whole range of morally dubious and po­
tentially risky new food products (Zwart, 2000).
Industrialisation affected the destruction of self-providing rural communities of the 
past, and greatly increased the distance between production and consumption of food 
(Zwart, 2000). This ever-increasing distance is both concealing and disquieting and 
raises the question of who can be trusted with the fundamental task of food produc­
tion. Rather than being able to trace the source and quality of their food themselves, 
consumers have to depend on food producers, food providers and intricate labelling 
practices. Food today has materialised into industrial food products, with consumers 
acting only indirectly and from a distance on the systems of food production (Zwart, 
2000).
This denaturalization of food products is contrasted with an ethically inspired 
counter-movement, such as consumer preference for green labels, organic food, and 
fair-trade products (Zwart, 2000) as well as advertising campaigns that cultivate the 
natural and organic and the image of the rural idyll, resulting in nostalgia for the 
‘good old days’. A common assumption is that what is natural is safe and healthy, 
and what is artificial or man-made is likely to be the opposite (Drottz-Sjoeberg, 
1997).
Hence although the problem of adulteration of food stuffs has existed since centuries 
it seems that the present context of food production has made the problem unaccept­
able for the public and has fuelled a feeling of public indignation:
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“For many people, the advent o f new technologies rhymes with the dis­
appearance o f  farmers and nature, both o f  which play quasi-mythical 
roles in the imaginary. ”
(Bonny, 2000; p.289)
2.7.6 Contagion and stigmatisation
When comparing food risks to other risks, it appears that incorporations of dangerous 
substances into the body (such as through eating) have more a profound significance 
than many other types of behaviour involving risks (Rozin and Fallon, 1987). One of 
the reasons for this may be because eating involves an extremely intimate exchange 
between the environment and the self:
“The insulated, safe, self, protected by skin from the rest o f  the world, 
experiences a material breach o f  this boundary a few  times every day in 
the act o f  eating. The world enters the self. ”
(Rozin, 1999, p. 14)
Hence it is not surprising that perceptions of contagion and stigmatisation are often 
particularly pronounced in relation to food. Rozin et al (1987) demonstrate that con­
tagion results from short contact between a food and an object seen as disgusting. 
This is true even when the likely concentration of any toxic substance is known by 
the subject to be minimal, or even absent (such as from a sterilised insect). These re­
sponses are culturally transmitted, and there is evidence for learning such responses 
during childhood (Rozin, Fallon and Augustoni-Ziskind, 1985). The idea held by the 
public that there is no safe level of toxic chemicals in food (Kraus et al, 1990) may. 
be related to these ideas of contamination and contagion. This implies a binary dis­
tinction between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ in that the mere presence of these chemicals 
makes the food unsafe, no matter how small the concentrations (Sparks and Frewer,
1994).
Related to perceptions of contagion are perceptions of stigma. Stigma is based upon 
negative imagery that has become associated with places, products, technologies, and 
people (Kunreuther et al, 2001). For instance, at the time of the Alar scare, not only
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were there huge losses in the US nation-wide apple market, but there was also a sig­
nificant decrease in the Washington-state cherry market, even though the only link to 
the Alar application was one of geography (Gregory, Flynn and Slovic, 1995). 
Clearly, generalisations of increased perceived risk apply not only to related risks but 
also to unrelated risks (Johnson and Tversky, 1983).
Stigmatisation appears to share some conceptual overlap with the perceived risk or 
‘signal’ value of a hazard. Signal value refers to the information that the hazard pro­
vides about future recurrence of the hazard (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 
1980). For example, it is thought that the occurrence of a low probability event, gives 
an indication that the hazard is out of control (Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 
1984). In effect a stigma can be a warning marker, a way of communicating about 
risk, for instance to decrease the likelihood of taboo transgression (Walker, 2001). 
Hence stigmatisation is likely to play a role in relation to public resistance to a new 
technology. Looking at the governmental track record regarding BSE, public resis­
tance to newer food-related technologies (such as GM) is unsurprising.
Although resistance8 is negatively connoted, it may function as an important signal 
that things are going wrong and as a call for action: “To register resistance may be 
‘life serving’ and secure the future” (Bauer, 1995; p.404). Like stigmatisation, resis­
tance is also a form of communication, pointing to the importance of certain issues 
that have to be dealt with immediately (Bauer, 1995).
2.7.7 Investigating food risk
Because of the socio-cultural particularities of food risk, it is evident that food risks 
have to be seen in their wider social and societal context. As food has a ubiquity of 
symbolic meanings food risk communication may be unique because of the rituals, 
mythologies, and cultural significance associated with eating.
8 Bauer uses the analogy of pain to explain the functions of resistance: "Resistance affects socio- 
technical activity like acute pain affects individual processes: it is a signal that something is going 
wrong; it reallocates attention and enhances self-awareness; it evaluates ongoing activity; and it al­
ters this activity in various ways to secure a sustainable future” (Bauer, 1995; p.3).
76
Unfortunately, despite these idiosyncrasies, little research is specifically orientated to 
risk perception in the context of food production and consumption, despite the view 
that each hazard needs to be examined in its own right (Slovic et al, 1980). Only few 
scientific studies apply risk communication concepts especially to issues of food 
safety and green biotechnologies (exceptions are: Frewer, Howard, Hedderley, and 
Shepherd, 1996; Fischhoff and Downs, 1997; Sparks et al, 1994). Thus to date, an 
overall framework for risk communication involving food safety aspects including 
GM food is absent.
Hence Sparks et al (1994) suggest that an understanding of public perceptions of 
food risk is a pre-requisite for effective risk communication practise, and that an un­
derstanding of public perceptions of food risk requires well-executed empirical re­
search actually addressing food  risks. In light of this the present study looks explic­
itly at expert and lay GM food risk perceptions, with a view to offering some impli­
cations for risk communication.
2.8 Conclusions Chapter Two
In conclusion, it is evident that societal risk communication is still fraught with diffi­
culties. In relation to food risk specifically, various socio-cultural and moral factors 
need to be better understood in order to be able to effectively communicate. Because 
of the importance of social factors in risk perception, Sjoeberg (2002) concludes that 
risk communication can no longer be construed as a question of providing scientific 
information alone. Rather:
“The theory o f  risk communication must be developed on a basis o f dif­
ferences in basic beliefs about nature and science. ”
(Sjoeberg, 2002; p. 12)
Although problematic, the move towards increased public participation in risk com­
munication (as well as evaluation) has been argued to be the best solution, especially 
when dealing with post-normal risk, such as the risks of most novel high technolo­
gies. In many cases, information provision alone is inadequate, because of the inevi-
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table gaps and uncertainties about how to evaluate risks. A clearer understanding of 
the scientific facts may allow a more focused debate but it may not resolve underly­
ing philosophical disagreements (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). Thus an understand­
ing of these non-scientific elements is of particular importance to risk communica­
tion efforts. To elucidate these disagreements a better understanding of how expert 
and lay people make sense of risk is vital.
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3 MENTAL MODELS AND SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF RISK
Following the examination of the challenges of risk perception and risk communica­
tion in the previous chapters, the present chapter introduces two frameworks, i.e. the 
mental model approach and social representations theory, which we utilise in order to 
explore expert and lay risk perceptions of GM food in depth.
The first part of the chapter introduces mental models, focusing on their application 
to risk communication. It is proposed that this approach can potentially improve risk 
communication design. Hereby, the focus is on the Carnegie Mellon University 
(CMU) approach, which provides part of the theoretical and methodological basis for 
the current thesis. Although offering a productive foundation for developing risk 
communication interventions, the CMU approach is criticised for some general as 
well as more specific shortcomings; in particular its individualistic orientation and 
lack of consideration for the origins of risk representations. It is argued that social 
representations theory (SRT) can alleviate some of these limitations.
Hence the second part of the chapter focuses on SRT, more specifically on how, in 
relation to risk perception and risk communication, this constructivist approach can 
supplement the cognitively orientated mental model approach. Although both ap­
proaches have thus far not been well connected they are not necessarily distinct. In 
essence, both approaches complement each other well as together they can highlight 
the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of risk.
3.1 An introduction to mental models
The beginnings of mental model research went hand in hand with the realisation that 
psychology could not rely on behaviour alone to investigate and explain human con­
sciousness. As such, mental models offered a major critique to the prevalent behav­
iourism of the 1930s. Since that time there has been a growing interest in studying 
mental models in both the cognitive and the social sciences.
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From the 1980’s onwards the mental model approach has become a major research 
topic in cognitive psychology (e.g. Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Rouse and Morris, 1986). Cognitive science proposes that thinking is the essence of 
mind and can be studied independently of other mental phenomena. Thus cognitive 
science largely ignores other mental phenomena such as moods, emotions, and con­
sciousness (Cummins, 1989). Hence in agreement with Niewoehner (2001) the pre­
sent thesis does not discuss this work in detail as it is rooted in a much more cogni­
tive framework than the mental models used in risk communication.
Apart from cognitive science, sociology also uses various concepts that deal with 
stored representations in memory. Carley and Palmquist (1992) suggest that mental 
models are central to all theories in which individuals represent the world and inter­
act with it through symbols, such as Mead’s (1934) concept of the social object and 
the symbolic interactionists (e.g. Blumer, 1969), as well as in theories in which indi­
viduals construct the world, such as social constructivists (e.g. Berger and Luck- 
mann, 1967). The assumption that language and communication are the keys to, and 
perhaps mediate the development of, mental models is not new (Carley et al, 1992). 
For example, Vygotsky (1962) and Luria (1978) argue that language mediates 
thought, thus affecting categorisation and behaviour to the extent that different social 
behaviours arise when language differs. With reference to the divergences in expert 
and lay risk discourse this latter point is particularly important for risk communica­
tion. Unfortunately, although sociology recognises the need for mental representa­
tions in social interactions, it has rarely studied this concept empirically.
In brief, it seems that on the one hand, cognitive psychology limits itself to issues of 
the mind as it functions within the individual, and thus studies mental models of the 
individual while neglecting the wider social context. Psychologists often pursue indi­
viduals’ cognitive activities within a structural vacuum, ignoring the influence of the 
social environment (Morgan and Schwalbe, 1990). On the other hand, sociology ex­
amines the mental model in its various guises by focusing on social relationships but 
neglecting individual processes. This lack of connection between the cognitively and 
socially oriented disciplines indicates how the mental model history mirrors the con­
flict of the scientific paradigms. So far the different domains have not been well con­
nected, although a convergence may offer a more complete representation of the ob-
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ject under study. Acknowledging this shortcoming, the present thesis hopes to find a 
‘middle way’ between both fields through a social psychological application of men­
tal models to risk communication.
3.2 Conceptual clarifications
With reference to the diverse conceptualisations of mental models it needs to be 
questioned whether and how mental models differ from other postulated forms of 
mental representations. Often, it is disputed how the concept should be differentiated 
from that of knowledge in general. In many cases, the term mental model is simply 
used as a substitute for knowledge (Rouse et al, 1986).
Accordingly, a range of novel constructs have been developed to deal with knowl­
edge structures of complex phenomena. Carley et al (1992) propose that the follow­
ing approaches are all similar to mental models sharing their basic network orienta­
tion: conceptual structures (Sowa, 1984), schemes (Anderson and Bower, 1973), 
schemata or schemas (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1988), 
frames (Minsky, 1975) and scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Brewer and Naka­
mura (1984) argue that these are all examples of one general class of knowledge 
structure, i.e. mental structures that underlie various aspects of human knowledge 
and skill. All are frequently used to refer to the representational structures into which 
memory is organised. Despite having been applied in different scientific contexts, in 
essence, these concepts are comparable to mental models.
But there are surprisingly few explicit definitions of mental models. This most likely 
reflects the extent to which the concept has come to be acceptable on an almost intui­
tive basis (Rouse et al, 1986). In social science, the term mental model is often used 
metaphorically to describe a tool that enables researchers to acquire textual data from 
participants that can be used in various types of analyses. It is clearly distinguished 
from cognitive maps (e.g. Kearney and Kaplan, 1997; Tolman, 1948) as it does not 
make any claims about cognitive structures or neural networks (Niewoehner, 2001). 
This is the way in which the present thesis utilises the concept, as conclusions re-
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garding neural structures and processing modes are not relevant to the objectives of 
the study.
Our aim is to explore expert and lay representations of GM food. Regarding risk per­
ception, lay people generally lack complete understanding of a risk but still have at 
least some relevant beliefs about it, which they use in interpreting the related com­
munication. To make inferences about the risk, such as how big it is, these fragmen­
tary beliefs are assembled into a “mental model”, which in turn informs their conclu­
sions (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). It is not a formal model, and does not involve 
strict mapping between things in the real world and elements in the model. However, 
it does share some functional features with formal models because people need to 
figure out which things in a complicated situation are worthy of attention, how these 
things interact with one another, and how well their abstractions capture the com­
plexities of the actual processes (Granger Morgan et al, 2002).
3.2.1 The functions of mental models
Mental models can take many forms and serve many purposes, varying between sci­
entific disciplines. But overall it is clear that mental models fulfil important roles in 
human reasoning and that they are essential for making sense of the world (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983). There is general agreement that mental models have three main pur­
poses: describing, explaining and predicting. Clearly, understanding is a prerequisite 
for all those functions- if one does not understand something one cannot explain it. In 
turn, the psychological core of understanding requires people to have a ‘working 
model’ of the phenomenon in their minds (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Craik (1943) sums 
up:
“I f  the organisms carries a ‘small scale model’ o f  external reality and o f  
its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alter­
natives, conclude which is the best o f  them, react to future situations be­
fore they arise, utilise the knowledge o f  past events in dealing with the 
presence and future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, 
and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it".
(Craik, 1943; p.51)
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In that way, mental models are necessary to enable people to think about things that 
are not present in the environment and to assess information related to the problem at 
hand (Kearney and Kaplan, 1997). Further, they may underlie an individual’s ability 
to give a causal account of a particular domain, offering explanations and justifica­
tions (Williams, Holland and Stevens, 1983). Humans do not react merely physically 
to their environment, but rather seek to anticipate it (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Thus the 
simulation of a mental model generates the representation of a situation, whereby 
possible consequences of actions and events can be anticipated and possible precon­
ditions of anticipated consequences can be identified (Jungermann, Schuetz and 
Thuering, 1988).
In order to serve these purposes, a mental model needs neither be wholly accurate 
nor correspond completely with what it models (Johnson-Laird, 1983). There may be 
no need for people to have a deeper understanding of particular issues because peo­
ple can grasp the way they work without having to reduce everything to their funda­
mental principles. Hence the usefulness of a model is not necessarily increased by 
adding information to it beyond a certain level (Johnson-Laird, 1983). This implies 
that the value of a mental model needs to be judged relative to its particular functions 
and goals.
To sum up briefly:
“Mental models play a central and unifying role in representing objects, 
states o f  affairs, sequences o f events, the way the world is, and the social 
and psychological actions o f daily life. They enable individuals to make 
inferences and predictions, to understand phenomena, to decide what ac­
tion to take and to control its execution, and above all to experience 
events by proxy; they allow language to be used to create representations 
comparable to those deriving from direct acquaintance o f  the world; and 
they relate words to the world by way o f  conception and perception. ”
(Johnson-Laird, 1983;p.397)
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3.3 Mental models in risk communication
Since mental models guide people’s perceptions, decisions, and behaviour (Kearney 
et al, 1997), they can aid in understanding how people perceive problems, in deter­
mining how information may be most effectively shared, and in designing strategies 
for behavioural change. These are some of the reasons why the application of mental 
models has become increasingly popular in risk communication. However, so far, the 
approach has largely focused on privately managed hazards, rather than societal 
risks. Johnson (1993) argues that there is a need to change focus. The study of GM 
food offers a case in point, and it is hoped that the present research may help to alle­
viate this shortcoming.
Previous chapters have shown that there is a heightened awareness of technological 
risk and a need to improve risk communication efforts. To make the process of risk 
management more amenable to public involvement better models of how the lan­
guage of risk assessment is understood by the public as compared to the expert 
community need to be developed (MacGregor, Slovic and Malmfors, 1999). Mental 
model theory is one of the most promising recent developments as it can show how 
individuals understand risk. The following section outlines the benefits of the mental 
model approach to risk communication, before looking at the (Carnegie Mellon Uni­
versity) CMU approach in detail as it provides the partial foundation for the present 
study. Lastly, the CMU approach is criticised on several points, which leads into a 
discussion of why the present study complements this approach with social represen­
tations theory.
3.3.1 Benefits of mental models for risk communication
As discussed in Chapter Two, a major problem in developing risk communications is 
determining the exact content. A deeper understanding of expert and lay risk percep­
tions can indicate what a message should or should not contain, and how best to de­
sign and present a communication. The application of the mental model technique to 
risk communication can potentially help to answer these vital questions.
Risk communication efforts often fail because information is not relevant enough to 
the audience in the particular context (Granger Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrum and At­
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man, 2002). Based on findings from mental models research and text comprehension 
studies Atman, Bostrum, Fischhoff et al (1994) show that inappropriate content and 
poor structure are likely to confuse communication recipients. It is difficult to decide 
what risk information needs to be presented and how extensive this information 
should be. Understanding people’s mental models may aid these decisions.
Effective risk communication must focus on the things that people need to know but 
do not know already- this seemingly simple norm is violated remarkably often 
(Granger Morgan et al, 2002). Rather than analysing what the public believes and 
what information they need to make the decisions they face, often communicators 
ask technical experts what they think people should be told (Granger Morgan et al,
2002). As a result, the needs of the intended audience may be neglected. Under such 
conditions it is not surprising that audiences frequently misunderstand (Granger 
Morgan et al, 2002).
Hence in order to educate the public, policy makers must start by educating them­
selves about what lay people already know and believe and how it might differ from 
what they need to know to make effective decisions, as one cannot necessarily trust 
technical experts’ intuitions about public beliefs (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein,
1982).
Therefore, a major task of mental model approaches to risk communication is to de­
termine what lay people currently believe about an issue so that information whose 
provision would have the greatest impact on recipients’ ability to make decisions in 
their best interests could be identified (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). Yet often stud­
ies focus not so much on what people know about a given topic or on how they use 
their knowledge but rather on what people do not know, i.e. gaps in their knowledge 
(e.g. Gamba and Oskamp, 1994; Syme, Beven and Sumner, 1993). However, it also 
needs to be determined whether the gaps are actually worth filling, i.e. are there any 
important decisions or substantive inferences that hinge on this knowledge? If not, 
then unease over this display of “ignorance” could be doubly damaging (Bostrum, 
Fischhoff and Granger Morgan, 1992). While on the one hand, it would unnecessar­
ily erode experts’ respect for lay people, on the other hand, it would waste the pub-
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lie’s valuable attention by focusing communications on irrelevancies, perhaps erod­
ing public respect for experts (Bostrum et al, 1992).
Thus the identification of knowledge gaps by itself does not provide sufficient direc­
tion for devising communications. Rather, it is also important to consider an individ­
ual’s existing mental model of the issue. As communication never involves filling a 
‘tabula rasa’ the availability of prior knowledge presents the basis for gaining new 
knowledge as prior knowledge almost certainly affects learning (Glaser, 1984). Al­
though existing knowledge offers a foundation on which to build, it can also be an 
obstacle (Rouse et al, 1986). Prior knowledge that is incorrect will not necessarily be 
discarded once the correct knowledge is provided (Rouse et al, 1986). Instead, an 
amalgam of the correct and incorrect may be retained, especially if the incorrect as­
pects are such that everyday life experiences are unlikely to yield any inconsistencies 
(Rouse et al, 1986). Hence, mapping current knowledge is an essential part of im­
proving risk communication design and numerous studies show success of this (e.g. 
Atman et al, 1994; Bostrum et al, 1994; Kearney et al, 1997).
In sum, because inforfnation provided does not equal information received effective 
communication requires an understanding of people’s existing mental models so that 
information can be framed in a way that encourages people to notice and integrate 
the new information rather than ignore and re-interpret it. The mental model ap­
proach has the potential to solve these problems, as assessments of lay mental mod­
els can contribute important new input to decision making and problem-solving 
processes (Kearney et al, 1997). In turn, further integration of lay knowledge in the 
decision making process may facilitate wider acceptance of the solutions that are fi­
nally reached (Kearney et al, 1997).
3.3.2 The Carnegie Mellon University approach to risk communication
From the different mental model approaches, the present thesis utilises the Carnegie 
Mellon University (CMU) approach to risk communication developed by Granger 
Morgan et al (2002). This is a pragmatically well developed approach, and provides a 
number of clear guidelines for risk communication design. By addressing prior mis­
conceptions as well as providing correct knowledge the CMU approach offers a po­
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tential solution to the risk message and communication problems outlined in Chapter 
Two.
The approach suggests that communication failures reflect the lack of systematic 
procedures for finding out what people know and need to know, and for confirming 
empirically that a communication has been effective. Hence the CMU approach con­
sists of a five-step method for creating and testing risk messages as shown in table 
3.1. Briefly, before disseminating a risk message, communicators must characterise 
expert knowledge about the risk, study current expert and lay beliefs, examine the 
risk decisions that people face, develop a communication focused on critical content, 
and evaluate the message through empirical testing (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). 
The present study focuses solely on steps 1 and 2 aiming to establish expert and lay 
mental models of GM food risk.
Table 3.1 The CMU Methodology (adapted from Granger Morgan et al, 2002; pp. 20-21).
1. Create an expert model. Review and summarise the current scientific knowledge about the risk. 
The formal representation may be an influence diagram, a directed network drawn from decision 
theory, which allows representing and interpreting the knowledge of experts from diverse disci­
plines. The term ‘expert’ refers to the individuals creating it, without implying that their beliefs 
are superior to lay beliefs. What experts believe about a risk provides one basis for determining 
what lay people need to know. These beliefs can be summarised in influence diagrams, a formula­
tion that allows (a) integrating diverse forms of expertise and (b) assessing the importance of dif­
ferent facts. The objective is to construct a single description, summarising the pooled knowledge 
of the community of experts, not the views of any one expert.
2. Conduct mental models interviews. Utilise open-ended interviews to elicit people’s beliefs about 
the hazard, expressed in their own terms. The interview protocol is shaped by the influence dia­
gram. The responses are analysed in terms of how well mental models correspond to expert 
model captured in influence diagram.
3. Conduct structured initial interviews. Create a confirmatory questionnaire whose items capture 
the beliefs expressed in the open-ended interviews and the expert model. Administer this ques­
tionnaire to larger groups of the intended audience, in order to estimate the population prevalence 
of these beliefs.
4. Draft risk communication. Use the results from the interview and questionnaires, along with an 
analysis of the decisions people face, to determine which incorrect beliefs most need correcting 
and which knowledge gaps most need filling. Then draft the communication and subject it to ex­
pert review to ensure its accuracy.
5. Evaluate communication. Test and refine the communication with individuals selected from the 
target population, using one-on-one read-aloud interviews, focus groups, closed-form question­
naires, or problem-solving tasks. Repeat this process until the communication is understood as in­
tended.
In essence, the goal of the CMU approach is to create an adequate mental model of 
the risky process, allowing people to know which facts are relevant and how they fit 
together. In this way, it is a more public-centred framework to developing risk mes­
sages than traditional risk communication approaches, as it assumes that the principal
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obstacles to understanding are lay time and attention, not intelligence (Granger Mor­
gan et al, 2002). The CMU approach adheres to three tenets. First, the audience 
needs to be offered a basic understanding of the exposure, effects, and mitigation 
processes relevant to making decisions about the hazard. Second, existing audience 
beliefs are assumed to affect reception and interpretations of any new information. 
Third, new information must be represented in such a way as to be consistent with 
the levels of understanding that is manifest in the audience (Breakwell, 2001). 
Breakwell proposes that:
“This approach is possibly the most productive basis for developing risk 
communication interventions. It seeks to identify for a particular hazard 
both accurate and inaccurate beliefs that are held by a target population. 
Mental models are then used as the basis fo r developing risk communica­
tion material that will correct misunderstandings. In this approach, the 
goal is to bridge the gap between lay and expert models o f  the risk by 
adding missing concepts, correcting mistakes, strengthening correct be­
liefs and minimising peripheral ones ”.
(Breakwell, 2001; p.341)
3.3.3 Influence diagrams
It should be noted that, to date, the actual construction of mental models in general is 
not a well-defined technique- clear methodological guidelines tend to be lacking. As 
shown in table 3.1, steps 1 and 2 of the CMU approach comprise the construction of 
expert and lay mental models in the form of influence diagrams. Since this is not a 
widely used technique in social psychology it is explained in some detail here.
In accordance with Granger Morgan et al (2002), the present thesis represents expert 
and lay mental models through influence diagrams. Influence diagrams were devel­
oped by decision-analysts as a way to summarise information about uncertain deci­
sion situations, allowing effective communication between experts and decision­
makers and the conduct of information-related analyses. An influence diagram is a 
directed graph, with arrows or ‘influences’ connecting related nodes. It can be 
thought of as a snapshot of all the factors that influence the state of the world, includ­
ing the decisions that can trigger or shape the processes captured in the nodes. Many 
nodes can be involved simultaneously and involve uncertain outcomes, so that the
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outcome is unknown until the process has played itself out. Being able to incorporate 
both causal and non-causal relationships allows influence diagrams to accommodate 
all available information (Granger Morgan et al, 2002).
By imposing a few structural rules, attaching actual mathematical relationships to the 
influences and describing the value of the uncertain variables in terms of probability 
distributions, influence diagrams can be given very precise meaning and be con­
verted into a decision tree. However, the present thesis uses influence diagrams more 
heuristically, showing which factors matter and how they are interrelated9. After the 
transcription and the coding of the interview data, we investigate the co-occurrences 
of codes and then graphically map the relationships between them. The procedure for 
our development of expert and lay mental models of GM food risk is explained in 
more detail in the relevant chapter (Chapter Six).
3.3.4 An empirical application of the Carnegie Mellon University approach
The CMU approach as described above has been used to investigate a variety of 
risks, such as risk perceptions of smoking (Niewoehner, 2002), and helped to set the 
agenda for public health risk campaigns about HIV and sexual behaviour (Carnegie 
Mellon Aids Group, 1997). To date, the approach has not yet been applied to exam­
ine risk perceptions of biotechnologies, or more specifically, GM foods. Because the 
CMU approach is so central to the present thesis we illustrate the application of this 
approach by looking at research conducted by Bostrum, Granger Morgan, Fischhoff 
and Read (1994) on another societal risk, namely climate change. In line with the 
CMU approach, Bostrum et al characterised public understanding of climate change, 
aiming to comprehend the public’s literacy about the topic.
Based on expert knowledge, and following the steps of the CMU approach as out­
lined in table 3.1, lay people were asked what they know about definitions, exposure 
and effects of climate change. The results indicated that even well-educated lay peo­
ple conceptualise climate change issues very differently to technical specialists. For 
example, lay mental models of climate change focused more on CFCs than carbon
9 For Granger Morgan et al (2002) the goal of constructing an expert model is achieving sufficient 
clarity that the influence diagram could be converted into an executable computer model. This is not 
necessarily the objective of this thesis.
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dioxide or energy use, and frequently omitted the latter. Fundamental inconsistencies 
were often based on confusion of the greenhouse effect with ozone depletion, as well 
as other relatively basic terms. Commonly, people simply equated the greenhouse 
effect with global warming and were unaware of the underlying mechanisms and 
causes. Rather than mentioning the production of electricity as a cause of global 
warming, far more respondents believed that space exploration was the cause, with 
some believing that spacecrafts punch holes in the ozone layer10.
Thus the findings showed that in order to succeed, a risk communication about cli­
mate change would need to address a range of issues that differ significantly from 
expert assessments of the risk (Bostrum et al, 1994). Essentially, the application of 
the CMU approach to climate change risk illustrated the pervasive influence of basic 
misconceptions, and in turn, their potential to influence judgements and decision 
making.
Although most respondents believed climate change to be a threat and favoured ac­
tion to address it, it was clear that their mental models restricted their ability to dis­
tinguish between effective and ineffective strategies. For instance, results showed 
that lay people may waste their energies on fairly ineffective actions such as refusing 
to use spray cans, while neglecting more critical strategies such as energy conserva­
tion. Further, apart from potentially mis-directing the public’s support for proposed 
polices, some of these misunderstandings may leave the public vulnerable to manipu­
lation of interest groups (Read, Bostrum, Granger Morgan, Fischhoff and Smuts, 
1994).
In sum, by utilising the CMU approach and allowing respondents to structure and 
define their own responses, Bostrum et al (1994) showed how people conceptualise 
and describe issues about climate change. In this way, the empirical assessment of 
what lay people already know together with a scientific determination of what people 
actually need to know about this risk was shown to be an important foundation for 
the design of relevant risk communications.
10 One respondent suggested that NASA consider launching through a single hole, so as to avoid mak­
ing new ones.
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Read et al (1994) followed up the mental model interviews above with a structured 
questionnaire to give a more precise indication of the frequency of beliefs observed 
by Bostrum et al (1994), essentially following the third step of the CMU approach as 
outlined in table 3.1. The findings largely confirmed the prior qualitative results 
highlighting the potential usefulness of the CMU approach to risk communication 
about climate change.
3.3.5 Reflections on the Carnegie Mellon University approach
The above example indicates that the CMU approach can potentially offer a theoreti­
cally integrated and empirically testable set of easily used risk communication design 
and evaluation methods. To some extent, the CMU approach agrees well with the 
‘third way’ of risk assessment discussed in Chapter One. Like other risk communica­
tion approaches, it is committed to the scientific facts of risk and to their empirical 
investigation, but stresses the need for openness in communication about risk and the 
importance of public perception and involvement (Granger Morgan et al, 2002).
According to Granger Morgan et al, the CMU approach provides a way to identify, 
avoid, and evaluate the pitfalls of irrelevant or poorly structured and understood risk 
communication by evaluating both expert and lay perspectives. It ensures that, if they 
choose to, lay people can understand how the risks they face are created and con­
trolled, how well science understands these risks and how great they seem to be 
(Granger Morgan et al, 2002).
By listening to the public’s concerns before designing communications, and by ad­
dressing misconceptions held by the public, the CMU approach can help to ensure 
that the information provided is relevant. This would alleviate at least some of the 
message and communication problems outlined in the previous chapter.
Developing effective risk communication can be time-consuming and expensive. The 
successful application of the CMU methodology can take up to one year (Granger 
Morgan et al, 2002). But Granger Morgan et al insist that it is certainly worth it, es­
pecially when considering the potential health (and economic) consequences of mis­
understanding risks. Properly used the methods described can help to develop clear
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and understandable risk messages (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). The availability of 
such messages is an important element in the process of risk communication and 
management. But while such messages are important, Granger Morgan et al admit 
that they are only part of what is needed for a more democratic management of risk 
in society.
3.4 A critique of mental models
Although potentially useful for improving risk communications, the CMU approach 
can be criticised in relation to several general mental model research limitations. Be­
cause of its particular concern for risk communication research our focus is on the 
individualistic orientation of mental models and their lack of consideration for the 
(social) origins of risk representations, which leads into a discussion of why, for the 
present thesis, the approach is synthesised with social representations theory (SRT).
3.4.1 Biases of mental models of risk
One of the limitations of mental models is fundamental to science in general. Scien­
tists’ conceptualisations of others’ mental models are dependent on their own mod­
els. These dictate what observations are made and how the resulting data is organ­
ised. The ultimate subjectivity and arbitrariness of this process has long been recog­
nised (e.g. James, 1909). The problem of subjectivity is aggravated in the study of 
mental models because such studies amount to one or more persons developing stud­
ies of others’ models of the external world (Cohen and Murphy, 1984). In essence, 
our conceptualisation of others’ mental model of a risk is basically a “model o f a 
model ” (Norman, 1983; p.9).
Thus it needs to be recognised that the conceptualisations chosen by researchers re­
flect their methodological backgrounds and the way in which they assume humans 
are likely to view the issue (Norman, 1983). This of course is fraught with opportuni­
ties to misinterpret observations and bias descriptions, as it can be difficult to get 
away from the fundamental assumptions of one’s own cultural tradition. Yet the fail-
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ure to appreciate the utility of others’ mental models may cheat us out of important 
insights (Hutchins, 1983).
This implies that expert as well as lay mental models of a risk have to be taken seri­
ously and treated as valid. However, one of the major problems of the CMU ap­
proach is that it has a strong bias towards the scientific perspective- any deviations 
from it are seen as major problems and as ‘errors’ requiring correction. Therefore, 
although it can be credited with outlining lay views in addition to those of the ex­
perts, essentially the CMU approach is still a top-down approach. Because it aims to 
bring lay views in line with those of the experts rather than explore the utility of lay 
views, it implies that the former are less legitimate representations of the risk in 
question.
But looking at nuclear power for example, it is evident that lay people do not merely 
process information according to the hard facts of science. Rather nuclear power is a 
highly emotive issue, for example in relation to environmental destruction and fear of 
catastrophes (Joffe, 2003). As such, the symbol-laden response to nuclear power (for 
example symbols of scientific and technological hubris) is as legitimate as the scien­
tific perception of it, rather than a deviation from objective reality (Joffe, 2003). This 
recognition is important in order to represent a risk in all its complexity. In turn, this 
implies that the CMU approach would benefit from being complemented with an ap­
proach that can better account for the non-scientific risk dimensions of a risk.
3.4.2 Completeness and accessibility of mental models of risk
Beyond limits imposed by researchers’ biases, there are difficulties in uncovering 
people’s mental models because “the ‘black box’ o f  human mental models will never 
be completely transparent" (Rouse et al, 1986; p.349). Entirely capturing a mental 
model is difficult, because they are dynamic entities that have a multiplicity of forms 
even for a particular individual in a specific situation (Jungermann et al, 1988; Rouse 
etal, 1986).
Also, apart from incompleteness discovering what a person’s mental model is like is 
difficult because all of a person’s belief structures may not be available to inspection
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(Johnson, 1993). But in agreement with Rouse et al (1986) the present thesis argues 
that mental model research should focus on its practical aims. We take a more prag­
matic view by considering its uses for risk communication. Completeness is less of a 
problem when taking a functionalist perspective as in the present study. Lay people’s 
mental models of a risk do not need to be complete or consistent for them to be effec­
tive, a reasonable large and coherent interconnected set of facts and hypotheses can 
be workable and robust (Kahnemann, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).
3.4.3 The individualistic orientation of mental models of risk
However, a significant shortcoming of the mental model approach is its individualis­
tic orientation. Because of the cognitive research tradition to date and the subsequent 
neglect of the social context of beliefs, explanations regarding the development and 
the origins of mental models focus solely on individual information processing.
By focusing on an individual’s cognitive processing the CMU approach essentially 
overlooks how social processes may confirm or alter initial interpretations of events. 
The dynamics, by which the patterns and contents of risk representations are ac­
quired and maintained, are mostly ignored. As such, the mental model approach 
takes the world as a given, rather than as partly a social construct. This may be espe­
cially problematic for the study of risk, which as previous chapters indicate, is at 
least in part, socially constructed.
Hence the CMU approach cannot explain how mental models of a risk actually 
emerge. Despite a broad range of empirical studies the issue of how exactly indi­
viduals come to think of the world in a particular way has largely been neglected (an 
exception is Breakwell, 2001). Some mental models are highly artificial and acquired 
only by deliberate cultural training, e.g. models governing domains of pure mathe­
matics. Others are natural, acquired without explicit instruction, and used by ‘every­
one’ (Johnson-Laird, 1983). This latter point hints at some social or cultural con­
struction of mental models, but Johnson-Laird does not offer any further detail.
Mental models are constructed when we make inferences that can be either explicit 
requiring conscious effort, or implicit, outside conscious awareness (Johnson-Laird,
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1983). This distinction between explicit and implicit inferences suggests that we 
must also consider the conditions under which inferences are made. When suggesting 
that some of those are outside conscious awareness, Johnson-Laird (1983) indicates 
the importance of considering the situational and socio-cultural contexts. As the true 
creator of an idea is not the individual but the thought collective11 (Fleck, 1935), it is 
unlikely that the creator of a mental model is the individual rather than society.
Yet it is a long-standing problem in social psychology that explanations and hence 
interventions are often focused at the individual failing to recognise that people’s 
views are located and legitimised within social groups. Lewin (1958) already showed 
in his paper on changing food preferences that it is difficult to change attitudes by 
working on individual attitudes alone. Rather, attitudinal change is far more likely 
when the social context is incorporated as representations are often the outcome of 
group processes. Thus if risk representations are indeed the outcome of group proc­
esses and legitimised as such then one needs to address the normative frameworks 
that lie behind expressed attitudes. In that respect, the CMU approach is lacking, in­
deed it can be argued that it is a socially deficient model as it focuses on the individ­
ual in isolation, neglecting the social context of risk perception and risk communica­
tion.
3.5 Utilising SRT to complement the mental model approach
“The greatest error o f  individualistic psychology is the assumption that a 
person thinks. This leads to a continual search for the source o f thought 
within the individual himself and for the reasons why he thinks in a par­
ticular way and not in any other. What actually thinks within a person is 
not the individual himself but his social community. The source o f his 
thinking is not within himself but is to be found in his social environment 
and in the very social atmosphere he *breathes ”
(Gumplowicz, 1905; p.46 op cit)
11 Fleck suggests that "if we define’ thought collective’ as a community ofpersons mutually exchang­
ing ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction, we will find by implication that it also provides the 
special ‘carrier ’for the historical development o f any field o f thought, as well as for the given stock of 
knowledge and level o f culture. This we have designated thought style” (Fleck, 1935; p.39).
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Gumplowicz’s (1905) quote above indicates the importance of incorporating the so­
cial context when investigating risk representations. Cognitively orientated ap­
proaches (such as the CMU approach) are practical to develop efficient and possibly 
predictive models. Yet although they can clarify how individuals think and act in 
various circumstances cognitive approaches are insufficient because of their lack of 
concern about supraindividual dynamics (i.e. cultural, social, and ideological dynam­
ics). Lorenzi-Cioldi (2000) argues that this focus on individual models has distracted 
researchers from studying the conditions that facilitate, hinder or moderate the im­
plementation of cognitive principles. The individual appears to be simply an infor­
mation processor according to certain mechanical rules. Hence a socially orientated 
approach is required to explain why and when such general cognitive principles are 
activated and applied in social reality. In this respect
"Molecular approaches to social cognition and more comprehensive ap­
proaches to social representations complement one another. ”
(Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2000; p.220)
Thinking is always ‘situated* and can therefore only be fully understood by taking 
the situation into account (Lave, 1988). Hence for the present research we choose to 
supplement the CMU approach with social representations theory (SRT). Following 
the discussion of the limitations of the CMU approach above, the following sections 
outline how SRT can alleviate some of these shortcomings.
3.5.1 Defining social representations
Moscovici (1963) defines social representations as “the elaborating o f  a social ob­
ject by the community for the purpose o f behaving and communicating” and as a so­
cially determined “universe o f  opinions” (Moscovici, 1963; p.xiii). Although 
Moscovici*s use of the term social representation has been criticised as lacking a 
clear operational meaning (Hammond, 1993), the common theme of various defini­
tions is the existence of some form of a shared ideation across a group.
The key point is that social representations constitute collective systems of meaning 
which may be expressed, or whose effects may be observed in values, ideas and
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practises (Duveen and Lloyd, 1993). In short, social representations are more than a 
system of images inherited from culture rather they can be regarded as the result of a 
given group’s confrontation of the objects in its environment with its social reference 
criteria (Kaes, 1968). A group’s social representations of an object are a complex 
product of available information about that object and attitudes towards it12. Because 
they are the shared affective property of a group, rather than the mental property of 
isolated individuals, they are social representations (Morgan and Schwalbe, 1990).
In turn, SRT obliges the researcher to move beyond the notions of a generic informa­
tion processor as implied by the mental model approach to the social contexts of be­
liefs in which individuals live and interact. This is achieved by pointing to factors 
that determine the content of representations, facilitate their emergence, activation, 
and use (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2000). In this way, SRT shifts the theoretical focus from the 
formal properties of individuals’ mental models to the properties of the surrounding 
social context (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2000). By incorporating this wider context, mental 
models are “socialised” turning them into social representations.
3.5.2 “The thinking society”
Representations are social in at least three senses. Firstly, they are linked to commu­
nication processes, most importantly, unstructured everyday talk (Moscovici, 1984). 
Secondly, social representations are social because they provide a way of distin­
guishing between social groups. Thus they are a unifying and homogenising force; 
and indeed, sharing a common representation may be the very thing that makes 
groups what they are (McKinlay, Potter and Wetherell, 1993). Thirdly, social repre­
sentations provide an agreed code for communication. To the extent to which people 
share a representation, they will understand each other and be able to have fluid and 
intelligible conversations (McKinlay et al, 1993).
12 More formally, a social representation can be characterised as the relation between three elements: 
1) Subjects or carriers of the representation, 2) An object that is represented, a concrete entity or ab­
stract idea, and 3) A project or pragmatic context, of a social group within which the representation 
makes sense (For a more detailed discussion, please see Bauer and Gaskell, 1999).
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In SRT, the social and the individual are not seen as opposed universes, but rather is 
the social seen as a product of communication and interaction between individual 
minds culminating in “the thinking society” (Gaskell, 2001). Although the concep­
tion that society does not think prevails, it is evident that individuals and groups are 
not simply passive receptors, but think for themselves, and produce and communi­
cate their own specific representations (Moscovici, 1984).
Thus social representations have a dual existence as both product and process. First, 
they are the product of social thinking, structuring beliefs and knowledge about phe­
nomena considered significant for a coherent community (Philogene and Deaux, 
2001). Second, they are the processes by which people construct reality, shape their 
thoughts and talk about events and objects (Philogene et al, 2001). Hence they are 
the products of interconnectedness between people and the processes of references 
through which we conceive the world (Philogene et al, 2001), allowing us to make 
sense of the world and communicate that sense to each other (Moscovici, 1984).
In brief, representations are social creations, and as such, part of social reality. When 
contemplating individuals and objects, inherited genetic predispositions, learned hab­
its, preserved memories and cultural categories all combine to make them as we see 
them (Moscovici, 1984). They arise through communication and interaction, rather 
than being an individual construct. As a result of the conceptual mediation between 
the social and individual (Wagner, 1994), and the recognition of the importance of 
our social reality, SRT may help to “socialise” the individual in psychology.
3.6 Benefits of social representations theory for risk communication
In relation to risk communication the advantages of utilising both SRT and the men­
tal model approach are evident. To begin with SRT explicitly aims to understand 
common sense knowledge rather than perceiving lay perceptions as “deviant”. As a 
result, the theory may offer an alternative to the information-deficit model. Further­
more, by appreciating the social context of beliefs SRT may also help to shed light 
on the origins of risk representations.
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3.6.1 Understanding common sense
In its present form, social representations research was initiated in the late 1950’s 
with Moscovici’s investigation into what French men and women thought about psy­
choanalysis (Moscovici, 1961). In essence, Moscovici wished to understand what 
happens when a scientific theory becomes represented and absorbed into common 
knowledge. Common sense is continually being created in society, especially when 
scientific and technical knowledge is popularised (Moscovici, 1984).
Consequently SRT has been specifically developed for the study of lay knowledge 
(Moscovici, 1976). Hence a distinct advantage of SRT over the mental model ap­
proach is that it explicitly aims to understand the productions, structures and func­
tions of common sense (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). Thus in contrast to the mental 
model approach which focuses on individual cognitive processes and their limita­
tions, SRT emphasises meaning-making and the complexity of common-sense think­
ing. Social representations are recognised as being more than purely cognitive or sci­
entific constructs. Rather, they have affective and prescriptive functions, and are 
likely to be dynamic and continually changing (Gaskell and Fraser, 1990). Thus util­
ising SRT for risk perception research means looking at how lay people make sense 
of a risk rather than focusing on the scientific aspects of the risk alone.
3.6.2 The reified and consensual universes
Moscovici (1976) distinguishes between the ‘sacred’ sphere of science and the ‘pro­
fane’ sphere of ordinary life, and refers to these as different worlds of meaning as the 
reified and consensual universes. The sciences are the means by which people under­
stand the reified universe, while social representations deal with the consensual.
The worst crisis occurs when tensions between consensual and reified universes cre­
ate a rift between scientific and common sensical knowledge (Moscovici, 1984). In 
relation to risk, competing expert and lay representations are common- hence risk in 
general is excellent territory for contested social representations (Breakwell, 2001).
Moreover, Moscovici (1984) proposes that the character of social representations is 
revealed particularly in times of crisis and upheaval when new concerns arise for dif­
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ferent groups. When a group or its images are undergoing a change people are more 
willing to talk and images and expressions are livelier (Moscovici, 1984). Therefore, 
SRT is especially relevant for describing and understanding ‘hot’ social issues, i.e. 
social objects in the making or in rapid change, such as biotechnology (Gaskell, 
2001).
Since science has transformed, and will likely continue to transform, life as we know 
it today, it is important to study the social representations of science (Farr, 1993a). 
Indeed, Farr argues that the study of social representations is a form of social science 
that natural scientists need to take seriously if their advise to governments is to be­
come more effective (Farr, 1993a). It is challenging if the consensual and reified uni­
verses are “worlds apart” as this inhibits any communication between both spheres 
(Farr, 1993a). With regards to risk communication, if scientists ignore lay representa­
tions they may find that the consequences of the advice they offer governments is not 
what they intended (Farr, 1993a).
3.6.3 An alternative to the information-deficit model
Past societal risk communication failures have shown that communications based on 
the information-deficit model are often insufficient to alleviate lay concerns. Yet in a 
sense the CMU approach is still a version of the information-deficit model because it 
regards lay risk perceptions as (potentially) incorrect beliefs that need to be corrected 
through the provision of more scientific information.
In contrast, having been especially developed for the study of common sense, SRT 
appreciates that lay perceptions are not inherently faulty and instead regards them as 
the common sense response to the challenges posed by the experts (Bauer et al, 
1999). Hence lay perceptions are not interpreted as false or biased representations of 
the experts’ understanding, but rather recognised as a reality of their own. This 
means that plural risk responses are possible, and that there is not one right and one 
wrong response as implied by CMU approach.
While lay people’s risk representations may be an irritation to experts, their emer­
gence, collection, description and functional analysis is one of the potential contribu-
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tions of SRT to the CMU approach. Thus SRT is a public-centred bottom-up rather 
than expert-orientated top-down approach. By recognising the social correctness13 of 
lay knowledge, SRT may offer an alternative to the often criticised information- 
deficit model.
3.6.4 The origins of risk representations
Rather than individualist assumptions common in the traditional risk literature, 
whereby human thoughts are studied as if they arise within and reside exclusively 
inside individual minds, SRT proposes that human thought is relational at root (Joffe,
2003). Thus in contrast to the mental model approach, this framework appreciates 
that representations are not constructed within individual minds but that they emerge 
within society, within interpersonal communication, the mass media and social, po­
litical and cultural institutions.
In particular, SRT is concerned with how new knowledge changes as it is trans­
formed from the reified into the consensual sphere. Often, it is through the media that 
lay people are first confronted with novel scientific information, such as information 
about risk. Thus the media likely play a major role in the development of social rep­
resentations of a risk as it means that representations are communicated between 
people and thus enter their thoughts and explanations of new events (Joffe, 2003).
Regarding biotechnology, many of its scientific aspects are incomprehensible to the 
untrained person. Since most people do not have the time to follow detailed expert 
discussions or read scientific journals, the majority relies on media reporting and per­
sonal conversations (Bauer et al, 1999). In this way, biotechnology becomes a reality 
through images, metaphors, and 30 on. Resulting representations give shape to the 
public’s understanding and define the characteristics of the social object “biotech­
nology” (Gaskell, 2001).
13 Habermas (1973) argues that images and beliefs can be socially true- even when incorrect in the 
sense of scientific truth- when they are “good to think”, i.e. when their meanings are well embedded 
in a group's local world of experience, and their symbolisms appeal to the group's dominant aesthetic 
sentiments. If images and associated beliefs are good to think, they are said to be socially true.
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SRT appreciates that a re-presentation of biotechnology is not a final outcome but 
rather a process that is essentially socially generated and sustained, resulting in a 
number of realities of biotechnology in the public sphere (Gaskell, 2001) because far 
from being passive receivers of media presentations lay people actively forge repre­
sentations in line with their concerns. By analysing the different representations of 
biotechnology underlying diverse positions, it can be documented how and under 
what conditions social representations enable, constrain or change the trajectory of 
biotechnology (Bauer et al, 1999), an understanding of which is of major importance 
for the development of better risk communications.
3.6.5 Familiarising the unfamiliar
More specifically, SRT suggests two major processes of how (generally unfamiliar) 
scientific knowledge becomes familiarised and of how lay people may make sense of 
a novel risk: anchoring and objectification.
Anchoring involves the naming and classifying of novel encounters, ideas, things, or 
persons based on an existing order of meaningful names (Moscovici, 1984). It draws 
something foreign into our particular system of categories and compares it to the 
paradigm of a category, which is thought to be suitable. Insofar as a given object or 
idea is compared to the paradigm of a category it acquires the characteristics of that 
category and is re-adjusted to fit within it. Even when aware of a certain discrepancy, 
of the approximation of our assessment we cling to it to preserve a minimum of co­
herence between the unknown and the known (Moscovici, 1984).
Objectification is a far more active process than anchoring. It solidifies and makes 
tangible the abstract new idea, turning the idea of unfamiliarity into the essence of 
reality. Every representation realises a different level of reality. These levels are cre­
ated and maintained by a collectivity and vanish with it, having no reality of their 
own (Moscovici, 1984). In the process of objectification an icon, metaphor or trope 
is constructed which comes to stand for the new phenomenon or idea. The choice of 
icon, etc. is not arbitrary but related to culture (Wagner and Kronberger, 2001). This 
is shown in Jodelet’s (1991) study where French lay subjects (villagers and farmers) 
talked about mental illness in terms of ‘decay’, or ‘curdling’ like butter. As such so-
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cial and cultural conditions of certain groups favour specific kinds of trope to repre­
sent and familiarise an unfamiliar phenomenon. Thus group differences may be soci- 
ostructural, historical, cultural, subcultural, educational, and so on (Wagner et al, 
2001).
It should be noted that anchors and objects are not wholly fixed rather they are transi­
tional pointers in the evolution of meaning of an aspect of the world (Moscovici,
1984). Also, it is implicit in the notion of anchoring that a social representation of 
one target relates to that of another. Unfortunately, empirically, the problem lies in 
knowing when one finishes and another begins. This decision may be arbitrary, and 
as in mental model research there are no clear criteria which, once satisfied, ensure 
that the representation has been catalogued (Breakwell and Canter, 1993).
3.7 Reflections on social representations theory for the study of risk
Hence, empirically, SRT is open to criticism on the clarity of its methods and per­
haps as a consequence, some of its findings (Gaskell et al, 1990). Methods for de­
scribing social representations have presented recurring problems, as the ways in 
which the notion of representations may be conceptualised, articulated, and incorpo­
rated into empirical research are often ambiguous. Unfortunately, so far the frame­
work offers relatively little guidance on the design of empirical research (Bauer et al, 
1999). However, in the present study SRT is used in conjunction with the CMU ap­
proach with its very clear guidelines, ensuring mainly that risk representations can be 
captured in all their complexity and richness.
In essence, SRT is still a developing theory and further empirical research is required 
in order to resolve some of its empirical uncertainties. Overall, despite its limitations, 
it seems that SRT can make a vital contribution to the mental model approach to risk 
communication. By incorporating the social contexts of beliefs and focusing explic­
itly on common sensical knowledge, SRT may help better to understand how lay 
people make sense of a novel risk.
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3.8 Conclusions Chapter Three
In conclusion, to study risk representations, the benefits of complementing the cogni­
tively oriented CMU approach with the constructivist SRT approach are evident. Al­
though the inclusion of lay views indicates that the CMU approach is a step in the 
right direction away from the information deficit model, it is still largely a top down 
approach aiming to bring lay views more in line with those of the experts. But risk 
communications require more than the simple information-deficit correction ap­
proach targeted at the individual. They also require acknowledgement of the motiva­
tional and subcultural dynamics that underpin the development of the original mental 
model (Breakwell, 2001).
Hence despite offering a useful framework to characterise the understanding and 
relevance of particular risks to people, the CMU approach can be criticised with re­
gards to its individualistic orientation and neglect of the social origins of beliefs. 
While the approach can be used to make sense out of data and support the design of 
relevant communication content, it is questionable whether it is sufficient to address 
societal risks such as GM food.
To alleviate these shortcomings the present thesis synthesises the CMU approach 
with SRT to effectively mediate .between social and individual structures. By looking 
at risk in its social and cultural contexts, we aim to “socialise” mental models.
Because it deals explicitly with common sense, SRT may provide risk communica­
tion research with a vital new perspective on lay knowledge. Rather than regarding 
lay risk perceptions as deviant, it is more fruitful to develop a deeper awareness of 
how people come to understand and reason about risk. This is the aim of the present 
study. The chosen research methodologies and procedures are outlined in the follow­
ing chapter.
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
GM food has been a huge public controversy during the 1990s, receiving extensive 
media attention, and culminating in widespread public resistance. It is widely ac­
knowledged that a major determinant of resistance to GM food, are lay risk percep­
tions which, as established in Chapter One, often differ significantly from those of 
scientific experts. And because expert and lay people perceive GM food risks rather 
differently, it makes communication between both parties challenging, partly because 
they do not “speak the same language”.
Thus it is increasingly appreciated that, in addition to the scientific estimates of a 
risk, lay concerns often dealing with moral and ethical risk dimensions may need to 
be addressed to avoid further public controversies. However so far, the power of the 
moral aspects of risk has been insufficiently researched. In many ways it is still in­
sufficiently understood how expert and lay people make sense of risk. But in order to 
improve risk communication efforts, it first has to be better understood how risks are 
“constructed” by both groups.
4.1 Research aims and objectives: Part I
The aim of the first part of the present thesis is an exploration of expert and lay GM 
food risk representations with the help of the two frameworks outlined in the previ­
ous chapter, i.e. the science-based CMU approach and the constructivist social repre­
sentations theory.
1. Part I explores expert and lay representations of GM food risk in depth using 
the CMU approach.
1.1 Accordingly, the first objective is to create an expert mental model of GM 
food risk to show GM food risk based on science.
1.2 The second objective is to create a lay mental model of GM food risk to show 
how lay people perceive the risk.
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1.3 In line with the CMU approach, expert and lay mental models are compared 
and contrasted to show similarities and differences in both groups’ represen­
tations of GM food risk.
1.4 In turn, this comparison is aimed to provide some implications for risk com­
munication.
4.2 Research aims and objectives: Part II
The research proceeded incrementally. The first part of the research as outlined 
above was followed by a secondary study which aimed to answer some of the ques­
tions raised in the first part. The exploration of the CMU approach led us to focus on 
the non-scientific issues within the GM food debate and how, if at all, the CMU ap­
proach might deal with those.
2. Thus Part II explores lay perceptions of one particular non-scientific dimen­
sion of GM food risk, namely lay people’s concern that GM is ‘messing with 
nature '.
2.1 The objective is to investigate what people actually mean when they make the 
judgement that GM is *unnatural ’ and is ‘against nature'.
2.2 Therefore, the frames and anchors people use to make the judgement that GM 
is ‘unnatural' are explored.
2.3 By viewing GM food in the context of other nature- and food-related ‘ob­
jects’ we aim to establish a comparative judgement to show how nature and 
naturalness are constructed in relation to food.
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4.3 Research design
For our study of representations of GM food risk, we chose three types of qualitative 
methodologies: for the first part of the research interviews and focus groups, and for 
the second part, a free associations task. Figure 4.1 shows an outline of the research 
design. In line with the CMU approach the first research part comprises in-depth in­
terviews of nine scientific experts on agricultural biotechnology about the risks and 
benefits associated with GM foods. Secondly, with a topic guide based on the results 
of the first step, five focus groups were conducted with the lay public. Data were tri­
angulated with ALCESTE and Atlas/ti.
The second research part, focusing specifically on lay representations of nature and 
naturalness in relation to food, comprises an internet administered free associations 
task. Data were prepared with EXCEL for the further analyses with correspondence 
analysis (CORA) and cluster analysis. All analytical tools are explained in detail in 
the relevant chapters.
Figure 4.1 Research design
Methodology Analytical tools
Research P art I 
‘Risk’
Elite
interviews
Focus groups
j ALCESTE I J Atlas/ti
j  ALCESTE 1 J Atlas/ti
Research P art II 
*Nature’ Free associa 
tion task
EXCEL I CORA | Cluster 
) analysis
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The following section discusses why we chose qualitative research to answer the re­
search questions outlined above and introduces the chosen methodologies, before we 
present the research procedures for the first part of the study.
4.4 Investigating representations of risk
The original meaning of the word method is “a route that leads to the goal” (Kvale, 
1996; p. 12), thus one has to first determine what the goal of the research is. There is 
no single best way of doing social research as qualitative and quantitative method­
ologies have different contributions to make. For the present research aims, there are 
two major benefits of using qualitative methodologies. First, this approach can help 
to examine risk representations in their contexts, and second, it allows the partici­
pants, rather than the researcher, to set the agenda.
As outlined above, the overall aim of the present thesis is the exploration of expert 
and lay representations of GM food, examining in detail how and why these repre­
sentations may differ. Thus we focus on concrete cases in their social, cultural and 
historical contexts. Qualitative research is more suitable to achieve these research 
goals because it aims to understand beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations in-depth 
and in relation to the behaviours of people in particular social contexts (Gaskell, 
2000).
Further, an essential difference between qualitative and quantitative methods of re­
search in the social sciences concerns the issue of who sets the agenda- the re­
searcher or the respondent (Farr, 1993b). Since the present thesis is primarily con­
cerned with studying risk as experienced by the audience, it is important that the re­
searcher does not impose her own representations on those of their informants. When 
aiming to understand expert and lay risk representations qualitative methodologies 
are useful to provide access to respondents’ cultural and moral worlds (Silverman, 
1993).
Moreover, as neither the form nor the content of a representation that will emerge 
from an investigation can be known in advance (Moscovici, 1987), there is a general
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preference for the use of qualitative techniques to study both social representations 
(e.g. Gervais, 1997; Herzlich, 1973; Jodelet, 1983) as well as mental models (e.g. 
Bostrum et al, 1994; MacGregor, Slovic and Malmfors, 1999; Owen, Colboume, 
Clayton and Fife-Schaw, 1999).
4.4.1 Interviews
Tarde (1910) first maintained that representations are created in the course of con­
versation. He demonstrated how they emerge in specific places, how they are deter­
mined by the physical and psychological dimensions of those encounters between 
individuals, and how they change over time. Conversation shapes and animates so­
cial representations and thus gives them a life of their own (Moscovici, 1984).
Consequently, interviews, often described as a conversation, albeit with a purpose 
(e.g. Glazier and Powell, 1992; Rubin and Rubin, 1995) are particularly useful to ex­
amine people’s shared beliefs in a social context.
Hence as proposed by the CMU approach to risk communication for the first part of 
the thesis we utilise open-ended interviews. Here, expert and lay mental models are 
extracted from interview transcripts. The major advantage of this method is that 
open-ended responses can identify those concepts that respondents themselves per­
ceive to be relevant to the domain in question (Rouse et al, 1986). Participants can be 
encouraged to explore their own knowledge structures as each topic raised by re­
spondents, they can later be asked to elaborate (Granger Morgan et al, 2002). The 
limitation is of course that the approach is exceptionally time- and labour-intensive 
limiting studies to very small numbers.
4.4.2 Elite interviews
In accordance with the CMU approach to risk communication, we conduct in-depth 
elite interviews with scientific experts on agricultural biotechnology. Elite interviews 
are a specific form of, generally semi-structured, interviews whereby the range of 
potentially relevant information provided largely deals with a particular expertise 
(Moyser and Wagstaff, 1987). Unfortunately, while interviews are established as an
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effective method of data collection for research on elite subjects (Odendhal and 
Shaw, 1995), there is still a shortage of methodological literature on applicable re­
search practises. With few exceptions (e.g. Hertz and Imber, 1995; Moyser et al, 
1987) the literature of interviewing seldom differentiates between elite and non-elite 
subjects, although there are some identifiable difficulties specifically in relation to 
the former. For example, problems of access often abound, and it may be especially 
difficult to get past gatekeepers.
Further, since the term elite is closely linked with the operation of power, control and 
privilege, any analysis of elites also depends on the broader interpretations of power 
in society, and on an understanding of the relationship between elites and non-elites, 
and their respective environments (Odendhal et al, 1995). Thus elites should not be 
studied in isolation from the contexts in which they operate, making it critical that 
researchers substantiate elite interviews with additional non-elite interviews (Odend­
hal et al, 1995). In line with this suggestion, the present thesis combines elite inter­
views with scientific experts with focus groups to study non-elite (in our case lay) 
participants.
4.4.3 Focus groups
Individual and group interviews are in many ways, very similar and can be equally 
effective for answering certain research questions (Morgan, 1998). Both methodolo­
gies constitute dynamic meaning-making occasions as knowledge is created through 
the points of view of the interviewer and the interviewee as both actively construct 
meaning in each other’s talk (Silverman, 1997).
Yet it has been suggested that the focus group context has several advantages over 
the individual interview, such as that it facilitates openness and enhances disclosure 
(Wilkinson, 1998). Wilkinson argues that social desirability is less of a problem in 
focus groups than in interviews, as discussions tend to generate expressions of more 
‘socially undesirable’ opinions. In a group, people are more willing to entertain novel 
ideas, to take greater risk and to show attitude polarisation (Gaskell, 2000). Thus 
group pressure can be viewed as positive rather than negative because it can stimu­
late new ideas and thought (Wilkinson, 1998).
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Although in focus groups, the researcher has less control over the data produced than 
in one-to-one interviews (Gibbs, 1997) this may be advantageous rather than disad­
vantageous. Compared to the individual interview, it is harder still for the researcher 
to impose his own agenda in the group context. The researcher’s influence is diffused 
due to being in a group rather than a one-to-one situation, enabling participants’ to 
better explore their own meanings (Morgan, 1998).
4.4.4 Functional equivalence of interviews and focus groups
Like individual interviews, focus groups enable the researcher to listen to partici­
pants. But since focus group participants talk primarily to each other, they talk in a 
way that is much closer to everyday conversation than in the one-to-one interview. 
Focus groups share many of the features of ordinary social interaction, and reflect 
everyday social processes, such as sharing information, expressing dis/agreements, 
asking questions and providing answers (Wilkinson, 1998). Thus an advantage of the 
opinions generated in group, over opinions elicited from individual interviews, is that 
they have a higher degree of external validity (Wilkinson, 1998).
Essentially, focus groups might generate opinions more like those of the public than 
would even a large number of isolated respondents because they are influenced by 
the social nature of the group interaction, rather than relying on the individual per­
spective (Gaskell, 2000).
Consequently the social dynamics through which mental models are acquired and 
maintained can be highlighted. Because the interplay of the personal and the social 
can be explored, focus groups are especially functional for investigating the structure 
and processes of social representations (Breakwell, 1993). In that sense, the limita­
tion that the mental model approach is strongly centred on the individual, ignoring 
the wider social environment can, to an extent, be overcome by utilising focus groups 
rather than individual interviews.
In contrast, focus groups are less appropriate for experts. Apart from the pragmatic 
difficulties of convening high ranking scientific experts in one session, it may also 
inhibit discussion, and lead to arguments. Therefore, conducting elite focus groups
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would have been less suitable for examining different expert perspectives. Thus for 
the present study, lay focus groups and expert interviews can be seen as functionally 
equivalent.
4.5 Free associations
For the second research part, the present study utilises word association tasks to ex­
amine issues that were found to be important distinguishing factors between expert 
and lay people (i.e. issues concerned with nature and naturalness in relation to food), 
in depth and on a larger sample.
In essence, free associations are a special form of open questions, which can give 
good access to the understanding respondents have of a target object (Wagner, 1997). 
People are simply asked to spontaneously say what comes to their mind in relation to 
a particular stimulus, such as a word or a picture.
Free associations bear resemblance to the idea of associative memory in cognitive 
psychology. An associative memory is a system which stores mappings of specific 
input representations to specific output representations. That is to say, a system that 
“associates” two patterns such that when one is encountered subsequently, the other 
can be reliably recalled (Kohonen, 1984). In that way, we can infer that respondents’ 
associated words to say ‘natural things ’ to some extent parallel their representations 
of the object in their memory.
In social psychology, free associations were initially used as a means to investigate 
shared conceptions of widely used notions (such as intelligence) assuming that re­
sults show a consensual appreciation of reality, allowing access into people’s knowl­
edge structures (Doise, Clements and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). Moreover, free associa­
tion tasks have frequently been used for the study of social representations (e.g. Di 
Giacomo, 1980; de Rosa, 1988). The resulting free associations data has the benefit 
that it can be relatively easy formalised and utilised in a wide range of ways.
According to Wagner (1997), the word association technique can be located some­
where in-between closed questions and qualitative techniques. On the one hand, they
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can be applied to larger samples in a reasonable short amount of time. On the other 
hand, they allow rather unrestricted access to what respondents think. Unfortunately, 
to date the method is still an under-theorised technique.
4.6 Refuting criticisms of qualitative research
From a positivist perspective, qualitative approaches are often criticised on several 
points, such as the lack of generalisability of their findings. But in qualitative ap­
proaches the goal of generalisability is replaced by an emphasis on contextuality and 
heterogeneity of knowledge.
The particular strength of many qualitative approaches is their advantaged access to 
the common sense understanding of participants which provides their worldview 
(Kvale, 1996). Thus for the present research, the deliberate use of the subjective per­
spective is not a negative bias. Rather than lacking objectivity, the qualitative inter­
view may obtain a privileged position of the social world because it allows the re­
searcher to explore representations within a linguistically constituted and interper- 
sonally negotiated social world (Kvale, 1996).
Additionally, a major criticism of qualitative research is concerned with their as­
sessment methods. In the positivist tradition, representativeness, reliability, and va­
lidity are the criteria of sound research. But these criteria are less applicable for 
qualitative research as they do not adequately acknowledge the specific character, 
aims and objectives of qualitative inquiry (Gaskell and Bauer, 2000).
Regarding representativeness, in qualitative research it generally does not make 
sense to ask and answer questions of sampling or specific methods in an isolated 
way. Whether sampling is appropriate can only be answered with reference to the 
research question, to the results, to the generalisations that are aimed at and to the 
methods used (Flick, 1998). As the aim of the present research is not to establish the 
population prevalence of certain beliefs, but rather to explore specific representations 
of risk, the relevance of the cases is more import than their representativeness.
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Concerning reliability and validity, Gaskell and Bauer (2000) note a dilemma be­
tween these criterions in qualitative research. High reliability does not automatically 
confer validity, as in interpretation validity may be associated with low reliability. 
And while inter-coder reliability may provide a partial solution, it can be questioned 
whether different coders have a valid interpretation of the text (Gaskell et al, 2000). 
Thus the present study adopts a range of alternative assessment criteria in accordance 
with Gaskell et al14.
4.6.1 Alternative assessment criteria for qualitative research
Gaskell et al (2000) recommend claims-making and public accountability as the cen­
tral issues in the qualitative research process. Claims-making suggests that claims 
based on empirical research must be supported by rigorous evidence, while public 
accountability describes the idea that science operates in public, rather than private, 
domain. The latter rests on claims within two broad criteria: confidence and rele­
vance.
Confidence markers for qualitative research incorporate triangulation and reflexivity. 
Therefore, we triangulate the methodologies in both parts of the research to validate 
findings. Further, transparency and procedural clarity are provided through the de­
tailed descriptions of the research procedures (as well as the appendices). Moreover, 
the use of thick description shows how e.g. codes and quotations occur in their origi­
nal contexts.
Another confidence marker is corpus construction which, Gaskell et al argue, is func­
tionally equivalent to representative sampling and sample size as it aims to maximise 
the variety of unknown representations. This we aim to achieve with our range of 
expert participants and the segmentation of the focus groups. Since sample size is 
less important than evidence of meaning saturation few interviews distributed across 
a wide range of strata are preferable over the absolute number of interviews (Gaskell 
et al, 2000).
14 Various other efforts have been made to develop new standards and rules for assessing qualitative 
research. Generally, these incorporate similar criteria such as trustworthiness, credibility, dependabil­
ity, transferability and confirmability (e.g. Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
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Additional relevance markers (referring to the extent to which the research is viable 
in the sense that it links to theory internally or some common sense externally) in­
clude local surprise and communicative validation (Gaskell et al, 2000). Hence to 
gain further data authenticity, participants were offered the opportunity to read the 
interview transcripts and/or view findings on a webpage and provide feedback if they 
so wished.
These alternative criteria imply that qualitative research should be assessed through 
its own particular principles, rather than traditional positivist benchmarks, in order to 
fully capitalise on the values of this research perspective. Applying alternative as­
sessment criteria, qualitative methodologies clearly offer a valid and sound strategy 
for conducting social research.
Akin to choosing a research perspective, deciding on a particular methodology al­
ways brings with it its own benefits and limitations. The decisive factor is that the 
method used is consistent with the assumptions and underlying principles of the the­
ory. With regards to the present research topic and the research objectives, we have 
shown three different qualitative methodologies- elite interviews, focus groups and 
free associations- to be suitable to study representations of GM food. The following 
section outlines our research procedures for the first part of the thesis.
4.7 Research procedure: Part I
4.7.1 Elite interview participants
Expert participants were chosen from a broad range of UK institutions dealing with 
plant biotechnology. These included the Advisory Committee for Novel Food and 
Processes (ACNFP), the Advisory Committee for Releases to the Environment 
(ACRE), the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC), the 
Institute for Food, Science and Technology (IFST), the John Innes Centre, the Agri­
cultural Technologies Group English Nature, the British Society of Plant Breeders, 
and Genewatch UK.
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These institutions advise the UK government on decisions related to agricultural bio­
technology, and are recognised as providing the highest level of scientific expertise. 
The selection of expert interviewees was based on their positions within these institu­
tions. Using a ‘top-down approach’ those deemed to possess exemplary reputations 
(such as ‘chair’ or ‘director’) were contacted first, and if unavailable, asked to refer 
an alternative participant.
Participants were initially either contacted via email (directly, through referral or via 
gatekeepers), or approached at open gatherings related to the GM Science Review 
(2003), and asked to participate in an interview about GM food. During these initial 
contacts, the researcher’s identity was presented and the research aim was clearly 
stated. In that way, Morse’s (1994) criteria of a “good informant”15 were met. Nine 
expert participants were successfully recruited.
4.7.2 Elite interview topic guide
In accordance with the CMU approach, the expert topic guide was driven by the sci­
entific and popular literature on agricultural biotechnology. Issues to be addressed 
included current and future developments in relation to GM food, issues of food 
safety and regulation, and various issues of scientific uncertainty. Interviews were 
semi-structured to allow for unexpected information, and the interview schedule was 
kept flexible, although the topic guide was followed fairly consistently to increase 
the comparability of data.
Questions were open-ended to invite opinions and general knowledge, and to cover 
areas where the interviewer’s own knowledge was lacking. In order to critically ex­
amine alternative perspectives several confrontational questions were included. 
Please see Appendix A for the expert topic guide.
15 In relation to expert interviews, Morse (1994) defines a ‘good informant’ as someone who firstly, 
has the necessary knowledge and expertise of the issue under study, secondly has the capability to 
reflect and articulate, and thirdly is willing to participate.
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4.7.3 Elite interview procedure
Interviews were conducted between February and May 2003. Location and timing of 
the interviews was chosen at the interviewees’ convenience. For this reason, some 
interviews were conducted via telephone. An explanation for the interview was 
given, and the significance of the research and the individual’s participation in it was 
emphasised. Confidentiality was assured. The possibility of withdrawing from the 
interview at any time should the participant wish to do so was offered, and any fur­
ther questions were answered. Interviews lasted between 30-90 minutes after which 
interviewees were thanked for their participation.
All interviews were tape-recorded with participants’ consent and transcribed verba­
tim applying the general CAQDAS transcription guidelines (Lewins, 2002).
4.7.4 Elite interview pilot study
Problems during elite interviews can include blockage of the interview as the inter­
viewee proves not to be an expert as previously assumed (Moyser et al, 1987). This 
was the case with our first pilot interview, which accordingly was excluded from fur­
ther study. Although the requirement of expert knowledge in the field of GM food 
was stated explicitly during the initial contact, the pilot study indicated the need, to 
ask participants directly whether they considered themselves to be an expert in this 
area.
Also, as several issues were shown to be ambiguous the topic guide was amended 
accordingly. Definitions of ‘GM food’ were unclear, and needed to be refined. GM 
food can be defined as either food, which was processed using a GM ingredient, but 
does not contain any traceable genetically modified DNA (such as Canola oil), or as 
an actual GM product, such as a genetically modified tomato. Experts (as well as the 
literature) are equivocal on the issue of how to define a GM food. Therefore, the pre­
sent research utilises the broader definition, characterising both process and product 
as GM food.
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Furthermore, question wording was amended in that the question ‘what are the risks’ 
was changed to the more constructivist ‘what do we know about the risks’. Results of 
the pilot study are not included in the final analysis.
4.7.5 Focus group participants
We utilised a segmented convenience sample to explore a wide range of representa­
tions of GM food. Respondents were initially contacted via email and invited to par­
ticipate in a focus group. The focus group was presented as ‘an organised but infor­
mal discussion ’ about the risks and benefits of GM food, to ensure that participants 
would have something to say about the topic. Taking advantage of social networks, 
snowball sampling was utilised.
Focus groups commenced between May and June 2003. The invitation to the focus 
group was sent out 2-3 weeks in advance, and feedback was received from 45 re­
spondents who were willing to participate. A remainder was sent out two days in ad­
vance. Recruitment resulted in 39 participants with a mean age of 32 years (SD 8.3),
with a male/female ratio of 40/60. This ensued in five focus groups of between 6-10
individuals. All participants were UK residents. As a consequence of the social net­
working, in each focus group participants shared some common characteristics as 
shown in table 4.1, creating a comfortable environment for a productive discussion 
about the topic.
Table 4.1 Segmentation o f focus groups
• Focus group 1 ‘c o u n try Participants living in the countryside/villages
• Focus group 2 ‘law’: Lawyers
• Focus group 3 ‘m a tu r e Mature participants with children
• Focus group 4 'finance Finance students
• Focus group 5 ‘P h D Social Psychology PhD students
The relatively small number of both interviews and focus groups was sufficient as 
the point of meaning saturation, where no novel concepts appeared, was reached.
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4.7.6 Focus group topic guide
The focus group topic guide was informed by results of the expert interviews. It ad­
dressed issues of risk, benefit and risk management in relation to GM food. Focus 
groups were moderately structured to be open to participants’ ideas while still ad­
dressing the researcher’s interests. Thus a funnel design was used as suggested by 
Granger Morgan et al (2002). Two broad, open-ended questions { ‘what comes to 
your mind when I  mention the word GM fo o d ’, ‘what is your opinion on GM fo o d ') 
let participants express their own thoughts on the topic. This was followed by several 
central and more specific topics dealing with public health and environmental risks 
and benefits. For an outline of the focus group topic guide, please see Appendix B.
4.7.7 Focus group procedure
Focus groups were conducted at the London School of Economics and at partici­
pants’ homes, making participation as convenient as possible. Refreshments were 
provided. In each group, participants were introduced to the moderator (myself) and 
the research topic. Confidentiality was assured and participants were reminded that 
they could leave the group at any time should they wish to do so. Participants were 
informed that they should not worry about right or wrong answers as the study was 
specifically interested in what they had to say about the topic. When questions were 
addressed to the moderator, participants were told that any questions would be an­
swered after the discussion. Focus groups lasted between 1-2 hours, after which par­
ticipants were asked to complete a brief document detailing their demographics. All 
participants were thanked for their participation.
Focus groups were tape-recorded with participants’ consent with two recorders to 
provide backup for the data, and then transcribed verbatim applying the general 
CAQDAS transcription guidelines (Lewins, 2002).
4.7.8 Focus group pilot study
A pilot group was conducted with six participants. Changes to the topic guide were 
not required, thus results were incorporated in the final analysis. However, the pilot
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group was relatively small, hence subsequent group were over-recruited by two par­
ticipants.
4.7.9 Ethical considerations
For both elite interviews and focus groups, ethical guidelines as proposed by the 
British Psychological Society (1999) were followed. The present study did not re­
quire any further ethical considerations beyond confidentiality and obtaining in­
formed consent. When selecting and involving participants full information about the 
purposes and uses of participants’ contributions was provided.
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5 EXPLORING EXPERT AND LAY REPRESENTATIONS OF GM FOOD
The first exploratory data analysis of the elite interviews and focus groups was con­
ducted with the analytical tool ALCESTE. We provide a brief theoretical background 
to ALCESTE before describing our analytical procedure. Moving on to the results, 
the basic results are presented first, before the lexical classes and the resulting corre­
spondence spaces are examined. Expert and lay findings are presented separately be­
fore a comparison is drawn.
Both interviews and focus groups analyses resulted in four clusters. As could be ex­
pected in relation to the topic guides, both groups address similar issues albeit from 
different perspectives. For instance, the cluster ‘environment ’ shows that experts dis­
cuss the environmental risks of GM largely from a physical and agricultural perspec­
tive. In contrast, rather than focusing on the environmental impacts of GM per se, lay 
people frame the discussion in terms of a broader ‘nature ’ debate indicating the in­
corporation of a different type of underlying values.
The results show that ALCESTE can offer a valuable initial analysis helping to make 
sense of a relatively large data set very quickly. However, findings also indicate the 
need to investigate the data in more depth, which is done through the Atlas/ti analy­
ses in Chapter Six.
5.1 A theoretical background to ALCESTE
ALCESTE is a computerised technique for text analysis developed by Reinert during 
the 1980s. It is a tool for determining the main word distribution patterns within a 
text and it aims to obtain a primary statistical classification to reveal the most charac­
teristic words and patterns. In the words of Reinert (1998; p.l):
“The objective is to obtain a primary statistical classification o f  the 
‘simple statements’ o f  the studied corpus in function o f the way words 
are distributed within these ‘statements’- in order to reveal the most 
characteristic words. ”
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Based on correspondence analysis16, ALCESTE categorises the text into clusters ac­
cording to the distribution of vocabulary found. The analysis substitutes sentence 
meaning by examining local co-occurrences of words. The underlying idea is that the 
meaning of sentences can be captured if one finds those words that occur together in 
sentences and that are produced by as many respondents as possible (Kronberger and 
Wagner, 2000). This allows for conclusions such as that a substantial number of lay 
participants associate GM food with health risks.
Hence ALCESTE can help to understand collectively shared points of view as its un­
derlying assumption is that different point of reference produce different ways of 
talking, i.e. the use of a specific vocabulary is seen as a source for detecting ways of 
thinking about an object. The ALCESTE analysis aims to distinguish word classes 
that represent different forms of discourse about a topic of interest (Kronberger et al, 
2000).
After preparing the text, the analysis can be run using standard parameter settings so 
that the subsequent output is not influenced by the researcher’s preconceptions. Since 
categorisation often introduces researcher’s bias and needs to be well justified 
(Kronberger et al, 2000), the present research preferred to first ‘let the data speak’. 
As text is coded automatically, ALCESTE was ideal for this purpose.
In order to successfully analyse a text corpus, two preconditions have to be met. The 
corpus has to be relatively homogeneous (i.e. focus on one topic), and exceed 10,000 
words in length. In the present study, both conditions were met.
The main advantage of ALCESTE is that large quantities of material can be analysed 
quickly for recurring themes or topics. While it is less suited to hypothesis testing, it 
is appropriate for a preliminary exploration and description of data. Moreover, the 
ALCESTE findings provided a valuable basis for the subsequent Atlas/ti coding 
frame.
16 Correspondence analysis is discussed in more detail in relation to the second research stage. But for 
a detailed review of this technique, please see Greenacre and Blasius (1994).
122
5.1.1 Analytic procedure: ALCESTE
1. Transcripts of expert interviews and lay focus groups were analysed as two sepa­
rate data sets.
2. Data sets were saved as ASCII files with line breaks and the texts were prepared 
in the following way.
3. Capital letters at the beginning of a word are automatically changed to lower case 
by ALCESTE. The interviewer’s/moderator’s questions were changed to upper 
case letters, so as not to be included in the main analysis. Upper case words in the 
document to be included in the analysis were changed into lower case letters, e.g. 
‘GM’ was changed into ‘gm’ by using the search and replace function. ■
4. As the symbols ‘*’ and *$’ are used as special tags by ALCESTE, they were re­
moved from the main text.
5. All apostrophes were replaced by underscores (_) in order to be recognised as 
single words (e.g. ‘it’s’ was changed to ‘itjs*).
6. ALCESTE uses a hierarchy of context units on which the analysis is based. Units 
can be defined by the user by tagging the text accordingly, and additional passive 
variables (e.g. age) can be included. An Initial Context Unit (ICU) represents a 
pre-existing division of the text and has to be specified. An Elementary Context 
Unit (ECU) is a unit of text within which ALCESTE calculates the frequency of 
word co-occurrences. In the present analysis, each of the nine elite interviews 
comprised a separate ICU. To be able to identify each expert ‘passive’ variables 
were used to tag each participant, such as **** *Expert_l.
7. Similarly, each focus group presented a separate ICU, with units tagged with 
each group’s identification, such as **** *Fgl *country.
8. ALCESTE uses a technique called Temmatisation’ whereby words are reduced to 
their root form to reflect their semantic similarity. For example, the words ‘regu­
lation’, ‘regulate’ and ‘regulatory’ were all reduced to ‘regulat’. The dictionary of 
significant words in the output was examined and forms which were not recog­
nised by ALCESTE (but with likely significance for the findings), were replaced 
manually, e.g. all occurrences of Tied’ were replaced by Tie’.
9. Further, all co-occurrences of ‘genetically modified’ were abbreviated to ‘gm’ for 
ease of presentation in the resulting correspondence analysis graphs. Also, for the 
purpose of the present analysis, it was decided to regard various GM foods as 
single words, such as ‘gm_soya’ and ‘gm_ingredient’.
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10. Lastly, responses were homogenised with respect to synonyms, with the most 
frequent synonym replacing the less frequent one. For instance, ‘sweetcom’ was 
replaced by ‘maize’.
The analysis was run. As a first step, ALCESTE automatically subdivides words into 
groups of function words (e.g. articles) and content words (e.g. nouns) which carry 
the sense of discourse and on which the final analysis is based (Allum, 1998).
As a second step, ALCESTE identifies word classes based on the concept of hierar­
chical classification analysis. For each class, ALCESTE computes a list of words 
characteristic of that class. The strength of association between each word is ex­
pressed by a chi-square value. Thus the chi-squared criterion here is used as a meas­
ure of relationship existing between words rather than as a test. All words exceeding 
a certain chi-square value are listed. The larger the chi-square value the more impor­
tant the particular word is for the construction of the class. Word lists can then be 
utilised to interpret the classes.
Third, the ‘Cle selectionnee’ comprises a set of original and prototypical ‘key’ state­
ments associated with a class, showing the context within each word is used in the 
original text.
Finally, ALCESTE presents results in a correspondence space, where relationships 
between classes are represented. Graphs produced can be super-imposed and read in 
conjunction. Ideally, the interpretation then should give some semantic content to the 
purely structural information produced by ALCESTE (Kronberger et al, 2000).
To ensure stable results, ALCESTE computes two sets of classifications utilising dif­
ferent lengths of text units. An acceptable solution classifies at least 70% of text units 
(Kronberger et al, 2000).
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5.2 ALCESTE analyses: Basic information
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the basic statistics relating to the corpora of the 
elite interviews and focus groups. The total word count is slightly higher for the fo­
cus groups than for the interviews, but both corpora satisfy the minimum recom­
mended word count. The unique words analysed reflect the range of vocabulary em­
ployed in each setting. The vocabulary used in the elite interviews is more versatile 
than in the focus groups, possibly due to the often subject-specific terminology used 
by experts.
The passive variable counts show the number of tagged indicators in each corpus. 
The nine variables in the elite interviews represent the nine interviews conducted; in 
the focus group, each variable represents one focus group. Likewise, each interview 
and focus group was tagged as a separate ICU.
Table 5.1 ALCESTE analyses: Basic information
Elite interviews Focus groups
Total word count 32630 36841
Unique words analysed 2323 1710
Passive variables 9 5
ICUs 9 5
Classified ECUs 592 645
Text units classified (%) 78.51 76.15
Lexical classes 4 4
Distribution of classes (%) A 18.92 A 16.12
B 11.66 B 9.62
C 41.72 C 32.09
D 27.70 D 42.17
Additionally, table 5.1 presents the number of classified ECUs along with the classi­
fied text units to give an indication of the stability of results. Classified units in both 
corpora exceed the 70% acceptability mark proposed by Kronberger et al (2000). 
Thus based on the internal criteria defined by ALCESTE, the classes identified are 
reliable representations of the text.
As table 5.1 shows, ALCESTE identified four classes for both interviews and focus 
groups, albeit of varying distributions. For the purpose of clarity, lexical classes are 
described separately for each corpus, before a comparison is drawn.
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5.3 Lexical classes: Elite interviews
Table 5.2 shows the thirty most characteristic words from each lexical class in order 
of descending significance.
Table 5.2 Elite interviews: Characteristic words ordered by strength o f chi2 association*
(A) Regulation (B) Risk (C) PUS (D) Environment
Food+ (55) Gene+ (36) Know (79) Crop* (87)
Product+ (39) Risk+ (27) People* (62) Farm* (45)
Label+ (35) Into (26) Think (76) Grow (40)
Consumer+ (30) Put (18) Well (61) Use* (30)
Process+ (24) Plant+ (16) Problem* (46) Organic (30)
Gm (23) Assess+ (12) Allerg* (32) Benefit* (28)
Gm food+ (21) DNA (11) Public* (28) Produce* (22)
Oil* (14) Take (11) Science* (25) Field* (23)
Cheaper+ (16) Experiment+ (10) Scientist* (19) Herbicide* (21)
Europe (12) Hazard+ (9) Understand (18) Land* (20)
Contain+ (11) Rice (9) Try (18) Resist* (19)
Allow+ (10) Find (8) Sure (16) Technolog* (16)
Point+ (10) Potential (8) Important* (16) Bt (16)
Breed (10) Expert+ (8) Commercial* (16) Agriculture* (16)
Possibilit+ (9) lntroduce+ (8) Part* (15) Trait* (14)
Choice (7) Question+ (7) Improve* (13) Reduce* (12)
Accept+ (7) Technique+ (7) Big (13) Seed* (12)
Sell (7) Protein (7) Social (12) Pest* (11)
Supermarket+ (6) Lecithin* (6) Regulation* (11) Movement* (11)
Retailer+ (6) Wild (6) Address* (11) Weed* (12)
Detect+ (6) Place+ (6) Solve* (10) Pesticide* (11)
Derive+ (6) Identify (5) Tend* (8) Environment* (11)
Gm_product+ (5) Ecolog+ (5) Diet* (8) Rape (11)
Simple (5) Toxic+ (5) Role* (8) Tolera* (10)
BSE (5) Cut (4) Concern* (8) Serious* (10)
Control (5) Affect+ (3) Extreme* (8) Application* (10)
Relative (5) Unlikely (3) Micro (8) Industr* (10)
Gmjngredients (4) lnsert+ (3) Favour* (7) Hybrid* (9)
Derivatives (4) Manage* (3) Food_production+ (7) Drought* (9)
Nature (4) Aware (3) Long_term (6) Available (9)
*Distribution o f the original forms per root in brackets.
+ = word stem
The most characteristic words of class A are ‘fo o d ’, ‘product\ ‘label’ and ‘con­
sumer Indeed this class largely focuses on issues related to labelling, definitions of 
GM food, and scientific regulatory issues, often connected to European rules.
The most characteristic word of class B is ‘gene The smallest of the four classes it 
centres particularly on the science of genetic modification, the potential of the tech­
nology and scientific risk assessment per se.
While still addressing the scientific developments in relation to GM food and the po­
tential nutritional benefits, the largest class (C) especially deals with the intricate re­
lationship between scientists and the public. This is shown in the most characteristic
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words, such as 'know ’, 'people', 'public ’ and ‘scientist'. The word ‘regulation ' may 
be part of this class because experts frequently discuss the lack of public knowledge 
about and/or trust in the management of GM. The fact that class C is the largest 
class, even though experts were not specifically asked about public perceptions, indi­
cates that experts do not necessarily view scientific and lay perceptions of GM as 
distinct:
“ You did not want to ask me about public perceptions but the ways the 
public perceive the risks are also very important. And i f  the public thinks 
there are risks then the scientists have to listen to them. So it ’s not quite 
as distinct as you suggest because over the last few  years w e’ve learnt to 
listen to the public very hard. ”
(Expert 1)
Different to the other three classes, class D specifically addresses current GM devel­
opments in relation to their effects on the environment and on agriculture, such as the 
development of herbicide-resistant crops. Noticeably, the word ‘benefit ’ is strongly 
associated with this class. Like class B, this class addresses the predominantly scien­
tific side of GM technology. Consequently, the terminology used is of a more techni­
cal nature than in classes A and C.
5.3.1 Relationships between words and classes
For each class, ALCESTE also classifies the most characteristic word groupings to 
understand the links between the words in each class, as shown in table 5.3. These 
word groupings can be taken as indicators of the context.
Table 5.3 Elite interviews: Most characteristic word groupings per class
Class Word grouping
(A) Regulation Breed Conventional Control+ relative+
Current+ substantial_equivalence Process* product+
(B) Risk Identify hazard+ lntroduce+ rice
Assess+ risk+ Experiment+ lecithin+
(C) PUS Vitamin A+micro nutrient+ Enhance+ vitamin*
Play+ role Social science*
(D) Environment Crop+ rape Organic movement+
Hybrid+ seed+ Benefit+ pesticide
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For instance, the most characteristic word groupings in class B are *identify haz­
ards) ’ and ‘assess risk(s)
The relationships between words and classes are ‘mapped’ in figure 5.1. Whilst the 
classes 'environment ’ and ‘regulation ’ present separate clusters, the clusters of the 
classes ‘risk’ and ‘PUS’ are overlapping, indicating that expert discourse often cen­
tres on both topics together.
Figure 5.1 Elite interviews: Correspondence analysis o f characteristic words
benefit+
maize
significant+ 
sell accept+choice Regulation 
eu depend+ product+contain+
oil+term+ retailer+control+ 
allow+derive+ supermarket+ 
breed bse peanuts+
gm_food+positive 
substantial_involve+ 
relative+choose
food+
chain
dna
place+
potential+
risk+ Risk
think people+
Itype+oilseed 
I agree+
soil+rape Environment
| trial+produce+
I pesticide+farm+
| conditions herbicide+ 
j organic grow movement+
I land+crop+pest+available
| seed+field+trait+
+bt use+agriculture+
| resist+application+
j environment+enormous+
main+serious+ variet+ wild hazard+assess+
I industr+ word+manage+plant+ into
| put experiment+technique+
j gene+lecithin+ well introduce+
j unknown+
j way+ toxic+
| computer+ try
j PUS
I rice
find expert+ scientist+
acnfp understand 
commercial+ sure micro improve+diet+ 
solve+tend+ protein+somebody 
science+ part+know
problem+addres s+
+ = word reduced to its stem
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Figure 5.1 can then be superimposed by figure 5.2 to indicate which experts are as­
sociated with which class. For example, as could be expected, Expert 7 (profession­
ally especially concerned with the environmental impacts of GMOs) is associated 
with class D (environment), while Expert 4 (an expert in food policy) is associated 
with class A (regulation).
Figure 5.2 Elite interviews: Correspondence analysis o f experts and lexical classes
♦Expert 6
Regulation
♦Expert 4
♦Expert_9
+ Environment
rExpert_7
Risk
♦Expert 8
♦Expert 1
+  1
♦Expert 3
♦Expert_5
PUS
♦Expert_2
---------I--------- +
To further contextualise the above findings, table 5.4 shows the most representative 
ECUs per class in descending order. The number in front of each ECU represents the 
chi2 value of association with the particular class. For the purpose of brevity, only the 
three most significant ECUs are chosen. A full outline of representative ECUs results 
can be found in Appendix C.
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Table 5.4 Elite interviews: Most characteristic ECUs in each class
Class Most representative ECUs per class
(A)
Regulation
(B)
Risk
(C)
PUS
P )
Environment
56 what processes have been involved in the production of foods not simply 
what are the final ingredients, the label is not compulsory, it s voluntary in 
most cases. Where they derive from maize and soya, currently in europe you do 
have to label, but you only label when there is detectable dna from the gm ori­
gins. (Expert 4)
42 you can think of gm_products or products derived using gm_technology 
that would be advantageous in terms of lower processing costs, and subject to 
the economics of the food chain that might be passed on to the consumer in sig­
nificant measure. (Expert 6)
35 but there have been gm_foods on the market, including gm_ingredients, 
therefore gm_foods, and there are at the moment. Anything that contains maize 
and soya derivatives and flour or oils which is used extensively in food process­
ing. (Expert 4)
70 and th a ts  somewhere else in the body but there is no evidence at all that 
they are put into the gene material. If they were, you know you and I after eat­
ing potatoes for 400 years, might expect to find potato genes in our guts. 
(Expert 1)
35 now the question then becomes, is there, because of the potential to put in a 
gene from a different species into a crop, does that create any special hazard? 
(Expert 6)
34 you ve inserted one gene in a particular place, or maybe two, but one is the 
typical thing. Actually, with the golden rice it_s three or four, but never mind. 
you_re splitting specific genes and putting them into specific places in the dna. 
so you re targeting very precisely. (Expert 2)
21 that is rice enriched with pro vitamin_A, which would play a tremendous 
part in preventing blindness in children in southeast_asia. but there is work go­
ing on, and this is with micro nutrients. A lot o f the problems with world hun­
ger. It_s not just quantity, it s quality and particularly the lack of micro nutri­
ents like vitamins. (Expert 1)
21 now they were beaten. Perhaps because they did not have the internet in 
those days, I do not know, but I think that has played a very big part. (Expert 2) 
19 the 8th of april is tuesday. so you see, we made a mistake, mistakes can 
happen. I know acnfp pretty well, I know some of the people who are on it, and 
I think they do a thorough and effective job. (Expert 2)
49 it_s there all the time, but it_s not economically a serious pest in most cases 
there are only small patches of it. but herbicide tolerance is the main transfor­
mation that is available, and that s the type of crop being grown in the usa very 
widely. (Expert 7)
31 now that s another way of doing it. and then there is research going on on 
gm_foods that can grow in conditions that have been inhospitable to those 
crops, crops that can grow on salty soils, making a whole lot of land available 
without encroaching on the wild environment, crops that will grow on alumin­
ium rich soils, again making a lot of arable land available that previously was 
not arable land. (Expert 2)
30 those crops are widely grown in the usa and there is a small amount of bt 
maize that_s grown in spain at the moment on a commercial basis, but it_s only 
a very small amount. (Expert 7)
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5.4 Lexical classes: Focus groups
Table 5.5 shows the thirty most characteristic words from each lexical class in the fo­
cus groups ordered by strength of association.
Table 5.5 Focus groups: Characteristic words ordered by strength o f chi2 association*
(A) Industry (B) Food (C) Nature (D) Science and 
politics
People+ (39) Buy (36) Gm (115) Know (158)
Want+ (37) Food* (36) Gene* (64) Real* (81)
Make (33) Gm food* (17) Different* (40) Inform* (52)
Help+ (32) Label* (17) Nature (34) Government* (51)
Poor+ (29) Organic* (15) Natural* (28) Trust* (48)
Money (26) Choice* (14) Change* (28) Risk* (46)
Compan+ (26) Supermarket* (13) Into (26) Research* (39)
Feed+ (19) Look* (8) Plant* (25) Scientist* (35)
World+ (19) General* (7) Same (24) Out (33)
Benefit+ (14) Pay (7) Animal* (22) Tell (31)
Countr+ (13) Cheap* (7) Example* (21) Science (30)
Live+ (12) Read (7) Species (20) Find (24)
Produc+ (12) Expensive (5) Put (19) Decide* (20)
Profit+ (11) Probably (5) Danger* (19) Interest* (23)
USA+ (9) Tesco* (5) Chemical + (19) Public* (21)
Everyone (9) Additives (4) Use* (17) Keep (21)
Third_world (8) Ingredients (4) Tomato (16) Fact* (19)
Give+ (8) Prefer (4) Unnatural* (15) Decision* (18)
Sell* (8) Definitely (4) Grow (15) Bad (18)
Bring (8) Cost (4) Cancer* (15) Safe* (17)
Pay (7) Produce* (4) Worse (15) Politic* (16)
Consumer+ (7) Option* (3) Farm* (15) Question* (13)
Nonsense* (6) Guess* (3) Breed (14) Quiet (12)
Spend* (6) Processe* (3) Mess* (13) Harmful (11)
Distribut* (6) Somebody (3) Pesticide* (13) Regulat* (14)
Population* (6) Afford (3) Cow* (12) Someone (12)
Resources (6) Price* (3) Radiat* (12) Independent (11)
Market* (6) Contain (3) Mix* (12) Industr* (11)
Solution* (5) Stupid* (2) Kill* (11) Test* (10)
Short_term (5) Assume (2) Hormones (10) Progress* (8)
*Distribution o f the original forms per root in brackets
+ = word stem
Class A refers to conversation around corporate and commercial issues. Strongly as­
sociated words with this class are 'help\ 'poor’, ‘money’ and ‘world’. This may be 
due to conversation often focusing on arguments initially brought forward by biotech 
companies such as ‘GM will help to feed the third world’, which are strongly rejected 
by lay participants as the contextualisation of words in table 5.6 indicates.
Class B is by far the smallest class and focuses on food and consumer issues, such as 
labelling, as well as consumer choice and food selection issues, such as the differ­
ences between organically grown and GM food.
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Class C is associated with nature in a broad sense. Significant words include ‘gene 
‘nature’ and *natural’, ‘animal\ and ‘species’. While on the one had, conversation 
focus on naturalness versus unnaturalness in general, on the other hand, this class is 
often food-specific with discussions moving from GM to radiation in food, and the 
use of hormones, pesticides and chemicals in food production. These various food 
production issues are often not clearly distinguished:
“I  think it's scary, I  have a bleak view o f  all those things. I  like natural 
things and that technology is surely not natural They just mix genes and 
chemicals and nobody knows what will happen. You put things into your 
body and they mix with your genes. I  think they shouldn't put chemicals 
into our food and certainly not genes! I  don't agree with that at all, all 
these chemicals cause cancer and it has been shown that allergies are in­
creasing all the time here in the UK. GM would make that even worse. ”
(Female participant, 29, Fg 1 'country")
The largest class (D) focuses on communication between experts and the public, as 
well as the relationship between scientists and politicians. This is indicated by the 
words which are strongly associated with this class such as ‘trust’, \government\ 
‘knowledge) ’ and ‘inform(ation) ’.
5.4.1 Relationships between words and classes
Table 5.6 presents the most characteristic word groupings of each class and gives an 
indication of the context in which the words are used. For example, frequently 
grouped together are ‘long-term ’ and ‘solution ’ (Class A), ‘organic ’ and ‘expensive ’ 
(Class B), ‘mess(ing) ’ and ‘nature ’ (Class C), and ‘keep ’ and ‘quiet’ (Class D).
Table 5.6 Focus groups: Most characteristic word groupings per class
Class Word grouping
(A) Industry Long_term solution+ USA+ product-*-
Nonsense+ feed Live-*- societ-*-
(B) Food Label+ product+ Buy choice-*-
Organic-*' expensive Read probably
(C) Nature Intensive farm-*- Increase-*- cancer-*-
Mess+ nature Illnesses allerg-*-
(D) Science and Keep quiet Independent vested_interest+
politics Find out Lack knowledge
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Relationships between words and classes are mapped in figure 5.3. The classes ‘na­
ture ’ and ‘science and politics ’ represent distinct clusters. In contrast, the clusters of 
the classes ‘industry' and ‘fo o d ' are partially overlapping, indicating that these topics 
often focus together in lay participants’ discourse on GM food.
Figure 5.3 Focus groups: Correspondence analysis o f characteristic words
spend+
live+ Industry 
feed usa+price+easi+
pay world+poor+ 
make produc+ want+
produce+ sell people+money
patent+ help+ organ+obvious+third_world 
food+place+ cheap+countr+argument+
option+ bring societ+market+
using cost profit+
accept+ buy
general+ soya gm_food+ additives
prefer Food
gm definitely
guess+tesco+processe+
use+
label+
Nature
fruit+long+ 
change+tomatocancer+ 
worse normal+natural+
pesticide+different+ 
die allerg+grow 
into unnatural+children+
Ihand+cow+gene+artificial+ 
species nature apple+ 
mix breed animal+chemical+ 
same kill+farm+affect+
relat+hormones increase+ 
danger+
Chernobyl
put
choice+ read
trust+
research+ 
Science and politics real+
question+ 
independent government+ 
lie public+ test+ 
regulat+ decide+ 
decision+tell keep 
science fact+ inform+ 
let moment safe+ 
harmful find progress+ 
out 
know
risk+
. 1 ----------------- I ------------------ I ---------- +
+ = word reduced to its stem
Figure 5.3 can then be superimposed by figure 5.4 to indicate which focus group are 
more strongly associated with which class. As could be expected, the focus groups
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consisting of mature participants with children and of participants living in the coun­
try are most strongly associated with discussions about nature. On the other hand, the 
focus group consisting of finance students is more strongly associated with class A 
(industry) while the law group as well as the PhD group are associated with class D 
(science and politics).
Figure 5.4 Focus groups: Correspondence analysis of focus groups and lexical classes
+
I
*fg4 Industry
*finance
Food
+
Nature *fg2 *fg5
*fg3 *law *phd
*mature
*fgl
♦country
Science and Politics
To further contextualise the findings and to show how each word is used in the origi­
nal text, table 5.7 shows the three most significant ECUs per class by strength of chi2 
association. For a complete outline of representative contextual units, please see Ap­
pendix C.
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Table 5.7 Focus groups: Most characteristic ECUs in each class 
Class Most representative ECUs per class
(A) • 26 V: but it would still be a third_world country, it wouldn_t change that
Industry much, if they wanted to do it, they would have done it already. P: also,
there are other ways of helping the poor, they could do it in another, better 
way.
• 21 C_mon! P: in die end, they want to make the poor dependent on their 
products, their seeds, their crops, so they can make more money. I think 
saying _oh we will help the poor_ is just an excuse so that people accept 
all that stuff S: and even the poor countries are rejecting gm there must be 
a reason for it!
• 20 I think theyjre producing it for a reason, and that reason is not to help 
the poor. Maybe it will benefit the poor as well, but that_s not the aim be­
hind it I think SG: that_s just a selling technique S: they wouldn_t bother 
spending all this money on research, on persuading the public, etc.
56 you know when I go to a tesco supermarket and I look at the ingredi­
ents and I tend to do that a lot it reads like a chemist s prescription as op­
posed to a food store because it has loads of additives of all sorts of kinds. 
43 you buy tinned spaghetti, you can be sure they contain gm! V: I have 
one question: spaghetti is not made from soya bean is it? S: not yet! MW: 
but generally processed foods do contain gm.
38 DI: if it was the same price would you buy it? C: then I would buy 
only organic. P: me too. I think all gm_foods should be labelled at least 
ALL: yes, definitely D: I want to have the choice.
34 for example, putting a completely foreign gene, say from some animal 
into an apple I find totally unacceptable, for the reason that it is unnatural 
beyond belief it simply could not happen if nature had her way.
25 and in the end we have super insects, super weeds. V: how dangerous 
is it for the fields, the grounds, will it change the soil content? Organic 
farming is different and much better than artificial, modified farming MW: 
I mean the fertilisers will be washed down in the ground and get into the 
ground water, and the more we have of them the worse it will be for our 
health.
24 I just do not like that, it s artificial to put these things into our animals, 
but that_s different from gm. MI: it s different but both are unnatural. 
Milking a cow 24 hours a day, their tits start to grow bacteria on them, it_s 
horrible, leading to infection, this could transmit to humans.
(D) • 20 at the moment I do not know that and unfortunately we have a history
Science and politics here in the uk with the government not telling the truth, so why should I
believe them now? it s the lack of knowledge that scares you the most, the 
fact that you really do not know what s in your food, whether it_s been 
modified, how has it been modified?
• 16 DI: there isn_t any clear information. V: maybe not for us, but I think 
they know, they have the facts. DI: I do not know about that. I think there 
are just too many unanswered questions for all of us really. I do not know, 
perhaps there is more information on the internet.
• 14 they knew well before that but because the tobacco industry is such a 
profitable industry they tried to keep it quiet, the same thing might happen 
with gm. S: yes, there s so much profit involved that governments are 
unlikely to base their decisions purely on science facts.
(C)
Nature
(B)
Food
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5.5 Comparing elite interview and focus group findings
For clarity of comparison, figure 5.5 shows the overall ALCESTE classifications of 
both interviews and focus groups. For both groups, the largest class is concerned with 
the understanding of the public, science and politics (classes C and D respectively).
Figure 5.5 Expert and lay classifications 
Elite interviews
Class A 
Regulation
Class B 
Risk
Class C 
PUS
Class D 
Environ­
ment
Focus groups
Class A 
Industry
Class B 
Food
Class C 
Nature
Class D 
Science and 
politics
It could be argued that both classes address the same issues albeit from different per­
spectives. For example, a positive view of science and its ability to solve problems is 
evident in experts’ perceptions. Yet although science per se is generally not regarded 
as negative by lay participants the perceived interdependence of science, politics and 
industry and the lack of trust especially in the latter two may not allow for a positive 
evaluation of scientific developments in relation to GM:
“I think the real danger is the commercial aspect o f the whole adventure.
If it was pure science, done by the best independent scientists without 
vested interests, it would be much better, it might be something I could 
agree on. ”
(Male participant, 30, Focus group 2 ‘law ’)
In contrast, the smallest classes for both groups are those addressing specific risk and 
food issues (classes B), i.e. those dealing predominately with the science of GM, per­
haps indicating their lack of relative importance when constructing representations of 
GM food risks. As such it appears that the actual risk assessment from a scientific 
perspective may not be the prevalent concern for lay participants.
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Although both expert and lay participants address the environmental impacts of GM 
(in the classes ‘environment' and ‘nature ’ respectively) it is clear that lay people in­
corporate far wider issues in their representations than do experts. While experts 
mainly discuss the environment in relation to its physical dimensions and focus on 
GM in agriculture, lay participants represent issues in terms of a broader nature and 
value debate, and frequently discuss issues of “naturalness”.
Experts address consumer issues such as labelling and consumer choice. These sub­
jects are also discussed by lay participants yet topics related to ‘industry ’ are more 
prevalent and debated in a far more animated way. So far, lay participants do not ac­
cept the promised benefits of GM food at all. Indeed ‘feeding the world’ arguments 
may have backfired. When focusing on consumer benefits, experts seemingly neglect 
the predominantly negative consumer sentiment towards those corporations offering 
the benefits. By contrast, focus group participants are not only concerned about con­
sumer risks and benefits per se but also about societal power relations such as the 
American hegemony, the power of big corporations and the distribution of resources. 
The focus on US domination in discussions may partly have been due to the political 
climate in May 2003 (the Iraq war), as well as the fact that Monsanto one of the best- 
known biotech companies is an American company.
It may be useful to distinguish expert and lay risk perceptions in terms of denotations 
and connotations17. While the denotation, i.e. the scientific risk per se may not be a 
major source of disagreement between expert and lay people connotations clearly dif­
fer. It appears that for lay people the word “risk” suggests far broader meanings be­
yond the scientific risk, and that denotations and connotations cannot be easily sepa­
rated:
‘‘I  don’t necessarily think GM foods are more dangerous than non-GM 
foods but I  don’t like these associations. ”
(Female participant, 31, Focus group 1 'country*)
17 While denotation describes a direct specific meaning, connotation is the suggestion o f a meaning by 
a word apart from the thing it explicitly names or describes (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 
1980).
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Evidently, this is likely to have implications for risk communication efforts. From a 
risk communications perspective, it seems that only the smallest classes dealing with 
risk (elite interviews) and food (focus groups) respectively have been previously ad­
dressed. The largest classes concerned with the relationship of public, scientists and 
politicians have been recognised as problematic recently. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
improved communication efforts are being made. But because of the different ways 
that expert and lay people frame the issues, communications between scientists and 
the public are likely to be challenging in times to come.
When looking at expert classes A ( ‘regulation") and C ( ‘PU S"), and lay classes A 
( ‘industry") and D ( ‘science and politics *) it becomes clear that regulatory issues are 
discussed by both expert and lay participants. This may indicate the need of actively 
addressing regulatory concerns in risk communications, for instance by making regu­
latory processes more transparent. Results indicate that lay participants were unsure 
(and generally sceptical) of current regulatory practises.
Moreover, the contents of the focus group classes related to ‘industry' and ‘nature ’ 
(classes A and C) are normally not addressed by risk communication efforts at all. 
Both classes clearly deal with other aspects than the scientific risk per se. Rather they 
are concerned with deeper values, for which positivist science is unprepared. How­
ever, these classes seemingly play a notable role for lay people in constructing repre­
sentations of GM food risks.
5.6 Conclusions Chapter Five
In conclusion, the ALCESTE analysis offers a valuable first exploration of expert and 
lay data. By outlining and effectively summarising the discourse of both groups, the 
findings highlight various issues on which expert and lay perceptions of GM food dif­
fer significantly. In many aspects, expert and lay participants tend to frame issues in 
different ways. As could be expected, expert and lay people take different dimensions 
into account when discussing the risks of GM food.
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While experts primarily speak about the scientific risks per se, lay discourse does not 
focus on the scientific risks in isolation but rather incorporates the related broader is­
sues in which the controversy is set. For example, concerns about nature and natural­
ness in relation to food consumption and food production seemingly play an important 
role for lay participants, but not for experts. In turn, this indicates the potential impor­
tance of social and societal dimensions in lay GM food risk representations.
Moreover, the importance of the clusters concerned with the relationships of the pub­
lic, science, politics and industry for both groups may imply that expert and lay par­
ticipants alike perceive a need for improving communications. On the one hand, ex­
perts view the relationship of scientists and the public as problematic. On the other 
hand, lay participants are suspicious of the interplay of science, politics and in par­
ticular industry.
These issues are discussed in detail in the following chapter which provides an in- 
depth analysis of expert and lay GM food representations, and presents both groups’ 
mental models of the risk.
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6 EXPERT AND LAY MENTAL MODELS OF GM FOOD
This chapter presents our expert and lay mental models of GM food constructed with 
the software Atlas/ti. We briefly introduce Atlas/ti and explain the development of our 
coding frame before presenting the results.
In line with the previous chapter, findings of expert and lay participants are discussed 
separately before a comparison is drawn. Expert and lay mental models of GM food 
risk are presented in the form of influence diagrams, which show clear divergences in 
risk representations in relation to various central concepts, such as health risks and 
perceptions of benefits. A particular distinguishing factor is lay participants’ concern 
with various non-scientific issues which are not addressed by the experts.
In this sense, the findings show up the limits of the CMU approach to risk communi­
cation. While the CMU approach may be a useful tool to compare divergent risk per­
ceptions, it does in effect not go far enough as it neglects any issues apart from the 
science per se. Having a rather cognitive perspective, it is in many ways too rational 
to address lay participants’ concerns. To illustrate these limitations we focus on two 
areas that cannot be addressed through a science-based risk communication as sug­
gested by Granger Morgan et al (2002), namely trust- and value-related concepts.
An important value-related concept is 'messing with nature \  As it is a concept which 
has until recently been neglected in research, it is addressed in detail here. Our Atlas/ti 
analysis firmly establishes ‘messing with nature ’ as a major dimension of lay people’s 
GM food risk representations. But the results also highlight the need to further exam­
ine what lies behind this concept, and what participants actually mean when they 
judge GM to be ‘unnatural \
6.1 A theoretical background to Atlas/ti
Following from the exploratory ALCESTE analysis which helped to establish general 
discursive categories, Atlas/ti was utilised to investigate the particularities of expert 
and lay discourses of GM food risk in detail.
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Atlas/ti (developed by Muir in the 1990s) is a powerful coding tool for the analysis of 
qualitative data, which can help to uncover phenomena hidden inside the data in an 
exploratory way. Barry (1998) suggests that utilising Atlas speeds up the coding proc­
ess, and provides a more complex way of looking at relationships in the data. Also, by 
providing a formal structure for writing and storing memos, it aids conceptual and 
theoretical thinking about the data (Barry, 1998). The package is able to perform 
‘code and retrieve’ type operations, cross-referencing via hyperlinks, text searches, 
and the creation of visual code networks (Kelle, 2000).
The latter characteristic is particularly useful for the creation of mental models, as 
previous work by Niewoehner (2001; 2002) has shown. The networking feature of 
Atlas/ti allows the researcher to visually connect selected passages, memos, and codes 
by means of diagrams. Thus it can show a concept or construct based on visible rela­
tions. In Atlas/ti, networks break though the structural confines imposed by linear 
text, and thus allow for a better exploration of the texture of the data and the inter­
woven meanings (Barry, 1998).
As with most analytical tools for qualitative data analysis, there is the potential down­
fall of becoming distanced from the data itself, or that qualitative data might be ana­
lysed in an unsuitably quantitative way. However, firstly, Atlas/ti has been specifi­
cally designed to keep the focus on the data itself (Barry, 1998). Secondly, it is clearly 
not possible to analyse data without reading and being familiar with it to begin with. 
In that regard, Atlas/ti only provides assistance in the thinking and analysis which is, 
and always has been, the job of the researcher (Kelle, 1997).
Regarding the triangulation of the methodologies ALCESTE and Atfas/ti, it can be 
argued that both are complimentary. While ALCESTE offers an excellent quick out­
line of the complete data set, Atlas/ti can offer an in-depth and detailed analysis, 
whereby it is possible to focus on particularly relevant topics and concepts at length.
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6.1.1 Analytic procedure: Atlas/ti
The analysis of qualitative data is not simply a neutral process but rather an essential 
part of the construction of the research reality (Flick, 1998). Coding a data set means 
constructing the studied reality in a specific way. In order to be able to code text into 
identifiable categories, it is necessary to have operationalisations of the concepts of 
interest. For the present analysis these were not only provided through our theoretical 
background, but also through the ALCESTE analysis discussed in the previous chap­
ter. This means that, as a first step, the transcripts had been coded automatically ac­
cording to the co-occurrences of words rather than being influenced by the researcher. 
The general discursive clusters identified by ALCESTE grounded the development of 
the coding frame.
The coding scheme is intended to have heuristic value in interpreting the data rather 
than its codes ‘becoming’ the data to be analysed. Thus no codings are dependent on 
the presence of specific keywords or phrases. This is essential in order to enable the 
analysis of discourse that not only explicitly denotes a particular theme or concept, 
but also discourse that may only implicitly denote it (Allum, 2004). In accordance 
with Allum, the simplest and most all-encompassing working definition of risk was 
used. For the purpose of coding, risk was defined as
“Talk concerning some negative outcome in the future that has some de­
gree o f  uncertainty attached. ”
(Allum, 2004; p. 109)
6.1.2 Development of the Atlas/ti coding frame
Familiarity with all transcripts was gained through the transcriptions themselves and 
through re-reading the texts. Expert and lay data were coded separately, both with the 
following procedure.
Transcripts were coded iteratively using a hierarchical structure where super-ordinate 
themes (‘principle codes’) such as ‘risk’were coded with sub-themes (‘thematic 
codes’) such as ‘risk unknown'.
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In order not to have an excessive number of sub-codes, several code families were 
compiled. As an example, the expert code *benefit consumer' incorporates the merged 
sub-codes: ‘better food quality \  ‘better taste \  ‘cheaper fo o d ’, ‘enhanced vitamins \ 
‘greater food choice ’, ‘health benefit', ‘lengthened shelf-life \  and ‘nutritional bene­
fits  ’. With regards to the focus group data, the code ‘risk health ’ for instance was 
compiled out of the sub-codes ‘cancer ’, ‘allergies ’, ‘obesity ’, ‘death \  ‘viruses ’ and 
‘genetic mutation - all health-related issues that lay participants associate with GM 
food. For both groups, the code ‘previous UK food scares ’ comprises the merged sub­
codes 'BSE’ and foot-and-mouth’.
The basic unit of analysis was a single turn of a participant speaking (focus group) or 
a thematic utterance of the interviewee (expert interview). However, Atlas/ti does not 
require the researcher to pre-specify any particular length of analytic unit, and at 
times, several short turns were coded as one. An unlimited number of codes could be 
attached simultaneously to any fragment of text, hence individual text segments are 
frequently assigned various codes.
It was ensured that codes were matching when expert and lay participants addressed 
the same concept. For the purpose of analysis, memos comprising a selection of the 
actual quotes were attached to each code to remind the researcher of how a particular 
concept had been addressed by participants. These showed for example, that while 
both groups discuss the potential economic benefits of GM food, experts tend to speak 
about those in a positive manner while lay participants generally view those in a nega­
tive way.
When interpreting the focus group data, the entire episode was considered holistically 
and it was recognised that responses may have been subject to social influence (such 
as compliance), and not necessarily stand-alone statements, as the whole is often more 
than the sum of its parts (Gaskell, 2000).
Moreover, questions that arose during the analytic procedure (such as about com­
monly occurring relations between discursive themes) were addressed by refining 
searches focused on particular codes. For example, noting that lay participants often
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distinguish between different levels of genetic modification- or different levels of 
“foreignness” of genetic transfer- the focus group data was re-analysed, leading to the 
creation of the super-code ‘acceptability which addresses the boundaries of accept­
ability of GM. An outline of all codes and their respective frequencies in the elite in­
terviews and focus groups is presented in the following sections.
6.2 Results Atlas/ti
In accordance with the CMU approach, the particular focus of the analysis are expert 
and lay divergences, leading to certain concepts being only treated briefly, while oth­
ers (areas of strong disagreement that would need to be addressed in a risk communi­
cation) are discussed in detail. In line with the previous chapter, expert and lay results 
are first discussed separately, before a comparison is drawn.
6.3 Central concepts: Expert participants
As identified by ALCESTE, expert discourse centres on discussions of risk and bene­
fit, the public understanding of science (PUS) and regulation in relation to GM food. 
All experts address the same topics (loosely based on the interview schedule), albeit 
from different perspectives. Thus although the interview data is fairly consistent be­
tween interviewees (as a marker for good qualitative research), one expert provides a 
notable exception. Expert 8’s perceptions tend to be more in line with that of the pub­
lic rather than the other eight experts. For example, the question of whether GM is 
necessary at all (a major point of discussion in the focus groups) is addressed by this 
participant only. Table 6.1 present the frequencies of the primary and sub-codes for 
each expert interviewee (I) indicating how often the codings occurred in each inter­
view and in total.
Looking at the number of total codes, it is evident that experts speak about the bene­
fits of GM food far more frequently than about the risks, despite having been asked 
about both. Particularly, experts highlight the potential consumer benefits. The exact­
ing dimensions of these benefits are shown in more detail in the expert mental model
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below. This focus on consumer benefits might imply that the experts interviewed are 
actively interested in the utility of GM food for the western consumer. Also, it is no­
table that experts agree that GM foods are at least 'as safe as conventional foods ’ for 
human consumption.
As indicated by ALCESTE, the public understanding of science is a significant dis­
cussion point for experts, with many experts focusing on the problems related to pub­
lic perceptions of GM. Regarding regulation, table 6.1 shows that, with one exception, 
experts stress that GM is effectively regulated to date.
Table 6.1 Codes-Primary-Documents- Expert interviews
Codes 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Totals
Benefit
Benefit consumer 5 8 18 4 12 16 6 0 14 83
Benefit economic 3 A 6 2 4 7 4 0 4 34
Benefit environment 2 4 5 3 5 6 6 0 4 35
Benefit farmers 1 10 10 3 5 8 8 2 10 57
Benefit third world 5 7 8 2 4 8 2 0 3 39
Scientific progress 0 4 3 0 1 1 3 0 4 16
GM science
GM products 6 4 9 4 2 9 6 3 7 50
GM research problems 4 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 9
GM science perse 0 4 2 1 3 2 2 0 3 17
Sufficient research 0 4 1 0 3 1 6 0 8 23
PUS
Media 0 3 1 0 1 0 3 0 4 12
Pressure groups 0 4 2 1 3 0 2 0 10 22
Previous UK food scares 1 1 3 1 2 1 4 1 1 15
Public perception 7 8 10 4 7 1 11 1 2 51
Science-policy interaction 3 3 3 1 2 0 2 1 1 16
Regulation
Effective regulation 4 12 11 5 7 9 4 0 7 59
Industry 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 1 3 10
Labelling 0 1 2 2 4 2 0 0 2 13
Precautionary principle 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 5
Regulatory problems 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 7
Retailers’ behaviour 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
Substantial equivalence 0 2 0 7 4 7 0 2 2 24
Risk
As safe as conventional foods 9 7 1 1 15 8 10 3 13 77
Long-term effects 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 4 0 8
Risk assessment 1 1 0 1 0 2 5 1 2 13
Risk environment 2 1 5 2 0 0 5 12 0 27
Risk health 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 6
Risk unquantifiable 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
Scientific uncertainty 4 6 4 3 2 0 5 2 1 27
Values
Criticisms organic farming 1 2 2 0 1 0 3 0 4 13
No solution to poverty 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 0 8
Technological solutions 1 4 3 0 2 1 3 2 4 20
Totals 60 109 126 57 93 89 110 47 116 807
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In order to examine the relationships between these codes and contextualise them ac­
cording to the CMU approach, figure 6.1 presents the expert mental model before the 
findings are discussed. The diagram was constructed as follows. In accordance with 
the CMU approach, to construct the expert mental model, we predominately focused 
on the scientific aspects of GM. However, in order to highlight areas of expert dis­
agreement, we also include codes about regulatory problems, which are excluded in 
table 6.1 because of their very low frequencies.
As explained in the previous section, Atlas/ti allows the researcher to construct code 
families, e.g. *benefit consumer ’ or ‘benefit farmer ’. The mental model in figure 6.1 
shows in detail what these rather broad codings incorporate. Additionally, Atlas/ti 
provides a ‘query tool’ function which allows the researcher to further check how 
codes occur together in the dataset. It is then up to the researcher to establish the par­
ticular relations between the codes, and draw up a network of connections within the 
Atlas/ti networking function. The relationships between the codes are determined heu- 
ristically based on our knowledge of the interview transcripts, rather than by using set 
rules.
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6.3.1 Expert risk and benefit
As shown in the mental model in figure 6.1 experts perceive far more benefits than 
risks of GM food. However, although experts agree that GM foods have significant 
potential benefits, there is disagreement of what these benefits are likely to be and 
when society may be able to enjoy them. Benefits can be divided into five categories: 
benefits for a) consumers, b) farmers, c) the third world, d) the environment, and e) 
economic benefits.
For example, the expert mental model shows that benefits for farmers include herbi­
cide tolerance, and pest, fungal, virus and other disease resistance. Often, consumer, 
farmer and environmental benefit are perceived as interrelated:
“(GM) crops can grow with reduced pesticide inputs that has major bene­
fits in terms o f  the costs o f  poor farmers, and that works even for small- 
scale farmers, and it has benefits for the health o f farm workers, because 
they are not having to deal with as much pesticide application, and it has 
economic benefits as well as having benefits for the environment. ”
(Expert 6)
Speaking of health benefits (such as nutritional benefits) for the western consumer, 
experts admit that these (although in the research pipeline) are not fully developed 
yet, with their market introduction still distant.
Regarding the controversial issue of whether and how GM can help to solve problems 
of starvation in third world countries, experts largely agree that GM is not the only 
solution to these problems, but that it can (and generally should) play a significant 
part. There is wide-ranging agreement of the usefulness and necessity of providing 
technological solutions:
“You know it is poverty, and wars and corrupt governments and all these 
sort o f factors, and it is a huge complex problem. But it won’t be solved 
without science, no matter what you do in other respects! It won't be 
solved without science simply because the increase in world population in 
the next few  decades which is said to double by 2050, most o f the increase 
being in the developing and the poorest countries. There won't be enough
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land and enough water by conventional means. So this is the reason why 
GM is an essential contribution to the future. ”
(Expert 2)
Yet in contrast, Expert 8 argues that in relation to poverty, GM foods may actually 
pose a risk because:
<( Hunger is about poverty and one o f  the big concerns is about private in­
terests controlling food and food production. It will not help food poverty 
but could intensify it. So quite how that's going to help world starvation is 
beyond me really. ”
6.3.2 Health risk
Strikingly, our experts generally frame discussions about GM food risk in terms of 
safety, providing a more positive reference frame. Regarding human health, there is 
agreement that GM foods are at least as safe as any other novel conventional foods, 
and that they do not pose any additional human health risk. Often, a comparison be­
tween conventional plant breeding and GM is drawn. It is argued that while thousands 
of genes may be transferred in the former, the latter can be much more focused trans­
ferring only particular desired genes at any one time and hence is less risky. As such, 
the risk of allergenicity is judged to be no higher than with any other novel food:
“I  often say that i f  I  go out and have a Thai meal I  can guarantee that I ’m 
eating more foreign DNA- i f  you like to put it like that- more DNA that my 
body has not seen, than i f  I  eat any amount o f  Monsanto maize or soya­
bean. ”
(Expert 5)
On the other hand, Expert 8 disagrees about the risk of potential allergenicity:
“I  think because when you take a gene and it brings an allergen with it, it 
is so devoid from the original food that it is actually completely different 
from any other type o f  allergen that may be introduced as the result o f  
conventional breeding. ”
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6.3.3 Environmental risk
But there is accord that food safety is much easier to ensure than environmental 
safety. Regarding the environment, there is clear potential for adverse effects- how­
ever, experts disagree if and how detrimental GM crops may be. First, effects are dif­
ficult to predict due to the lack of lengthy field trials to date. Second, there is the ques­
tion of what exactly constitutes harm to the environment. For example, there is the 
risk of pollen transfer:
"The reality offarming means, the reality ofpollination means, that i f  you 
have GM crops in the countryside, they will cross-pollinate with organic 
crops from time to time, at unpredictable levels. ”
(Expert 7)
Yet is any change harmful or where do the boundaries lie? Here, risk assessment re­
quires a value judgement. This is a fact neglected by the CMU approach. Although 
the approach appreciates that there may be divergent expert opinions, it does not offer 
any strategies of how to deal with what are effectively different social constructions of 
reality.
On the one hand, it is suggested that GM crops may be damaging to biodiversity be­
cause
“With herbicide tolerance the risk is that you have completely clinically 
clean fields everywhere, not a weed in sight. You can do that. Now that 
would be very damaging to biodiversity. So that’s quite a high risk ”
(Expert 7)
On the other hand, GM crops are unlikely to be more damaging than other non-native 
species. Expert 3 suggests that:
“ There is far more environmental damage done caused by the introduc­
tion o f non-GM organisms. So for example, you have a history o f  the in­
troduction o f  non-native species into almost every country in the world.
Nine times out o f ten there are no problems, but roughly in ten percent o f 
occasions there are real problems. ”
150
While GM is generally perceived not to present any additional risk, experts also agree 
that there is no zero risk, whether in relation to GM or anything else in life. The re­
quest to quantify GM risk was declined by all, meaning that rather than a quantitative 
influence diagram as suggested by Granger Morgan et al (2002), current results are 
presented heuristically, showing potential risks (and benefits) but not their likelihood 
of occurrence.
One of the reasons experts decline to quantify the risks of GM food is because there 
are various issues of scientific uncertainty, especially related to the environmental ef­
fects. And contrary to popular belief most experts have no problem in admitting to it:
“There is always a very high degree o f  provisionality about scientific 
findings, they are almost never set in stone. ”
(Expert 3)
However, experts are much more accepting of this than the public, possibly because 
of their particular scientific knowledge, and their higher trust in regulation. This in 
turn may be the result of their knowledge about regulatory practises in relation to GM, 
as well as the fact that several experts interviewed had served or are currently serving 
in the UK government regulatory bodies.
6.4 Regulation
Overall experts express strong trust in the UK regulation of GM science. The preva­
lent opinion is that the regulatory mechanisms currently in place in the UK are effec­
tive, albeit clearly not ‘foolproof as such, as no regulation can be ‘absolutely safe’. 
There is strong trust in both the ability of experts’ knowledge as well as their motiva­
tions:
“Well, ACRE here in the UK works in my view very well It has a large 
number o f  people who sit on it. They have a very wide range o f  expertise, 
in molecular genetics, in ecology, in food safety, very very wide range o f  
expertise. And by and large they have no vested interests. They have been 
picked specifically so that they do not actually have any particular com­
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mercial interests in GM crops. That was not the case five years ago but 
i t ’s the case now. I  think they’re very reliable, they take their responsibili­
ties very seriously, the quality o f the information that they require from  
the industry is very high, and they often send applications back to Mon­
santo and others, saying ‘we do not believe this, we do not think yo u ’ve 
done it properly, tell us the real truth about this... ’. They often get some 
bad science, some sloppy science in applications, they spot this immedi­
ately. So I  have a lot o f  faith in the regulatory system in the UK. ”
(Expert 7)
Interestingly a distinction is drawn to EU regulations, which are sometimes perceived 
as less trustworthy indicating that the public’s suspicions may be warranted to some 
extent:
“I  would not have the same degree o f faith in the European regulatory 
system more generally, because I  think that some o f  the regulatory com­
mittees in other countries are populated by people who have very strong 
vested interests ”
(Expert 7)
Understanding^, this might be worrying since the risks of GMOs are not necessarily 
geographically bounded. Furthermore, it is remarkable because the EU had a major 
role in shaping GM regulations. Yet the above statement shows that there are UK sci­
entists calling into question the competence of EU committees.
6.4.1 Regulatory problems: Labelling
There are some issues of significant expert disagreement, related to regulatory prob­
lems, such as the labelling of GM products, and the validity of risk assessments. Re­
garding labelling, experts agree that GM foods should be labelled in order to provide 
consumer choice, and that it is a necessary prerequisite for consumer acceptance. But 
there are problems of how and when a product should be labelled, and when a product 
should be considered a GM product, when it is an actual GM food (such as a GM to­
mato) or when it merely has some GM ingredient in it? This is turn is related to the
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issue of traceability of GM, and what level of GM is acceptable in the UK as well as 
the EU:
"Labelling in principle is reasonable. Where I  do think it becomes a prob­
lem is where you have this issue that there is no simple dipstick test at the 
point o f  purchase for the consumer or the food retailer to say whether 
something is indeed GM or not. And therefore I  actually subscribe to the 
UK government view, which is not the majority view in the EU, to in those 
cases to try and then have a regulatory system based on traceability back 
is un-enforceable and is therefore poor law. ”
(Expert 6)
6.4.2 Regulatory problems: Risk assessment
A further regulatory problem concerns the validity of the concept of substantial 
equivalence as a basis for risk assessment. Is it sufficient if the (end) GM product it­
self is substantially equivalent to a non-GM product, or should the process of product 
development be taken into consideration when assessing the risk? Here, experts do not 
agree at all. While on the one hand, the majority of experts do not see any problems 
with using substantial equivalence as a recognised method for assessing effects, on the 
other hand, it is argued that:
“I  do not think substantial equivalence is valid. I  think it needs to be 
looked at. Substantial equivalence isn’t a good basis. You should be look­
ing at what’s different, not at what’s similar. ”
(Expert 4)
Again, risk assessment here seemingly comes down to a value judgement, hinting at 
the limits of a purely science-based risk evaluation. A further value-related area of 
significant expert dispute is the application (as well as interpretation) of the precau­
tionary principle to science. Although the principle by itself is not criticised, there is 
the common perception that it can be taken to far:
“I f  we ’d  adopted that sort o f  approach we 'd never have had a drug, we ’d  
never have a chemical in agriculture, w e’d never have done anything in 
terms o f lifesciences. Here the precautionary principle is used irresponsi­
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bly, totally irresponsibly! That’s not to say we should not be cautious but 
we should do it through the normal regulatory channels, ask as many 
questions as possible. ”
(Expert 9)
In sum, although experts generally express strong trust in the UK regulations of GM 
foods, regulation is problematic, with expert opinions diverging on issues of labelling 
and risk assessment procedures. At present there are several key regulatory issues that 
still need to be resolved and it seems that these are value-related matters that cannot 
be resolved by science alone.
6.5 The public understanding of science
As indicated by ALCESTE, the PUS is a major discussion point among all experts, 
although, as the interview schedule shows, no questions were asked about this topic 
directly. This implies that experts do take this topic seriously, however, in several in­
stances, experts’ attitudes towards the public are still very much in line with the in­
formation deficit model.
6.5.1 Media, pressure groups and social perceptions
Experts credit the media, the organic farming movement and various pressure groups 
(such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth) with a huge amount of influence on pub­
lic opinion, and in most cases, this influence is perceived as negative:
“But the options society faces are: do we do nothing? Do we stand still, 
do we ignore it? Do we follow what the Greenpeace fo lk  want and just say 
we ’re so frightened o f  unknown unknowns that we do not make any pro­
gress? ”
(Expert 9)
A common suggestion is that the media, together with various pressure groups, suc­
cessfully launched a campaign against GM foods exploiting the uncertainties around 
the issues, effectively scaring the public. Several experts accuse pressure groups of 
being ill-informed, and of not offering any solutions, but only criticism. Likewise, the
154
organic farming movement is perceived to have used their lack of GM as an influen­
tial marketing strategy:
“They have said 'all GM crops are the same. Everything that is produced 
by transgenic technology is bad and we will not have anything to do with 
it. ’ That’s their marketing ploy. ”
(Expert 2)
In this way, experts appreciate that lay perceptions of GM food are influenced by so­
cial rather than purely scientific factors. Expert 8 in particular recognises that the 
separation of the social and the scientific risk dimensions is not straightforward argu­
ing that solely assessing the scientific risks of GM is insufficient, as there are other 
(deeper level) issues that require consideration, such as
“The underlying question is does anybody want them or do we need them, 
and what are the alternatives- that should also be part o f  the equation.
Our feeling is that we need to look for more sustainable solutions and not 
try to look for technological fixes...Because it's not herbicide tolerant 
crops or carry on as we are at the moment- that isn’t the choice that we 
face. We have other ways o f doing agriculture. ”
(Expert 8)
With this approach, this expert echoes the prevalent attitude of the public. Because 
these issues cannot simply be resolved by science alone as suggested by the CMU ap­
proach, the question of how these issues can be addressed, and how such types of 
value conflicts can be solved remains.
6.5.2 Public perception problems
As indicated through the ALCESTE analysis, the findings show that public perception 
is perceived as a real problem by most experts. It is appreciated that the public have 
been sensitised to food problems since the occurrence of BSE and foot-and-mouth. 
However, in contrast to the public, experts view previous food scares as exceptions, 
not as the norm, appreciating that the public only knows about regulatory issues when 
things go wrong:
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“I  am appalled at what the green party do, they say’ you can not trust this 
government, because look at BSE, look at foot-and mouth, and therefore 
you can not trust them on GM’. I  just think that is appalling. Because all 
the normal government regulatory machinery, BSE was a surprise, and 
foot-and-mouth they should’ve dealt with better, but they are not the gov­
ernment regulatory machinery. The in place machinery like ACRE, like 
ACNFP, like AEBC, and so on, they’ve all done a brilliant job fo r  years 
but everybody ignores that! ”
(Expert 9)
The public’s opposition to GM is often described as “emotional rather than factual” 
(e.g. Expert 5), indicating that the information deficit model still finds some validation 
today. Experts perceive the lack of public knowledge about GM in general as prob­
lematic:
“I  find  that the level o f  understanding o f just fundamental genetics 
amongst the population throughout Europe is absolutely as low as it can 
get. Most people have not even the first idea o f even what genes are or 
where they are or how they are. They know nothing about it really. ”
(Expert 7)
To conclude on the expert mental model, overall our experts perceive many more 
benefits than risks of GM foods. However, there are notable expert divergences as 
well, such as in relation to environmental risks and benefits. Further, although most 
experts have strong trust in the UK regulation of GM, there are several regulatory is­
sues (often regarding the validity of risk assessment procedures) that still need to be 
resolved. Interestingly, expert disagreements are generally related to values, not the 
science per se. It appears that even experts, despite having access to the same scien­
tific knowledge, choose risk representations that are in line with their values and in­
terests, and that in many cases science cannot easily be divided from values. Hence 
just as there is not “one public opinion” there is not only “one expert opinion” either. 
Yet in turn, expert disagreements are problematic for the lay public, heightening for 
example lack of trust in science. These and other findings of the lay focus groups are 
discussed in the following section.
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6.6 Central concepts: Lay participants
To begin with, it should be noted that the word risk per se is employed by lay partici­
pants together with the words ‘danger' and 'uncertainty However, we remain with 
the term risk for the purpose of clarity and because it connotes both danger and uncer­
tainty.
When lay participants speak about the risks of GM food, a different range of issues 
come into the equation. Table 6.2 shows the frequencies of primary and sub-codes for 
each focus group (Fg) indicating how often topics are discussed in each focus group 
and in total.
Table 6.2 Codes-Primary-Documents- Focus groups
Codes Fgl Fg2 Fg3 Fg4 Fg5 Totals
Benefit
Benefit economic 13 16 7 26 8 70
Benefit environment 0 1 5 0 0 6
No benefit 7 4 4 9 1 25
Food
Concern food production 35 12 14 4 6 71
De-naturalised foods 27 8 18 14 13 80
Food risk general 17 11 4 15 12 59
GM foods on market? 8 12 7 11 3 41
Organic farming 13 0 6 8 2 29
Previous UK food scares 9 2 4 7 3 25
GM science
GM science perse 18 14 14 11 9 66
Scientific disagreements 3 7 0 4 2 16
Information/knowledge
Lack of information 6 25 10 14 12 67
Lack of factual knowledge 20 14 7 11 7 59
Insufficient research 4 10 11 13 12 50
Regulation
Lack of ethical framework 3 7 2 0 5 17
Regulation per se 22 30 6 9 9 79
Retailers' behaviour 7 7 1 2 3 20
Risk
Long-term effects 8 7 4 14 6 39
Risk environment 16 9 17 8 13 63
Risk health 46 11 14 28 8 107
Risk invisible 0 1 1 1 2 5
Risk involuntary 10 22 16 25 15 88
Risk irreversible 3 3 4 6 2 18
Risk uncontrollable 4 0 0 5 3 12
Risk unknown 7 20 17 15 6 65
Risk unquantifiable 1 8 0 2 0 11
Risk of patenting 0 5 4 2 2 13
Scientific uncertainty 23 13 16 23 15 90
Science and politics
Fatalism 3 8 3 11 9 34
Pressure groups and media 8 9 7 8 12 42
Public perception 9 2 6 2 7 26
Responsibility 4 4 1 5 5 19
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Table 6.2 Codes-Primary-Documents- Focus groups (cont.)
Codes Fg1 Fg2 Fg3 Fg4 Fg5 Totals
Science-policy interaction 14 8 4 5 14 45
Trust
Suspicion/conspiracy 31 18 13 20 10 92
Lack of trust general 12 16 4 6 7 45
Lack of trust in government 13 16 8 10 1 48
Lack of trust in industry 36 18 19 19 24 116
Vested interests 16 10 7 14 12 59
Values
Anti-americanism 0 2 2 0 12 16
Deeper level solutions 8 3 4 1 18 34
Equity , 14 10 9 10 9 52
Future of the planet 36 11 12 11 7 77
GM will make things worse 21 3 4 12 7 47
Not necessary 6 8 10 15 1 40
Scientific progress 11 11 0 8 4 34
Technological solutions 8 7 2 4 1 22
Third world problems 13 10 13 24 12 72
Nature
Idealisation nature 24 7 12 9 10 62
Messing with nature 39 19 15 32 9 114
Mixing genes 11 7 7 12 3 40
Acceptability (supercode) 15 12 16 14 8 65
Totals 682 497 391 541 381 2494
Table 6.2 shows that, in contrast to experts, lay discourse centres on the risks rather 
than the benefits of GM food. Of particular concern are the potential health risks of 
GM, and the fact that the risk is involuntary. The uncertainty in relation to the science 
of GM is repeatedly mentioned and viewed with unease. Moreover, discussions recur­
rently focus on trust-related issues, whereby the lack of trust in industry is most pro­
nounced.
Also, it is clear that in contrast to experts, lay participants frequently discuss non- 
scientific issues, such as those related to ‘values’- examining whether GM is neces­
sary, positive and negative sides of technological progress in general, and how nature 
and humanity should be treated. Hereby, participants often talk about the concept of 
nature in an idealised way, offering a contrast to GM which is perceived to be “mess­
ing with nature
In order to examine the relationships between the codes and contextualise them ac­
cording to the CMU approach, figure 6.2 presents the lay mental model before the 
findings are discussed. The construction of the diagram proceeded as outlined in rela-
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tion to the expert mental model in the previous section. For example, to provide more 
detail than in table 6.2 we show which codings are associated with the relatively broad 
code families, e.g. ‘health risk’ and ‘environmental risk’. To explore the meaning of 
codes in their contexts, the relationships between the codes are determined heuristi- 
cally based on our knowledge of the focus group transcripts using the Atlas/ti net­
working function.
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Figure 6.2 Lay mental model o f GMfood risk
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6.7 Lay risk and benefit
The lay mental model in figure 6.2 shows that in contrast to most experts, lay partici­
pants perceive only very few benefits of GM food. Indeed, it is frequently mentioned 
that there are no benefits at all: ‘7  can’t see any benefits at all, only risks really” 
(male participant, 31, fg2). Nevertheless, risks and benefits are often weighted up. 
There is a feeling that there may indeed be short-term benefits, but that they are not 
worth taking a long-term risk for, at least as long as these risks are still unknown:
H: “Nobody seems to know- yes they might say ‘it will help the poor peo­
ple and bring benefits for them ’ but what kind o f  risks does it bring? ”
E: “That's the question: do the benefits outweigh the risks? I  don’t think 
so. ”
(fg4 'finance *)
Although some participants consider GM to bring benefits for the third world and help 
relieve starvation, most do not believe this, and indeed, this argument seems to have 
backfired. It is appreciated that there are significant economic benefits, but these are 
not viewed positively as the question arose for whom- generally this is assumed to be 
solely to the big companies’ advantage. Often, these companies are viewed antagonis­
tically, especially Monsanto which seems to be made a scapegoat.
Interestingly, benefits perceived by the experts are often not regarded as such by lay 
participants. For example, experts mention longer shelf-life of fruits and vegetables as 
a consumer benefit. But this is deemed unnecessary and unwanted by the public:
“They say GM can make fruits last longer without getting squashy, and 
some people might see that as a benefit but I  don’t. I  just think i t’s unnatu­
ral ”
(male participant, 32, fg2 'law ’)
Essentially, lay participants disregard many of the benefits of GM foods outlined by 
experts and do not trust the motivations of the companies delivering the benefits. Par­
ticipants acknowledge that they simply had not heard as much about potential benefits 
as about risks, and readily admit to confusion as to what was actually happening at the
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moment. There is a lack of knowledge about what the benefits might be, and how re­
alistic they are. Thus not only are different risk perceptions of expert and lay people 
cause of controversy, but equally, different perceptions of benefits. Termed the “mis­
perception of risk perception” Gaskell et al (2004) argue that at the heart of the GM 
food controversy is not the mis-perception of the scientific risks, but rather the per­
ception of absent benefits. In turn, the relevance of risk communication strategies 
such as the CMU approach which aims to change public risk perception by focusing 
on the risk per se is questionable.
6.7.1 Health risk
In stark contrast to experts, most lay participants perceive GM foods to have signifi­
cant health risks. As shown in the mental model in figure 6.2, lay participants are 
strongly concerned that GM foods may lead to illnesses, such as cancer, obesity, al­
lergies, the creation of new viruses, and even death. The effect may not be immediate 
but certainly in the future and for future generations. Cancer is one of the main health 
concerns, and one that many participants are certain about. Yet the risk of cancer and 
other health risks anticipated by lay participants is not mentioned at all by experts, 
who consider GM foods to be ‘as safe as any other novel fo o d ’, maybe (but very 
unlikely) with some potential allergenicity.
Also, the risk of genetic mutations is discussed, and in a pseudo-scientific way it is 
suggested that GM may lead to handicaps:
“I f  you change genes it is likely to be very dangerous. Look at how we 
evolved- nature made everything perfect, we ’re not supposed to mess with 
it really. For example, you know that a lot o f  children, or people in gen­
eral are handicapped because o f  some genetic defect- do we want to in­
crease that with genetic modification? ”
(female participant, 30, fgl ‘country")
It seems that participants are not aware of the contradictions in the above in state­
ment- if nature worked so perfectly why would we have genetic defects in the first 
place?
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Yet despite the high perception of health risks, most participants are aware that com­
pared to other risks frequently taken, such as smoking, health risks of GM food are 
not likely to be greater- hence the difference here is the voluntariness of risks and the 
lack of choice in relation to GM. A further question that often comes up concerns the 
quality and quantity of the risk, such how much can one eat, maybe a little bit is not 
harmful but where do the boundaries lie? Is it more harmful for certain population 
groups (such as for children) than for others? Therefore, contrary to suggestions in the 
literature of food in general (e.g. Zwart, 2000), our lay participants do not necessarily 
make a binary distinction between the safe and the unsafe but rather are aware of pos­
sible nuances on a continuum from unproblematic to problematic food.
With regards to health risks, variations in lay people’s knowledge are especially pro­
nounced and there is often confusion as to how potential health risks might manifest 
themselves:
“They’re playing with the genes and the genes they use are not advanced.
I  hate that. There 're all kinds o f  different genes out there and some people 
have genes that are coming from quite far back and the scientists change 
that and that can be really dangerous. That's why they've got these aller­
gies, there 're always new genes coming along and the body can't cope 
with that, some people can die from that. That's where cancer comes from  
because it comes from basically pollution and chemicals. Your body can't 
cope with all these chemicals, and genes are even worse. ”
(female participant, 31, fgl ’country")
In that way, as implied by some of our experts, the concern with health risk is at least 
partly related to the limited knowledge of what genes are. The perception often is that 
one puts something strange into one’s body, something foreign that should not be 
there. Thus when speaking about how “bad” genes are, it is likely that participants 
mean foreign genes, not simply genes per se.
6.7.2 Food risk general
As shown in the lay mental model, a part of the perceived health risks is the concern 
with food risk general, which in turn is associated with previous UK food scares and 
concern with modem food production methods. Both BSE and foot-and-mouth are
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perceived as major food crises in the UK, and are frequently used as a comparison to 
GM. With all issues, the risk is not only involuntary, but felt to be forced upon society 
as “we all have to eat”. Moreover, previous food scares evidently contributed to the 
lack of trust now shown in relation to GM foods. The fact that a politician (Gummer) 
fed his daughter British beef in the midst of the BSE crisis is repeatedly presented as 
‘evidence’ for politicians’ lack of knowledge and hence well-placed mistrust.
Likewise, previous food scares are often perceived as an indication of things to come, 
and there is great concern with food production methods in general. Specifically, this 
relates to intensive farming techniques and the way farm animals are treated. The pre­
vailing perception is that GM will make an already bad situation even worse:
‘W e ’ve seen already what all these kinds o f  intensive farming can do to 
us! Remember what happened with BSE and CJD? I t ’s a dangerous way 
o f farming and I  don’t agree with that. I  think GMjust will make all these 
issues worse, and there’s already so much wrong with farming, i t ’s far too 
intensive and that’s why we ’re getting all these illnesses. We don ’t need 
GM technology to make matters even worse. ”
(male, 38, fgl 'country')
Hence it is accepted that GM is certainly not the only problem, but rather a warning 
sign of the problems of modem food production and humans’ treatment of nature and 
of the environment in present times:
“In a way I  wonder, this issue is not just about genetically modified food, 
i t ’s about how the food that we eat is tampered with in a way that is not 
natural. ”
(male, 32, fg5 'PhD 0
Thus our findings raise the question of whether food risk today is in some ways a spe­
cial case for risk communication interventions. Food in general is perceived as pre­
carious because of previous food scares in the UK, and there is significant concern 
with current food production methods, often viewed in relation to de-naturalised foods 
on the market. The latter is a particularly significant part of the perception of general 
food risk and addressed in more detail under the section ‘natural versus unnatural 
foods’.
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6.7.3 Environmental risk
Moreover, despite lacking detailed knowledge, all lay participants are deeply con­
cerned about the potential environmental risks of GM. Most pronounced when speak­
ing about environmental risks, is the irreversibility of the risk and the fact that effects 
may be slow to show, and that when they do it may be too late to remedy them. Echo­
ing the dimensions of Slovic’s (1987) psychometric paradigm and anchoring risks 
technologically (rather than food-specifically as above), GM and its effects are per­
ceived to be like radiation:
“I  think it’s like radiation, you have no control over it, somebody else is 
making all the decisions, you can’t see it, you can’t smell it, and it will be 
here for years to come, these are the problems. ”
(female participant, 45, fg3 'mature1)
Also, the risk of GM is dreaded in the way that participants often expect some kind of 
resulting future disaster to happen:
“At the moment, maybe nobody is harmed at least not directly, but what 
about future generations, what about the environment, biodiversity? GM  
might be another Chernobyl waiting to happen! ”
(female participant, 30, fg3 'mature 0
Reflecting Beck’s (1986) definition of post-modem risk as knowing no boundaries in 
space and time, participants are strongly concerned about the longevity and distribu­
tion of GM risk.
A specific environmental risk commonly mentioned is the risk of cross-pollination. 
As with genes in general, there is the common assumption that GM plants and crops 
would “behave” in a different way than “normal” ones. It is perceived that pollen can 
go everywhere, and in the case of GM pollen, this is viewed as *contamination ’ and 
‘pollution ’:
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“I  worry very much about cross-contamination o f plants, the seeds o f GM  
plants can waft miles into other territories o f fields which are not GM and 
that's polluting them then. ”
(male participant, 29, fg2 ‘law1)
Additionally, participants are concerned about the reduction in biodiversity as the re­
sult of GM:
“On the one hand, there was a big story in the news a couple o f  years ago 
saying that GM kills butterflies, and I  think that, and basically killing any 
kind o f species is obviously a great risk to the environment. On the other 
hand, apparently now they say that wildlife flourishes in GM fields, more 
so than in normal fields even! This clearly would be a benefit o f GM, but 
whom do you believe to tell the truth? ”
(male participant, 32, fg2 Vow')
The above quote indicates that participants are also aware of potential environmental 
benefits of GM. For example, the decreased use of pesticides and fertilisers is occa­
sionally mentioned. Still, while not favouring the use of pesticides, participants prefer 
those to the use of GM, for the reasons that a) they are familiar and their risks are 
known, and b) they are added to the food rather than changing the essence of it. 
Moreover, the question that often comes up is who to believe to tell the truth? Partici­
pants are confused by the mixed risk and benefit messages they feel they are receiv­
ing. Since potential environmental risks and benefits are also a significant area of ex­
pert contention as shown in the expert mental model which indicates both possibili­
ties, lay participants’ confusion is not surprising.
In sum, although expert and lay divergences in perceptions of health (and to a lesser 
extent environmental) risks could be addressed by providing further information in 
accordance with the CMU approach, the fact that previous food scares have destroyed 
lay participants’ trust in government may be a barrier to effective communication. 
Further, concerns arise in part through non-technical risk issues, such as the involun­
tariness of the risk. These are issues that could not be addressed in a risk communica­
tion according to the science-based CMU approach. The following sections further
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highlight the limitations of this approach to risk communication by focusing on lay 
concerns about scientific uncertainty, trust, and value-related issues.
6.7.4 Scientific uncertainty and scientific disagreements
In contrast to expert participants, scientific uncertainty and scientific disagreements 
are perceived as particularly problematic by lay participants. The perception is that 
even science at the moment is unable to answer the questions that they want to know 
about. The concern is less about the quantity of the risk, i.e. the fact that the risks are 
not quantifiable (as experts agree), but rather about the quality, i.e. what the risks 
might be, which is perceived to be completely unknown. Hence the main concern is 
about unknowable risks:
“I  wouldn’t even trust the scientists, even i f  they really think they ’re doing 
it for the right reasons, ok maybe now the research shows GM is not 
harmful, but they cannot know what’s going to happen in the future. They 
really cannot know and that’s the main problem. They might be the best 
expert in the field  but they are not prophets- you know what I  mean! In 
that way they don’t know more than us at all. ”
(female participant, 35, fgl ‘country1)
Often, more research is called for to combat at least some of the areas of uncertainty. 
In contrast to most experts’ perceptions, there is strong agreement that the research to 
date is not sufficient, and that far more longitudinal research needs to be done in order 
to be able to adequately assess the safety of GM foods. The minimum time span for 
further research is often set at twenty years:
“Because it will stay with us forever I  don’t think twenty years o f further 
research is too much to ask! ”
(male participant, 27, fg4 ‘finance 0
Yet participants are acutely aware that the research that they feel needs to be done 
could not be done in practise because it is unfeasible to conduct studies over such long 
time spans, and that politicians would not wait that long to introduce GM.
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Apart from scientific uncertainty, a further cause for concern for lay participants, are 
disagreements between experts, often played out in the media. There is the feeling that 
clear-cut knowledge does not exist, hence participants do not know whom to believe. 
Contrary to experts’ beliefs, participants realise that pressure groups also have their 
own agenda, and do not trust them blindly. Additionally, since science is constantly 
evolving, many find it impossible to keep up with all the new developments. This is 
not restricted to GM foods though, but to wider food issues:
“The problem with food is also that you don’t really know anymore what 
is good for you and what isn’t. These so-called facts seem to change all 
the time, even with non-GMfood. And with GM I  can see no agreement at 
all, some say i t ’s not harmful others strongly disagree. ”
(female participant, 27, fg2 'law *)
In essence, the perception of GM food risk as both unknown and unknowable is wor­
rying for lay participants and clearly not an issue that can be easily resolved by sci­
ence alone- who should decide when GM foods can be declared safe and for whom? It 
seems that a pre-requisite of accepting scientific uncertainty is trust in the responsible 
agents, yet today well-publicised expert disagreements are contributing to a lack of 
public trust.
6.7.5 Trust
As can be seen in the lay mental model, trust, or lack of, is a major issue of concern 
for participants. Nevertheless, in the present study, it is addressed relatively briefly, 
because as outlined in Chapter One, it has received copious amounts of attention in 
the literature, and overall, the present findings confirm previous results. Apart from 
lack of trust in general, lack of trust in government/regulation, and in industry, the 
media is not trusted to tell the truth either. This leads to participants often feeling con­
spired against. Hence the problem may not be just lack of trust but an actual culture of 
suspicion and fear. In turn, this raises the question of whether risk communication 
problems can actually be solved with the CMU approach alone.
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6.7.6 Vested interests of science, politics and industry
Lay participants are deeply concerned that they cannot trust anyone, whether govern­
ment, industry, scientists, the media, as well as pressure groups. They mistrust any 
particularly strong claims, whether made by government or pressure groups, and fre­
quently call for more balanced information and the admission of uncertainties. Par­
ticipants do not necessarily expect experts to make definite judgements, but remark 
that experts do not want to admit to uncertainty.
Yet evidently it is not simply the uncertainty inherent in scientific research that is 
problematic, but rather the motivation of scientists and their interplay with industry 
and politics. There is a strong perception of industry bias, and of (undeclared) vested 
interests. The underlying assumption is that politicians cannot be trusted to tell the 
truth- about GM as well as other issues. Hence lack of knowledge and information is 
seen as particularly challenging in relation to the extent to which confidence in gov­
ernment is justified:
S: “The trouble is, i f  you don’t know anything you don’t know whom to 
trust. You just have to make this decision without the relevant informa­
tion... ”
B: “I t ’s the wider environment o f  trust, corporate trust and so on. I t ’s not 
just to do with scientists, look at Enron, look at the scandals surrounding 
the Iraq war. Trust now is at its lowest. There’s a crisis o f  trust in institu­
tions, not just science I  think. ”
(fg5 ‘PhD')
It is clear that just as risk cannot be seen in isolation, neither can trust. Trust in the UK 
government has deteriorated for a variety of reasons, such as the Iraq war and BSE. 
This illustrates the asymmetry of trust: once trust is destroyed, it is difficult to regain 
(Luhmann, 1979). Participants are aware that scientific advice turned out to be wrong 
in the past, and hence do not feel warranted to place their trust.
Interestingly, Barber’s (1983) tripartite conception of trust (value compatibility, fidu­
ciary responsibility and technical competence) is resembled- debates focus on either 
values, responsibility and motivations, or technical competence and capabilities of 
relevant authorities. Concerns arising from lack of trust are more often expressed in
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relation to the motives of actors rather than their capabilities. The common perception 
is that scientists, government and industry stick together and depend on each other, 
and hence cannot be trusted as money will determine the outcome in the end:
“The scientists might be the best in their fields, but they are dependent on 
the companies to provide them with research grants. So they are not inde­
pendent at all, in fact, some o f them even have shares in the biotech com­
panies! Moreover, the government is also dependent on the big companies 
to some extent- they need their investment. ”
(male participant, 32, fg3 'mature *)
6.7.7 Lack of trust in regulation
Lack of trust in regulation is associated with the perception of regulation as inefficient 
and irresponsible. Lay participants are strongly concerned about who has responsibil­
ity for decisions, and who is to blame if things go wrong. There is a feeling that the 
agents responsible cannot be trusted to have the public’s best interests at heart, and 
that they will carry on regardless:
G: “So where should we stop and who is responsible? The scientists or 
the politicians? When things go wrong they just start blaming each other, 
that’s how it usually goes. So it should be decided now who is responsible, 
and how far we should go with this technology. Just because science al­
lows us to do something doesn’t mean we should do it ”
M: “That’s a question that nobody asks- when and where is it going to 
stop? They should discuss that now and make some guidelines at least. At 
the moment they have no guidelines I  think and society has to decide now, 
before i t ’s too late, where to stop with this technology. ”
(fgl 'country')
Speaking about the “devil’s doctrine” in science, there is a general feeling that in sci­
ence “what can be done, will be done” and participants are fearful of the repercus­
sions. There is little trust in regulation being able to stop this process. In contrast to 
most experts, participants also strongly criticise the lack of ethical framework avail­
able and there is the feeling of technology going out of control, partly as the result of 
insufficient regulation in place. In contrast to most experts, lay participants have little
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trust in the current regulatory regimes, and also appreciate that they lack knowledge, 
highlighting the importance of transparency in decision making:
“/  don’t know anything about GM regulations, maybe i f  we would know 
then we could understand how decisions are made. ”
(male participant, 34, fg2 'law *)
Maybe because of their lack of detailed knowledge about regulations, concerns of lay 
participants are often related to the lack of choice and the lack of information with 
regards to food purchases. Regarding the lack of choice of food products, participants 
question what constitutes a GM food product according to the current guidelines- a 
question that experts also disagree on. There is resentment about being ‘cheated into ’ 
eating GM foods, with lack of choice being one of the main features of GM resis­
tance:
“I  want to have disclosure, I  want to be able to choose, I  feel like I  am be­
ing cheated into buying something I  do not want to buy. Whether i t ’s go­
ing to be damaging is a different matter, but we should be allowed to 
choose."
(male participant, 32, fg5 'PhD 0
Lay participants question which (if any) GM foods there are currently on the market, 
as they feel unable to find out. Some argue that most of the food we eat is already 
GM, while others assume that there is no GM food on the market yet. This confusion 
is not surprising since even experts are unable to agree on whether GM foods are ac­
tually on the market as it depends on how a GM food is classified. As such, questions 
related to the definitions and characterisations of GM food may need to be first clari­
fied by scientific experts in order to be able to effectively communicate with the lay 
public.
6.7.8 Conspiracies and lies
The lack of trust in the agents responsible to do the right thing, coupled with the per­
ception of vested interests, may be described as suspicion, rather than simply the ab­
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sence of trust. Participants are suspicious of being conspired against, by the govern­
ment and by industry:
“We have to stop it if  we still can, but probably w e ’ve been eating this 
stuff since ages and nobody told us. They like to keep these things secret 
because they know it could be dangerous. ”
(male participant, 38, fgl 'country1)
Some participants perceive past failures in risk assessment as blatant “lies” warranting 
their lack of trust. The feeling of being conspired against and lied to, and of power­
lessness against big institutions breeds resentment, often culminating in resignation 
and fatalism:
“People might disagree but the government just goes on regard­
less...Personally, I am against GM, but I feel there is nothing we can do.
They talk about participatory democracy, but le t’s face it: we don’t really 
have anything to say here. ”
(male participant, 31, fg2 'law)
Hence the findings highlight the difficulties of the relationship between the public, 
science, politics and industry. Arguments often explicitly or implicitly employ the 
concept of trust. As GM is not seen as being under the public’s control, there is an 
evident need for trust. Also, the public generally does not have access to all expert 
knowledge that would allow them to evaluate the risks themselves. Under these condi­
tions, lack of trust in scientists, industry and government is a key problem. Lay par­
ticipants appreciate this, and thus are greatly concerned with the interrelationships and 
perceived vested interests of all groups. Importantly, these concerns cannot be ade­
quately addressed by the CMU approach focusing solely on the scientific aspects on 
GM food.
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6.8 Value-related concerns
When comparing both mental models it is evident that a major distinguishing factor 
between expert and lay participants is the inclusion of value-related issues in the lay 
model. Hence this is a further non-scientific issue, in addition to the trust-related con­
cerns discussed above, which highlights the limitations of the science-based CMU 
approach. For instance, lay participants questions about whether GM is necessary at 
all and ‘what world do we want to live in ’ cannot be answered by science alone.
Looking at values related to nature, it is clear that lay participants generally perceive 
GM to be ‘messing with nature ', which contrasts with a common idealisation of na­
ture and traditional food and farming practices. A first indication of what ‘messing 
with nature ’ means for lay participants is shown in the way in which participants fre­
quently distinguish between different “levels” of GM. These attitudes towards diverse 
types of genetic transfer are discussed under the sub-section ‘acceptability and mon­
strosity ’.
6.8.1 GM food is not necessary
Lay participants are strongly concerned about fairness and equity in relation to the 
third world and do not think that GM food would be an adequate solution to the prob­
lems of developing countries. Hence the necessity and expediency of GM is ques­
tioned:
“There’s enough food in the world to feed  everybody, we have so many 
surpluses already. I t’s the distribution offood  that’s the problem and I 
don’t see how GM can alleviate this problem... ”
(male participant, 30, fg5 ‘PhD ')
In contrast to most of the expert participants, only very few lay participants acknowl­
edge that GM might play a role in alleviating starvation. Rather, it is felt that other, 
deeper issues and long-term solutions needed to be addressed first, as GM would only 
offer a short-term scientific fix, distracting from the real problems. Hence there is the 
frequent call for deeper level solutions as it is acknowledged that the GM debate may
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be only a symbol for the need to change attitudes towards global problems more gen­
erally:
“So maybe the real debate isn’t about GM at all, but i t ’s about ecology, 
how we deal with our planet, what kind o f  world we want to live in, how 
we treat consumers, the distribution o f  power. ”
(female participant, 48, fg5 'PhD')
Lack of belief in scientific solutions to societal problems, coupled with the perceived 
lack of benefits, contributes to GM food being considered as an unnecessary risk that 
could and should be avoided. Here, a consequentialist style of reasoning, which 
judges the rightness of actions according to the value of what follows from their per­
formance, based on the possible benefits of GM is common. In many ways, the per­
ceived lack of utility overrides concerns about risk:
“I  don’t know about the risks but why do we do all that in the first place?
Why do we experiment with our food, why does the government push it 
like that? We don’t need it and that’s i t”
(female participant, 29, fg5 'PhD *)
6.8.2 GM is “messing with nature”
As indicated by ALCESTE, the concept ‘messing with nature ’ is one of the major dis­
tinguishing factors between expert and lay participants. Often, lay participants roman­
ticise and idealise nature, perceiving nature in nostalgic and even melancholic ways, 
with many wanting to get back to how things used to be:
“I  think we should go back to our roots, your own garden, plant your own 
vegetables, do it all the natural way... ”
(female participant, 48, fg2 'law ')
Food-specifically, there is the prominent distinction of how food is or is not supposed 
to be:
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“I always order organic foods and am always glad to find insects inside, 
it means that the food has not been poisoned, that is has been kept as it 
was supposed to .’’
(female participant, 54, fg3 ‘mature 0 
In contrast, GM food is generally perceived to be “messing with nature”:
“You know all this messing with nature, changing nature in unnatural 
ways, just because we have the technology doesn't actually give us the 
right to just mess with nature. Some things should be left alone. I f  we were 
meant to be different, i f  plants were meant to be with some other genes, 
then nature would have done that! In nature, everything has a place, eve­
rything works as it should work, we shouldn’t take the risk o f  messing it 
up. ”
(female participant, 29, fg4 ‘finance ”)
This indicates that nature is often seen as a complex system not to be disturbed. Utilis­
ing a consequentialist style of reasoning couched in quasi-scientific terms, participants 
argue that GM is wrong because it disturbs the equilibrium of the natural world. Hu­
mans are frequently perceived to have behaved arrogantly in relation to nature, and 
GM is just another example of human arrogance for which humans ultimately have to 
pay a high price. Nature is seen as being able to take revenge, based on the perception 
that it has done so in the past already:
“Nature has worked millions o f years to get things right and we ’re just 
messing things up in a moment! There is no respect for nature and I  think 
i t ’s very important that we have respect for nature. When we lose respect 
for nature, that’s when things start to go wrong. Look at BSE, AIDS,. . .”
(female participant, 30, fgl 'country 0
On the other hand, arguing from a deontological ethic, based on the notion that ac­
tions should or should not be carried out regardless of the consequences that follow, 
many participants consider “messing with nature” as simply ethically and morally 
wrong:
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“It is not right. It is simply wrong to introduce genetic materials from dif­
ferent species, say fish or birds, into our foods. It is totally unnatural. ”
(female participant, 54, fg3 ‘mature 0
Related to an ecocentric attitude towards nature, here actions are wrong because they 
disturb nature per se. Although few participants speak of playing God specifically, in 
many ways “nature” can be replaced with “God”, as already suggested by Wagner et 
al (2001).
Despite arguing from different perspectives, both themes are similar in that the basic 
point is that it is wrong to mess with nature. Caution is urged either in recognition of 
the danger of disturbing insufficiently understood natural equilibria or through an ap­
peal to a sense of duty, of stewardship of nature. In both perspectives, human inter­
vention would only destroy nature’s perfection, as in the words of Aristotle: “nature 
does nothing uselessly”. One of the reasons for this perception may be that GM has 
the potential to literally change our/nature’s essence. GM is frequently perceived as 
being an invasive technology touching the deep-seated essence of what makes us hu­
man:
“We shouldn’t rush into fundamental things like that too quickly. Once 
nature is changed, i t ’s changed forever ”
(female participant, 31, fgl 'country 0
6.8.3 Acceptability and monstrosity
A particular aspect of ‘messing with nature ’ is the perception that one should not ‘mix 
genes While some lay participants resist any kind of genetic transfer for the reason 
that it is “against nature”, others distinguish clearly between different levels of genetic 
transfer, finding some acceptable and others not. One participant sums up the majority 
opinion very well:
“What I  came up with during this discussion is three categories, one is 
acceptable, the others are not. I  just explain with this example. You have 
the salmon, first you can change the process o f production, then you 
would get the effects o f  cheap salmon, but i t ’s still the same fish. I  think
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this is still acceptable. The second level is that you have this fish and you 
modify one gene so that it grows six times as fast as it would usually grow 
with the same food, and personally I  would be very cautious about that 
and how we would regulate that. The third way o f changing is crossing 
this fish with a bird or something, and this kind o f  exotic experiment we 
really don’t need. ”
(male participant, 32, fg2 ‘law *)
As the above quote shows, participants have boundaries of acceptability, often accept­
ing same species transfer, but resisting genetic transfer between species. Effectively, 
there are levels of naturalness, and it is seemingly a taboo to cross species.
The perception that one should not “mix genes” is related to the idea that by “mixing 
species” something completely novel and unknown will appear:
“The problem is also that they put things together which would never 
have come together in nature, just creating something totally new scien­
tifically. ”
(male participant, 30, fg5 'PhD')
In that way, it is a violation of natural kind boundaries which Wagner, Kronberger, 
Berg et al (2004) propose is strongly linked with the idea of monstrosity. Wagner et al 
suggest that monstrosity emerges when imagining the new transcends the boundaries 
of what is normal and natural and cannot be accommodated within the taken for 
granted order of the familiar world. The creation of a new kind of plant or animal may 
transcend hitherto known categories that structure the familiar world, thus putting the 
world as known at risk. There seems to be little awareness, that by for instance, insert­
ing a fish-gene into a tomato, one would not necessarily create a ‘tomato-fish’. Yet 
participants concerns are understandable. The (very memorable) hybrids presented in 
the media to date have indeed been a glowing mouse, glowing fish, or mice with a 
human ear growing on them, creating the link between “mixing genes” and monstros­
ity.
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6.8.4 Natural versus unnatural foods
Moreover, the results indicate that the distinction between the natural and the unnatu­
ral may be especially pronounced in relation to food. For the purpose of comprehen­
sion, and because the issues often are not distinguished by lay participants, the code 
‘de-naturalised fo o d s’18 is used to describe comments about additives, chemicals, 
hormones, steroids, vaccines, antibiotics, colourings and preservatives. These con­
cepts together make up the representation of “messing with our food”.
Although fundamentally different issues from a scientific perspective, for lay partici­
pants they all symbolise the unnaturalness and in many ways the unhealthy-ness of 
food. Many participants exhibit a kind of food anxiety whereby food in general is re­
garded as problematic and potentially harmful.
D: “They can put chemicals in the genes to make tomatoes last longer.
They are basically putting something in that just shouldn't be there. And 
we already have so many problems with chemicals in our foods, pesticides 
and all this stuff... ”
T: “I think i t ’s horrible what they do to our food today, did you hear they 
put horse and donkey meat into sausages? Disgusting! And people don’t 
know about it because i t ’s already processed, so they can’t see what it 
really is ”
H: “When you go to Greece or generally to the countryside i t ’s different, 
the food there is still natural. ”
(fg4 finance 0
Here, the polluted food (contaminated with something that “ju st shouldn ’t be there ”) 
is contrasted with the “still natural” food of the countryside, food how it was and 
how it ought to be. Calls for going back to how it used to be are common, which may 
explain the positive attitude towards organic farming. While GM and various inten­
sive farming techniques are perceived as artificial, organic farming signifies the natu­
ral, and is hence perceived as a step in the right direction.
Thus there is a clear dichotomy between GM and organic food- something “foreign” 
as opposed to something known and trusted. In that way, does the separation of natu-
18 ‘De-naturalised foods’ is translated from the German ‘denaturalisierte Lebensmittel’, meaning any 
food that has been processed in some way, containing e.g. additives, colourings, or where the produc­
tion methods diverge from traditional methods, such as chicken having been fed hormones, etc.
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ral versus unnatural signify the separation of something familiar and something unfa­
miliar? If so, it would be interesting to know why GM is perceived as more foreign 
than other de-naturalised foods. Comparing GM to pesticides, participants answer this 
question as follows:
“Although pesticides may be bad for us, at least we know a fair bit about 
them by now, and also they are added to the food, aren 7 they, with GM on 
the other hand, you change the food itself, and I  don 7 think that’s right. ”
(male participant, 32, fg2 ‘law ')
So apart from the risks per se, GM is perceived as morally and ethically wrong. For 
many respondents, organic food is the solution to these problems. While GM is com­
pared to intensive farming, traditional and organic farming practises, perceived to be 
more natural, are idealised.
This particular perception is summed up well by one of the experts:
“They see any new form o f agricultural technology, whether i t ’s GM, or 
battery hens, or pigs or feeding pigs antibiotics or what ever... they see it as 
an undesirable phase o f  agriculture. They would prefer it i f  agriculture 
was more, as the public sees it, more natural. As somebody who under- 
stands agriculture very well, I  can say that there isn 7 very much natural 
about agriculture at all. But public perception is that it should be more 
natural, that animals should be treated in a more natural way, that crops 
should be grown in a more natural way, that maintain soil fertility and 
things like that. ”
(Expert 7)
With regards to the above statement, it seems that while experts appreciate the pub­
lic’s concerns, they themselves rationalise it differently because they bring different 
representations into the issue. However, in many instances, lay participants also rec­
ognise that most food these days is not “natural” anymore as frequent comparisons to 
intensive farming show- hence they oppose GM as another step in the wrong direc­
tion.
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6.8.5 The social significance of food
Furthermore, results indicate that lay participants’ concern with food is also related to 
its social and cultural significance. This seemingly plays an important role in lay rep­
resentations of GM food risk:
‘7  think GM is really unnatural and it’s actually against o f  what we here 
think o f  as healthy food, do you know what I  mean? In the US, they might 
not care much about it, they eat junk food all the time anyway which is 
completely unnatural and basically consists o f  chemicals, but here... we 
are still more traditional in our eating habits, we try to ensure that our 
foods are healthy, nutritional and naturally produced. ”
(female participant, 29, fg4 'finance )
Distinguishing themselves from the Americans, participants pride themselves on their 
cultural eating habits. In that way, food has a meaning beyond the food per se, with 
eating practises indicating a culture, lifestyle and identity, and healthy food implying 
that one cares about oneself and others. Moreover, the positive attitude to “healthy” 
organic farming is often also justified by caring for the environment, i.e. having an 
environmental consciousness, and caring for the world and future generations. In that 
way, organic food may appeal to a number of different positive values which are not 
shared by GM food.
This indicates that food risk may indeed be a special issue for risk perception and sub­
sequently, risk communication. With or without GM- the food we eat and the ways in 
which it is produced is of major concern for lay participants. Thus it would be inter­
esting to also investigate issues of naturalness and unnaturalness in relation to food 
per se, not necessarily priming for GM. This is one of the aims of the second part of 
our research.
To sum up the overall findings of the lay mental model, it is clear that lay participants 
have very different representations of GM food risks (and benefits) to expert partici­
pants. While benefits of GM are generally seen as negligible, lay participants perceive 
many risks, such as a wide variety of health risks. Although this may be connected to 
lack of knowledge in some respects, it is certainly exacerbated by the lack of trust in
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science, government and industry- all perceived to have vested interests. In turn, this 
culture of suspicion, coupled with the perceived lack of adequate regulation, seems to 
make the scientific uncertainty inherent in most research, difficult to bear.
In addition, when assessing the risks of GM foods, in contrast to experts, lay partici­
pants include several value-related issues. Of particular importance here is the con­
struct “messing with nature ” which is one of the major lay arguments against GM. In 
this respect, the mental model approach clearly shows that many of the issues lay par­
ticipants are concerned about are not addressed by experts. Indeed, it appears that 
many of the lay concerns cannot be effectively dealt with by this science-based ap­
proach alone. The following section elaborates on these expert-lay divergences high­
lighting the limitations of the CMU approach.
6.9 Comparing expert and lay mental models
To begin with, both expert and lay mental models of GM food risk are very complex, 
albeit on different issues. Regarding the purely scientific arguments as suggested by 
the CMU approach, expert participants have a more intricate representation of GM 
food risk. Yet when other non-technical factors are included in the representation, the 
lay mental model is more complex than that of the experts, with its various facets re­
flecting amongst others, Slovic’s (1987) risk dimensions, such as whether the risk is 
involuntary, uncontrollable, unknown and invisible. These are essential parts of lay 
risk representations that cannot be adequately addressed by scientific expertise alone 
as proposed by the CMU approach.
As the discussion of expert and lay risk perceptions indicates, GM food risks are rep­
resented very differently by both groups. For the purpose of convenience and to draw 
a distinction between expert and lay perceptions, figure 6.3 shows a much simplified 
model of both groups’ representations, comparing only their principal codes. It is 
striking that (with the exception of environmental risk) there are hardly any overlaps 
between expert and lay codings. Further, it is evident that there are several value- 
related topics that are not under the purview of science. In line with the CMU ap­
proach, the following section looks at the major differences between expert and lay
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participants in detail before highlighting several cases where this science-based ap­
proach meets its limitations.
Figure 6.3 Comparison o f expert and lay principle codes
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6.9.1 Lack of factual knowledge
Although focus groups should be analysed as ‘one unit’, it is striking that there are 
many divergences in knowledge between participants within, rather than between 
groups. As the topic guide in Appendix B shows, participants were not asked ques­
tions about their factual knowledge in relation to GM, and despite variance between 
participants none had any specialised expert knowledge with regards to the topic un­
der discussion.
Often, this lack of factual knowledge about GM could be relatively easy addressed in 
a risk communication- as long as recipients trust the communicator. In several in­
stances, the focus groups reveal a need for further education in genetics as many par­
182
ticipants have insufficient knowledge that may heighten risk perceptions, particularly 
in relation to health risks:
"More and more people gain weight and become obese, and this is 
largely due to the genetic food. People don’t know what they eat anymore, 
how many calories it has and so i t ’s easy to put on weight when you eat 
GM.”
(female participant, 29, fg3 'mature *)
However, there are two levels to lay lack of knowledge- either participants are confi­
dent but factually incorrect (as above) or lack both knowledge and confidence:
“But how does it work? Does GM food grow normally as all other plants?
I  have no idea. ”
(female participant, 31, fg2 ‘law*)
The perceived lack of knowledge extends beyond the actual science to the regulatory 
issues surrounding GM, as none of the participants seem to have knowledge about 
regulatory practises in the UK, whether in relation to GM or any other food. Most ex­
press a desire out find out more, yet find this difficult because:
“The problem is that a lot o f these GM things are so scientific, so techni­
cal... for a layperson, he doesn’t have the skills to assess these situa­
tions. ”
(male participant, 31, fg5 'PhD ’)
In that way, as proposed by Michael (1996), when participants reflect on their own 
ignorance, they use it to delineate their own self- and group-identity in relation to ex­
pert knowledge and science, rather than as simply a deficit of factual information. Par­
ticipants position themselves as lay people, with lack of time to acquire the expert 
knowledge on GM perceived as a necessary pre-requisite for decision making. For 
most participants there is little conscious involvement with the technology per se, and 
indeed, this they would happily leave to the experts- if only they could be trusted. The 
dilemma is that participants would prefer to trust and not to need to know as the topic
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seems too difficult to understand but cannot trust, resulting in suspicion and confu­
sion. Moreover, in the focus group situation, participants often treated the moderator 
(myself) as a proxy for science, with the moderator being seen as the generic scientist 
assumed to have expertise in relation to GM. For instance, I was often asked “but 
what do you think? ”
None of the participants gave the impression of being satisfied with their state of 
knowledge, leading to frequent demands for more (generally meaning more balanced 
or clearer) information. Evidently, there are significant knowledge gaps in lay percep­
tions, that could be reasonably well addressed (and remedied) with a risk communica­
tion based on the mental model approach. Nevertheless, if trust is lacking, the effec­
tiveness of any communication is questionable.
6.9.2 Risks
The perception of significant GM health risks (such as obesity and cancer) by lay par­
ticipants is, in part, related to their lack of factual knowledge. Since experts tend to 
agree that the human health risks of GM are fairly small, it might be possible to alle­
viate these concerns with a risk communication based on the CMU approach.
However, in addition, lay participants are especially concerned about the long-term 
effects of GM, which science cannot accurately predict at the moment. For instance, a 
common argument by experts for the safety of GM foods is that millions of Ameri­
cans have been eating GM since over a decade without ill effects. In contrast, lay par­
ticipants do not think ten years is a sufficient “testing” time at all.
Moreover, where a risk communication is likely challenging is with regards to envi­
ronmental risks, about which experts also disagree. As figure 6.3 shows, this is the 
area where expert and lay perceptions of the risk are already often matching. For ex­
ample, in both groups there is concern about loss of biodiversity. However, environ­
mental risks (and benefits) are shrouded in scientific uncertainty. Clearly, this area 
requires further clarification, between experts and the public, as well as between ex­
perts themselves. Hence certain areas of scientific uncertainty may need to be better
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evaluated before an effective communication between experts and the public can take 
place.
6.9.3 Benefits
As figure 6.3 shows, expert and lay participants not only vary in their risk, but equally 
in their benefit perceptions. It seems that what counts as a benefit and what does not is 
a social (rather than scientific) judgement- which may be chosen in the same way that 
risks can be culturally chosen. While lacking detailed knowledge, lay participants are 
often aware of putative benefits of GM, for consumers as well as for farmers yet do 
not perceive those as actual “benefits”. Consumer benefits, such as "better taste ”, are 
deemed unnecessary and unwanted. Benefits for farmers are vaguely appreciated, but 
it is preferred to stick with what is known, and not to proceed further down the route 
of intensive farming techniques. The promise of benefits for the third world is not 
trusted. Rather, in line with Expert 8, lay participants favour different ways of reme­
dying global problems. Regarding environmental benefits, participants feel confused 
and express a desire to find out more.
Hence it is evident that “lack of knowledge” relates not only to risks that are per­
ceived as greater by lay participants than by experts, but also to benefits as proposed 
by experts. In that way, the potential benefits of GM may also need to be addressed in 
a communication, as lay people are often keen to weigh up risks against benefits but 
do not feel able to do so due to lack of information.
6.9.4 Regulation and trust
While experts mostly regard the regulation of GM as effective, lay participants have 
neither trust in nor knowledge of regulation. Although not part of the scientific risk 
per se, the evident lack of trust in regulation is related to risk perceptions- if there is 
little trust (a substitute for knowledge according to Luhmann, 1979), risk is likely to 
be perceived as higher.
Yet it is unsurprising that the regulation of GM food is perceived as problematic by 
the public. It is an area of frequent expert disagreement whereby it is evident that a
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range of regulatory issues still need to be resolved. The issues that need resolving 
(such as the validity of substantial equivalence) require value judgements- science 
alone seems to be unable to provide the answer. While lay participants are not aware 
of the intricacies of regulation, their lack of trust therein may nevertheless stem from 
the perception of (often publicised) expert disagreements. These expert disagreements 
also imply that, even within the scientific domain, there is not only one correct per­
ception. Rather, it appears that risk assessments always involve some constructive 
elements. This further complicates risk communications as it raises the question of 
how to address these non-scientific risk dimensions. In that way, a GM food risk 
communication would need to go beyond the scientific facts per se as suggested by 
the CMU approach, and also include a number of non-scientific issues, such as those 
related to the regulation of the technology.
Especially in the area of regulation science cannot easily be divided from underlying 
societal values anymore (if indeed it ever can be). Lay participants criticise the lack of 
ethical framework currently in place and some experts also appreciate this concern:
“I think one o f  the interesting philosophical points about change, espe­
cially technological change, that it has always been incorporated into so­
ciety before there were ethical frameworks to deal with the technology, to 
control the technology, and to regulate it. So the first time society sees a 
technology is in this chaotic way. ”
(Expert 2)
6.9.5 The value dimension of GM food risk representations
Expert and lay divergences related to the scientific risk per se (such as those about 
health risks), and, to some extent, the regulation of GM foods could be addressed rea­
sonably well in a risk communication according to the CMU approach. The CMU ap­
proach would set about to bring public perceptions and/or knowledge in line with the 
experts. Yet in relation to value-related issues this would be very difficult to achieve 
and it is exactly these areas whereby expert and lay participants differ significantly. 
Rather than simply arguing from different scientific premises, both groups also dis­
agree on moral and ethical grounds. Hence the limitations of a purely science-based 
mental model approach are evident.
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For instance, attitudes to scientific-technological progress are based on values rather 
than scientific knowledge per se. Experts generally favour scientific progress and 
technological solutions, such as utilising GM to remedy third world problems, view­
ing progress as an unambiguous societal benefit. While lay participants are not tech­
nophobic, it is continuously questioned how much progress is needed and beneficial- 
with most viewing GM technology as a step too far. There is considerable concern 
with equity- is it fair to the environment, future generations or the third world to in­
troduce GM? Should we not look for ‘deeper level solutions ’ rather than pursue pro­
gress at potentially huge costs? Is it ever right to change nature in irreversible ways? 
Clearly, these types of questions cannot be answered through scientific rationality 
alone, meaning that the CMU approach based on the provision of scientific informa­
tion is insufficient to effectively address lay concerns about GM food.
When comparing both mental models, it is clear that one value-related area not ad­
dressed at all by experts is the construct “messing with nature ”. But for lay partici­
pants, this is one of the major arguments against GM foods. When investigating the 
potential acceptability of GM, the present findings show that the genetic transfer be­
tween different kinds of species is definitely perceived to be “messing with nature ” as 
it could not happen without human intervention. But results also open up further ques­
tions, such as what is behind the concept, what do lay participants really mean when 
they speak of messing with nature, and what images does this invoke? Likewise, what 
lies behind participants’ veneration of “the natural”? Also, having shown that food 
risk per se is a particularly important risk category for lay participants in relation to 
GM, where do the boundaries of the natural versus the unnatural lie in relation to 
food? Answering these questions is the aim of our second research stage.
6.10 Conclusions Chapter Six
In conclusion, in agreement with the CMU approach, it is useful to find out what lay 
people do and do not know about a risk, what they want to know, and hence what 
knowledge can be build upon- both for the public desiring answers to their questions, 
and for the experts hoping to get their message understood. However, our findings 
indicate that the CMU approach alone cannot address all the issues lay participants are
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concerned about. Being an essentially positivist approach, it aims to answer lay con­
cerns with more and better scientific information which, in the case of GM food at 
least, is not sufficient as the real problems are not of a technical nature, but related to 
non-scientific issues, such as lack of trust and values.
Therefore, in practise, effective risk communication is likely to be much more chal­
lenging than implied by the CMU approach. Lay participants’ suspicions about the 
motivations of actors involved in GM in various ways cannot be simply remedied 
with a scientific risk communication. And if trust is lacking any communication may 
be in vain.
The results show that the scientific risk per se is certainly not the only concern for lay 
participants. However, being based solely on scientific rationality and facts, the CMU 
approach neglects lay participants’ social, moral and ethical concerns. Indeed it is 
questionable how these concerns (such as those about the ways in which nature should 
be treated) could be addressed in a risk communication at all. It appears that:
“As soon as questions o f will or decision or reason or choice o f action
arise, human science is at a loss. ”
(Noam Chomsky, 1978; p. 126 op cit)
As such, science alone cannot be the only voice for making what are essentially moral 
and ethical decisions. Unfortunately, so far, values have not been sufficiently ad­
dressed in risk perception research, and ethical and moral issues are only beginning to 
be included in policy making. Yet in relation to GM food, values, and perceptions of 
what is natural or unnatural are a particularly differential aspect between expert and 
lay participants. As our results highlight the importance of these issues for lay risk 
representations they are explored in more detail in the second part of the thesis.
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7 TOWARDS A SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF NATURE
The empirical findings of our first research stage established the importance of the 
construct "messing with nature ” for lay participants’ representations of GM food risk. 
Thus it seems that risk perceptions of GM food are partly driven by notions of what is 
seen as unnatural about this new technology.
As indicated in Chapter One Sjoeberg’s (2000; 2002; 2003) studies also show the di­
mension "tampering with nature ” to be a significant factor in explaining perceived 
risk. However, research has so far neglected to investigate this notion in depth. Hence 
we aim to provide a more detailed examination by looking at what lies behind this 
rather ambiguous construction. And to comprehend what "messing with nature ” im­
plies one has to first understand what “nature” means.
Thus the aim of the present chapter is to put nature into context. We make no claims 
to offer an exhaustive review of all the debates going on about “nature” in various sci­
entific disciplines, rather we intend to provide a brief background to the ways psy­
chology has attempted to understand the concept. In psychology, empirically the con­
cept has been mainly addressed from environmental psychology which adheres to a 
strongly positivist and reductionist research ethic. Therefore, this perspective is of 
limited use for our risk perception research and hence only addressed in passing.
Recently the focus has shifted from individual perceptions of nature to the investiga­
tion of the related moral and ethical dimensions. This latter research area focusing on 
values seems to be a more promising research avenue in relation to risk perception, 
however, it can still be criticised for its individualistic orientation.
This individualistic orientation is problematic because it is evident that nature always 
incorporates a range of socio-cultural symbolisms. Hence we argue that there is a 
need for a more social psychology of nature in order to better understand the social 
construction of nature and naturalness. Unfortunately, empirically these topics have 
not been well examined, which is the aim of our second research stage.
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7.1 Definitions of nature
"Nature is material and it is spiritual, it is given and made, pure and un­
defiled; nature is order and it is disorder, sublime and secular, dominated 
and victorious; it is a totality and a series o f parts, woman and object, or­
ganism and machine. Nature is the gift o f  God and it is a product o f  its 
own evolution; it is a universal outside history and also the product o f  his­
tory, accidental and designed, wilderness and garden. ”
(Smith, 1990; pp. 1-2)
Acknowledging the partial construction of nature, Smith’s (1990) definition indicates 
the challenges inherent in defining the concept. Broadly, there are three main con­
cepts. Firstly, nature can mean the essence of something- as in 'it is in her nature ’. In 
this meaning, there is nothing unnatural in the world, because any phenomenon has its 
nature, its essence, or its meaning. The ‘nature’ of the natural sciences is based on this 
all-embracing concept of nature (Eichberg, 2000). Secondly, nature can mean the 
physical world in its entirety, perhaps including humans, i.e. nature as a universal 
realm of which humans as a species are a part (Dictionary of Human Geography, 
2000).
Thirdly, nature can represent areas unaltered by human action, i.e. nature as a realm 
external to humanity and society (Eichberg, 2000). Eichberg proposes that the concept 
of nature represents an otherness, opposition, or liberation. For example, when saying 
'going out to nature ’ (to the green, outdoor environment), it is taken for granted that 
there is something, which is not nature. In romantic and idealistic terms, one can talk 
about going ‘back to nature ’ or as in our findings, ‘back to our roots ’, and express by 
this phrase that something has become unnatural in the course of history. Nature in 
this way describes a contrast- taking distance from the present reality, where nature is 
absent and/or threatened (Eichberg, 2000). Here nature is not the whole, but rather a 
part, signifying a dichotomy of nature and un-nature (Eichberg, 2000). It describes an 
otherness in confrontation with the artificial or the urban, with civilisation, or indus­
trial life. This is often seen in psychological research where the ‘natural environment ’ 
is contrasted with the ‘build environment’ (e.g. Kaplan, Kaplan and Wendt, 1972; 
Kaplan, 1984). ‘Nature’ functions thus as concept of opposition, resistance, or libera­
tion, creating a counter-world (Eichberg, 2000).
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7.1.1 Nature, environment and wilderness
So far, psychology has been mainly concerned with the environment, yet neglected 
nature. While the environment is generally conceived in material, spatial and social 
terms, nature seems to have broader and more affective connotations, leading Kroem- 
ker (2004) to conclude that environment is a specific variant of nature, but not the 
whole picture. What distinguishes nature and environment is unclear, boundaries are 
ambiguous, and definitions vary. However, one of the main distinguishing factors is 
the role of man- nature is untouched by man, while environment is related to the man- 
made components (Kroemker, 2004).
Similarly, Kaplan et al (1972) equate natural environments with environments that 
have no evidence of human intrusion, defining them through contrast with build envi­
ronments, considered the antithesis of naturalness. In other words, nature is non- 
artificial, and environment is no longer nature in this respect (Graumann and Kruse, 
1990). In contrast, Kaplan (1977) does not distinguish categories of natural elements 
from categories of environments. Trees are cited as examples of everyday nature, to­
gether with roadside views and backyard settings. Nevertheless overall, human impact 
seems to be the primary, albeit not the sole, dimension of naturalness.
Reflecting a US bias in research, many studies on natural environments have focused 
on wilderness (e.g. Kaplan and Talbot, 1983; Kaplan, 1984). The tendency to di­
chotomise natural and urban environments may stem from this conceptualisation of 
nature as wilderness. Nash (1982) proposes that although the word wilderness is noun, 
it acts like an adjective. As the ness-suffix suggests, the term designates a quality that 
produces a certain mood or feeling. In this case, wilderness is both a physical condi­
tion and a state of mind (Scoyen, 1969). Accordingly it makes sense that the present 
study should concern itself not only with nature, but equally, naturalness.
The ambiguity of these concepts may be because a definition has rarely been expli­
cated. Social scientists have assumed that sufficient agreement exists to guide any re­
search adequately (Mausner, 1996). With few exceptions (e.g. Mausner, 1996), re­
searchers rely on their own concepts of nature, implicitly assuming that their subjects 
share the same definition. Therefore it is critical that research also addresses nature
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and naturalness as defined by participants, which we aim to establish through the free 
association task.
7.2 Empirical research on nature
Like risk, nature has an essentially positivist research tradition. Until the late 1980s 
the vast majority of psychological research into nature has been concerned with aes­
thetic preference and pleasantness, followed by studies of emotional and physiological 
impacts of outdoor scenes in the 1990s. These research areas are of limited relevance 
for the present study and are thus discussed only briefly.
In the late 1990s research began to incorporate the moral and ethical dimensions of 
nature, and to address the significance of environmental values. These studies are dis­
cussed in more depth due to their potential significance for risk perception and, sub­
sequently risk communication.
However, all the above approaches can be criticised for their individualistic orienta­
tion, which leads us into why we propose a more constructivist perspective for the 
purposes of the present study.
7.2.1 Environmental psychology
Environmental psychology (e.g. Altman, 1975; Altman and Wohlwill, 1983; Stokols, 
1976) focuses on intrapersonal processes, such as perception and cognition that medi­
ate the impact of the environment on the individual. The emphasis is on the manner in 
which psychological and social processes interact with features of the physical envi­
ronment to yield patterns of behaviour.
Research in environmental psychology generally stresses psychological, physical and 
social determinants of behaviour and is conducted primarily at the micro level of 
analysis (Stokols, 1977). There are three main strands of research: the environmental 
preference literature, the psychological effects of nature literature, and most recent, 
research addressing environmental values.
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In brief, landscape preference research predominantly addresses the question of which 
characteristics a landscape or natural environment should posses to be preferred. Stud­
ies are not explicitly about the relationship of man and nature; rather the focus is on 
how a natural space is structured from a psychological perspective.
Generally, landscapes perceived as natural, i.e. without any notable human influ­
ences/interventions, are preferred (Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989; Mausner, 1996), and the 
(suggested) presence of human influences in natural scenes usually has negative ef­
fects on preferences of these scenes (e.g. Zube, 1973; Zube, Brush and Fabos, 1975). 
Often, assessment of naturalness diminishes in direct relation to perceived increases in 
human impact. The broader the scope of a human intervention, the more likely it is to 
negatively influence perceived naturalness (Mausner, 1996). Consequently, due to its 
potentially huge impact, it is unsurprising that GM is often perceived to be ‘unnatu­
ral’.
But while the environmental preference literature can help to establish what character­
ises ‘nature’, ‘wilderness’ and ‘landscape’, it does not ascertain what it actually all 
means for humans. Acknowledging the importance of the constructivist element in 
landscape, Tuan (1979) writes:
"Landscape ... is not to be defined by itemising its parts. The parts are 
subsidiary clues to an integrated image. Landscape is such an image, a 
construct o f  the mind and offeeling. ”
(Tuan, 1979; p.89)
This implies that positive responses to nature extend far beyond the domain of aes­
thetics. A growing body of research suggests that natural scenes possess physiological 
and psychological restorative powers (e.g. Altman and Wohlwill, 1983; Francis and 
Hester, 1990; Kaplan et al, 1989; Relf, 1992). In brief, natural scenes have been 
clearly shown to have positive effects on subjects’ emotional states (e.g. Ulrich, 1979; 
1981). The experience of ‘being in nature’ has been found to be a source of spiritual 
inspiration (Fredrickson and Anderson, 1999) and appears to integrate physical, emo-
193
tional, cognitive and spiritual components, for instance relaxation, safety from other 
people, and freedom from social responsibilities and constraints.
7.2.2 Limitations of environmental psychology
Despite their divergent research aims, these different strands of environmental psy­
chology share a major limitation. All are still rooted in the work of traditional positiv­
ist psychology borrowing its reductionist models- neglecting social, cultural, and his­
torical contexts. Hence the above approaches can be criticised for being individualis­
tic. They generally fail to theorise or investigate the social, political, or cultural di- . 
mensions, which structure the material world itself. Symbolic realities are left outside 
the scope of analysis, which as the second section of the present chapter shows, is 
problematic for the study of nature. By looking at nature from a more constructivist 
perspective, we demonstrate below that nature always has important symbolic ele­
ments that are neglected by positivist approaches.
In that way, positivist approaches do not provide a suitable framework for understand­
ing the environment as a social construct and the symbolic and material practises of 
people in relation to it (Gervais, 1997). Relying heavily upon numerical scales to ex­
press individual preferences (e.g. Kaplan et al, 1989; Zube, 1973) interpretations of 
human-environment interactions are often too simplistic. Also, subjects’ responses are 
generally assessed according to scales made by researchers beforehand, meaning that 
participants rarely use their own concepts when speaking about nature (e.g. Ohta, 
2001). Furthermore, as shown above, in most studies, the environment is conceived 
either in terms of its relation to the (bio-physical) needs of the individual, or in terms 
of its importance for the regulation of social interactions. Studies largely focus on the 
functional and visual components of settings, often describing places merely in terms 
of their physical location and appearance.
Yet what about the social and societal aspects of nature? How do humans perceive 
their relationship to nature today? What place does nature take in society? What do 
people really mean when they speak of nature or ‘messing with nature ’? Clearly, there 
is a need to re-investigate the relationship between humans and nature as such ques­
tions have not been addressed by environmental psychology. Even Kaplan and Kaplan
194
(1989; p.l), two major scholars of environmental psychology, admit that traditional 
scientific methods may be insufficient as “it is hard to justify the role that nature 
plays in rational terms ”.
Moving away from positivist environmental psychology, some more promising re­
search areas include the new environmental/ecological paradigm (NEP), and research 
focusing on values related to nature.
7.2.3 The new environmental and new ecological paradigms
The new environmental paradigm (NEP; Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978) has been the 
most prominent measure of environmental attitudes during past 20 years, and pre­
sented the first attempt to incorporate values in environmental research. Rather than 
measuring specific attitudes, Dunlap et al (1978; 2000) developed a series of items to 
assess people’s “ecological worldview”. Focusing on the environmental movement of 
the 1970s, they noted that there was more than just attitudes and concerns about envi­
ronmental issues- implicit in environmentalism was a challenge to society’s funda­
mental views about nature and humans’ relationship to it. Hence, the NEP focuses on 
beliefs about humanity’s ability to upset the balance of nature, the existence of limits 
to growth for human societies, and humanity’s right to rule over the rest of nature. 
The New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig and Jones, 2000) is the 
revised NEP scale which beyond these original three facets to also include beliefs 
about ‘human exemptionalism’, i.e. the idea that humans- unlike other species- are 
exempt from the constraints of nature.
Overall, both paradigms were designed to measure the degree to which people view 
humans as part of nature, rather than as consumers or protectors of nature (Dunlap et 
al, 2000). Findings show that a person’s environmental paradigm seems to constitute a 
fundamental part of a person’s belief system; it is a primitive belief9 and influences a 
wide range of concerns and attitudes concerning more specific environmental issues 
(Dunlap et al, 1978; 2000).
19 Primitive beliefs form the inner core of a person’s belief system and “represent his 'basic truths’ 
about physical reality, social reality and the nature o f the se lf’ (Rokeach, 1968, p.6).
f
195
However, there is still ambiguity in measuring these phenomena. While the NEP aims 
to focus on broader social issues, moving away from individualistic psychology, it is 
limited in that it measures general environmental concern. Moreover, the approach 
lacks a clear theoretical foundation of why a person develops the types of attitudes 
s/he does (Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico and Khazian, 2004). Hence since the middle of 
the 1990s, new research approaches began asking fundamentally different questions 
investigating environmental attitudes in more depth, specifically addressing the under­
lying values of such attitudes.
7.3 The value basis for environmental concern
Recently, a more detailed literature on the ethical and moral dimensions of environ­
mental concern has been emerging. Research has shown that a high percentage of 
people worldwide know about and are concerned about environmental problems (e.g. 
Dunlap, 1991; Dunlap et al, 2000; Ray and Anderson, 2000). The recognition that 
human activities are altering the ecosystem has led to a growing acknowledgement of 
the necessity of more sustainable forms of development. This has led to the sugges­
tion that society is in the midst of a fundamental re-evaluation of the underlying 
worldview that has guided humans’ relationship to the environment (e.g. Milbrath, 
1984; Inglehart, 199020).
In the literature, the terms concerns, values and worldview are often used inter­
changeably. Schultz et al (2004) suggest the following distinction. First, environ­
mental concerns refer to the affect (i.e. worry) associated with environmental prob­
lems. Second, attitude describes a person’s evaluative judgement about a particular 
entity, typically expressed in degrees of favourability (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), 
while environmental attitudes consist of a collection of beliefs, affect and behavioural 
intentions regarding environmental issues. Social psychological research on values 
suggests that attitudes are often associated with multiple, even contradictory, values 
(Eagly et al, 1993). Third, worldviews concern a person’s beliefs about humanity’s
20 In brief, Inglehart (1990) argues that environmental concern is part o f the shift towards post­
materialist values in western societies, developing among wealthy people once the more basic needs of 
food and safety have been met.
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relationship with nature (Schultz et al, 2004). Fourth, at the broadest level are values, 
which are conceptualised as important life goals or principles (Rokeach, 1973). Val­
ues function as organising system for attitudes and beliefs, and are viewed as determi­
nants of attitudes (Schwartz, 1994). Environmental values refer to those values that 
are specifically related to nature or that correlate with specific environmental attitudes 
or concerns (Schultz et al, 2004). Essentially, all definitions suggest a value-basis for 
environmental concern.
7.3.1 Environmental ethics
Particularly in light of the environmental crises facing society today, such as global 
warming, how man’s relationship with nature is perceived is likely to influence the 
solutions to these problems. Is nature regarded as property of man, to be used how­
ever desired or does nature have intrinsic value, value aside from its usefulness to 
humans?
Thus traditional measures of environmental concern are being supplemented by in­
struments seeking to measure ‘ecological consciousness’ (Ellis and Thompson, 1997), 
anthropocentrism (Chandler and Dreger, 1993) and anthropocentrism vs. ecocentrism 
(Thompson and Barton, 1994). Such research explicitly attempts to identify the under­
lying values that provide the basis for environmental attitudes. Hence, two people 
could be equally concerned about environmental issues but for fundamentally differ­
ent reasons (Schultz and Zelezny, 1999). Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism are two 
ways of understanding an extension of ethics to nature, i.e. when and why humans 
extend their ethical scope to include nature.
Anthropocentrism represents the idea that humans are the centre of the universe 
(Campbell, 1983). It considers humans to be the most important life form, and other 
life forms only important to the extent in that they affect humans or can be useful to 
humans. Here, nature deserves moral consideration because harming nature can harm 
humans (Kortenkamp and Moore, 2001).
Ecocentrism represents the idea that the universe is the originator of life (Campbell, 
1983). Adopted in the 1970s by deep ecologists (e.g. Naess, 1988), it refers to the idea
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that all life has intrinsic value, and hence deserves moral consideration (Kortenkamp 
et al, 2001).
In sum, in an anthropocentric ethic nature deserves moral consideration because how 
nature is treated affects humans. In an ecocentric ethic nature deserves moral consid­
eration because nature has intrinsic value (Kortenkamp et al, 2001).
7.3.2 Value-based environmental research
Utilising related values dimensions to above, the value-belief-norm model (Stem and 
Dietz, 1994; Stem, Dietz and Guagnano, 1995) aims to explain environmental atti­
tudes and behaviours, stating that a person’s environmental attitudes are the result of a 
more general set of values. The model postulates a causal chain of variables that leads 
to behaviour: values, worldview, awareness of adverse consequences for valued ob­
jects (risk perception), perceived ability to reduce the threat, and personal norms for 
pro-environmental behaviour. It predicts that individual values interact with specific 
perceptions of a given situation to yield behaviour.
Specifically, there are three different bases for environmental attitudes: the individual, 
all people, and all living things21. Egoistic values focus on the self and self-oriented 
goals (for example, social power or wealth) based on beliefs about the effect that envi­
ronmental destruction may have on the individual (Stem et al, 1994).
Taking a broader perspective, altmistic (or social-altruistic) values focus on other 
people (for instance, family, community or humanity), and are concerned with human 
benefits or human goals. Here, protecting the environment is considered important 
because of the long-term consequences on others; environmental issues are judged on 
costs and benefits to all people.
Lastly, adopting concern for the whole biosphere, biospheric values focus on the well­
being of all living things (plants, animals, trees) and hence centre on the inherent 
value of nature. Here, humans should not harm nature because they are part of nature.
21 A very similar tripartite classification is proposed by Merchant (1992) who terms the dimensions 
egocentric, anthropocentric, and ecocentric.
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These terms are also used in Schultz’s (2001) value-basis theory. This theory is an 
extension of Schwartz’s (1977) norm-activation model of altruism, suggesting that 
environmental concerns are due to an awareness of harmful consequences (i.e. risk) to 
a particular value or valued object. Different value orientations lead to different atti­
tudes; and the link between values and environmental concern is moderated by risk 
perception. The theory proposes that attitudes are formed by considering a few salient 
aspects of an attitude object and the relevance of this object to a few salient values. 
Environmental concerns and behaviours are viewed as the result of an activated altru­
istic moral norm, although attitudes clearly can be linked to a broader range of values, 
not just altruism (Schultz, 2001).
There is considerable evidence for the existence of value-based environmental con­
cerns (e.g. Thompson and Barton, 1994; Schultz, 2000; Stem et al, 1995). Findings 
generally indicate that egoistic and biospheric concerns are related to different values. 
For example, egoistic concerns are positively correlated with self-enhancement22 and 
negatively with self-transcendence while biospheric concerns are negatively corre­
lated with self-enhancement, and positively correlated with self-transcendence23 (e.g. 
Schultz, 2001; Schultz and Zelezny, 1999).
These values are perceived as a continuum- at one extreme is the individual who be­
lieves s/he is separate from nature, and that humans are exempt from the laws of na­
ture and superior to plants and animals. At the other end is the individual who be­
lieves that s/he is as much part of nature as are other animals, and that the same rights 
should apply to all. This core belief is ‘connectedness with nature’ (Schultz et al, 
2004). Results thus far suggest that the type of concerns an individual develops is 
based on the degree to which they perceive an interconnection between themselves 
and others (altmistic) or between themselves and nature (biospheric) (Schultz, 2001).
22 Self-enhancement reflects the degree to which a person values goals and ideals that are directly 
linked with tangible rewards for the self, e.g. successful, wealth, social power. This orientation towards 
self benefit; people who score high on this measure do not define other people or other living things 
within their boundary of self (Schultz, 2001).
23 Self-transcendence reflects the degree to which a person values goals and ideals that are not directly 
linked to the self, e.g. a world of beauty, honest, loyal, and also the degree to which a person includes 
other people and living things within their boundary o f self (Schultz, 2001).
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7.3.3 Limitations of value-based environmental research
Although value-based environmental research offers a new direction for psychological 
research into the relationship of man and nature, it is still limited in several ways.
First, despite their obvious relevance to environmental concerns, few empirical stud­
ies have addressed the concepts of ecocentrism and anthropocentrism in depth, and 
there still exists the problem of ‘measuring’ distinctions between both ethics 
(Kortenkamp et al, 2001). Overall, no consistent model or theory for understanding 
environmental values, motives, and behaviours exists, as research tends to be frag­
mented and difficult to integrate into organised theory.
Second, above approaches are limited in that they are still founded on traditional (in­
dividualistic) attitude theory. This means that values and ‘connectedness with nature’ 
have generally been construed as individual psychological variables, rather than as 
socio-cultural concepts. Yet values are social and societal rather than individual con­
structs, indicating that a more social psychological approach to nature may be more 
appropriate than research that is essentially still based on the positivist paradigm.
Hence there is a need for a more constructivist approach to nature because to date, the 
social dimensions of nature are significantly under-examined (Macnaghten et al, 
1998). The silence that surrounds the concept of nature within the social sciences has 
been repeatedly criticised (e.g. Katz and Kirby, 1991; Fisher, 2003), and it is still un­
clear how the relationship of humans and nature is defined and what the concept of 
nature incorporates as it has rarely been addressed in sufficient depth. But it is impor­
tant to further investigate the concept empirically since:
“Are humans an integral part o f  nature or are they separate from it and in 
some way superior to it? The answer to this question is crucial in deter­
mining how different thinkers and religions decide which human actions 
can be regarded as legitimate or morally justified. From this flow other 
related questions about whether all plants and animals in the world are 
there solely for the benefit o f  human; about whether humans have a re­
sponsibility to guard and take care o f the rest o f nature. ”
(Ponting, 1991; p. 141)
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7.4 Cultural theory and myths of nature
The above sentiments are appreciated by Schwarz and Thompson (1990). Providing a 
constructivist approach to nature, Schwarz et al (1990) extend the grid-group analogy 
of cultural theory as outlined in Chapter One into the realm of environmental under­
standing and social practises, arguing that credibility of any view of how the envi­
ronment will react to human activities is secured by the moral commitment of a com­
munity to a particular set of social/institutional regimes.
Schwarz et al (1990) identify four idealised conceptions of how nature responds to 
human activities. Using the analogy of the movement of a ball in a landscape to show 
the relations between human activity and the natural world, they identify four primary 
myths of nature, which map into the grid-group typology. Figure 3.1 shows how the 
myths of nature can be mapped onto the rationalities of cultural theory.
Figure 7.1 The myths o f nature mapped onto the rationalities o f cultural theory (from Schwarz and 
Thompson; p.9).
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Each myth functions as cultural filter so that adherents are predisposed to learn differ­
ent things about the environment and to construct different knowledges of it, and each 
of these views appears “irrational” from the perspective of any other.
According to this typology, the fatalists view nature as capricious, suggesting an in­
herent unpredictability to the ways in which nature responds to human activities. This 
perspective stresses the essential randomness and lack of control of natural events and 
outcomes, and favours a pragmatic view of nature and its behaviour (Schwarz et al, 
1990).
Supported by hierarchists is the representation of nature as tolerant/perverse. Here na­
ture is perceived as forgiving in most instances but is vulnerable to an occasional 
‘knocking of the ball over the rim’. Hence both nature’s vulnerability and its resil­
ience are recognised. Thus the importance of regulation against unusual occurrences 
is emphasised. This myth reflects scientists’ views of the world in which expert 
knowledge is prioritised. Nature’s balance is perceived to be determined by natural 
limits and laws which human activities may either observe or exceed and the role of 
the expert is to provide advice to society so that these limits are not abused (Schwarz 
et al, 1990).
The individualists view nature as benign. Here nature is represented as being capable 
of recovering quickly from exploitation by humans. Nature is seen as forgiving, no 
matter what knocks are delivered, the ball will return to the bottom of the basin. This 
view is similar to the egocentric beliefs identified by Pepper (1984). Adherents of this 
view rely on technocratic and managerial approaches for speeding up or assisting na­
ture’s recovery (Schwarz et al, 1990).
Lastly, associated with the egalitarian way of life (and often representing counter­
cultures in modem societies, such as the German greens) is the view of nature ephem­
eral. Offering a contrast to nature benign, this view emphasises the vulnerability of 
natural systems so that any human activity involving nature is regarded as potentially 
damaging to the integrity of natural systems. Linked with an ecocentric worldview, 
views are consistent with advocacy of the precautionary principle (Schwarz et al, 
1990).
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Unfortunately, as with cultural theory in general, empirical support for these typolo­
gies is lacking thus far24. Also, Kroemker (2004) argues that these typologies are over­
simplified because they neglect the possible nuances within them. It is unclear 
whether these are individual types or part of a continuum, i.e. from nature ephemeral 
to nature benign? Research to date is inconclusive, and it is likely that typologies are 
far more complex than cultural theory suggests (Kroemker, 2004). Thus essentially, it 
can be argued that from a social psychological perspective at least, nature has not yet 
been well researched empirically.
7.5 Social conceptions of nature
Today, proposals to re-introduce the concept of nature into the social sciences are 
made more and more frequently (e.g. Grundmann and Stehr, 2000). It is increasingly 
appreciated that it is essential to move beyond the individual to the social and sym­
bolic dimensions of nature to fully capture the concept, to find out what nature repre­
sents, and what it means to people. Therefore, we take a more social perspective look­
ing at how nature has been represented historically and culturally to show how socie­
tal developments have influenced (and continue to influence) different representations 
of nature.
7.5.1 Socio-cultural symbolisms of nature
A seminal work in the German literature is Oldenmeyer’s (1983) typology of nature 
representations25. Oldenmeyer’s typology can be either understood from a historical
24 Kempton, Boster and Hartley’s (1995) study on environmental values indicates how cultural models 
are ingrained in American society and how they provide the basic conceptual underpinning of lay 
thinking about the environment. It can be argued that their three cultural models of nature are in some 
ways similar to Schwarz et al’s (1990) types. For instance, Kempton et al’s model of nature as fragile 
and limited corresponds to the egalitarian way of life, while their model characterised by the current 
American way of living, industrialism and consumerism corresponds with the individualists’ view­
point. However, the present thesis does not discuss this work in detail as it still adheres to an individu­
alistic perspective, defining cultural models simply as mental models that are shared. As such, culture 
is perceived as residing in the individual, and as separate to the external reality defined by science 
(Macnagthen et al, 1998).
25 Oldenmeyer (1983) speaks o f ‘Naturbildem’. Literally, these are pictures of nature, but are translated 
here as nature representations, a more fitting translation in the present context.
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perspective as a form of progress (from pre-industrial to post-modern times) or 
equally, as various types that co-exist.
Firstly, during pre-industrial times, nature was represented in a (mostly religious) 
magical-mythical way. Man and nature were in a symbiotic relationship- nature was 
seen as a partner that had to be respected in order to avoid punishment. In pre­
industrial societies, there was little choice but to work with and use nature. From to­
day’s perspective, nature and humans were very close- there were few technologies 
that offered the opportunity to separate man from nature and allow abuse of a great 
scale. The prevalent perception was that anything that was different from ‘nature’ 
could not be desired from God, and that bad things happened as nature’s response to 
human actions (Oldenmeyer, 1983). Such a respectful and caring relationship of man 
and nature can still be found in for example Native American Indian cultures26.
Secondly, a holistic representation of nature incorporates the perception that man and 
nature are “one”. Here, nature and man are not separate entities, in that way, what one 
does to nature, one does to oneself (Oldenmeyer, 1983). The perception that one 
needs to listen to nature and disturb her as least as possible is still represented in Bud­
dhism and Taoism.
However, advanced industrial societies progressively moved away from these repre­
sentations. Today, nature is decreasingly seen as godly power and it appears as if 
there is an increasing separation of man and nature. Often these developments are at­
tributed to the decline of religion and the continuous and rapid advance of science in 
western societies (Oldenmeyer, 1983).
7.5.2 Science and nature representations
Regarding the advance of science in the past centuries, Descartes’ philosophy is at­
tributed a particular influence on these developments, as humans and human con­
sciousness were perceived as being ‘above nature’, while simultaneously theological
26 For example, in some constructs of the Native American life world no dualities between humans and 
nature, or necessarily between animate and inanimate objects, exist.
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perspectives on nature decreased. Humans were given priority over nature, culminat­
ing in the view of man being the only measure of all things in nature.
This technological-utilitarian use of nature went hand in hand with the industrial revo­
lution, which reduced man’s direct contact with nature. At the same time, science and 
technology were confidently perceived to be able to bring solutions to most human 
problems. Moreover, 19th century science, especially evolutionary theory, has played 
a fundamental role in shaping our understandings of nature (Williams, 1981). Conse­
quently, since that time the dominant discourse of nature was that of science, rather 
than religion (Pepper, 1984). Science became the paradigm of reason, including moral 
reason (Wagner, Kronberger, Gaskell et al, 2001),
Katz and Kirby (1991) suggest that the model of natural rationality has insinuated it­
self into modem lives, withdrawing humans from a comprehension of nature within 
everyday life. Hence today, as already established in the context of risk the world as 
constructed by the natural sciences is the dominant paradigm:
“Greek philosophers, mathematicians and medical men committed their 
scientific successors exclusively to this effective direction o f  thinking.
They closed for Western scientific thinking the elsewhere open questions 
o f what hind o f  world people found themselves inhabiting and so o f what 
methods they should use to explore and explain and control it”
(Crombie, 1988, p .l)
However, our findings in the previous chapter indicate that rather than the science per 
se, in relation to GM food at least, the question of what world people want to live in 
and how nature should be treated is of major importance. In many ways, science is no 
longer perceived as being able to establish moral principles by reasoned debate alone, 
or to provide safe predictions of events as in the past (Wagner et al, 2001). For exam­
ple, our results show that the risks of GM food are publicly often perceived as being 
unknown and unknowable within current scientific knowledge, and that, in agreement 
with Wagner et al (2001) nature itself is frequently viewed as a complex system, 
where prediction and control are beyond human capabilities.
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In sum, these divergent perceptions of nature indicate that nature is far more than a 
material given, but rather that representations are constructed through social and his­
torical developments. Hence nature representations are socio-cultural and fluid rather 
than individual and stable phenomenon as implied by environmental psychology. Al­
though the positivist perspective holds that nature is not “a mere cultural convention 
or artefact, as some postmodernists maintain, but part o f  a physical and biological 
reality that bounds children’s cognition” (Kahn, 1999, p.7), this does not necessarily 
deny the symbolic dimension of nature. Clearly, the societal relationship to nature has 
some material dimensions, as well as always consisting of important symbolic aspects 
(Jahn and Wehling, 1998). And to investigate these symbolic aspects in more depth, 
there is a need to move away from the prevalent positivist to more contructivist per­
spectives on nature.
7.5.3 A constructivist perspective on nature
Macnaghten and Urry (1998) postulate that rather than a single nature, there is a di­
versity of contested natures, constituted through a variety of socio-cultural processes 
from which they cannot be plausibly separated. As shown above, specific social prac­
tises produce and transform different natures. Because nature is not only a physical 
entity, it is important to recognise how nature is structured and shaped through social, 
cultural, scientific and political processes. Nevertheless, to date, empirical research 
that could account for the different facets and meanings of nature is still rare. Social 
representations theory (SRT) as discussed in relation to risk in Chapter Three may 
provide a useful alternative to the predominantly positivistic orientated approaches.
Arguing that nature always has a human history, Moscovici (1976) strongly rejects the 
dualism of man and nature, proposing that both the assumed non-historicity of nature 
and the separation of nature from humanity are simply (in-) convenient fictions. In 
that way, the strict dichotomy between some reified nature untouched by human prac­
tise and a culture divorced from it is not warranted.
Briefly, Moscovici argues that humans have continuously changed throughout their 
history. Likewise, nature as a permanent given is inaccessible; instead, there is a suc­
cession of natures. From the moment humans begin to act upon material forces, they
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also create themselves, i.e. their historically and spatially located states of nature. Par­
ticular natural configurations include humankind as an internal, creative, organising 
factor, thus humans cannot be deduced from some autonomous natural process. Hence 
Moscovici proposes to relinquish conceptualisations of nature and society which pre­
sent these two terms as either unrelated or opposing spheres. All human practises, by 
virtue of being human, belong to the realm of nature. Likewise, any natural configura­
tion is in part a human creation- nature is always at least partly constructed 
(Moscovici, 1977). In this sense, invention does not create some artificial anti-nature- 
on the contrary it is the accomplishment of humankind’s own nature (Moscovici, 
1977). In the words of Gervais (1997):
“The human history o f  nature is the history o f  the social construction o f  
states o f  nature through the activities o f  members o f  natural categories 
who, by their labour, effect changes both in matter and in themselves. ”
(Gervais, 1997; p.76)
In essence, nature contains vast amounts of human history, with the current under­
standing of nature resulting from a complicated array of ideas, linked to e.g. culture, 
religion and science. Regarding nature as a social representation shows how nature is 
constructed, in that all natures are geographically, historically and socially consti­
tuted. Thus ideas of nature are always intertwined with ideas of society at a particular 
time27 (Macnaghten et al, 1998). Lukacs (1923) proposed a long time ago that
“Nature is a societal category. That is to say, whatever is held to be natu­
ral at any given stage o f  societal development, however this nature is re­
lated to man and whatever form his involvement with it takes, i.e. nature’s 
form, its content, its range and its objectivity are all socially condi­
tioned. ”
(Lukacs, 1923;p.234)
27 Macnagthen at all (1998) suggests that if nature is indeed socially and culturally constructed (and 
hence likely contested), it cannot readily provide society with the foundations for the correct moral and 
ethical life. On the other hand, representations of nature may still provide people with a context in 
which to understand the uncertainties and risks of post-modernity because "cultures o f nature may on 
occasions facilitate the kind of communities or traditions that provide an enormously significant sense 
of meaning and value in societies struggling to break from the modern world” (Macnaghten et al, 
1998; p.4).
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7.5.4 The social construction of naturalness
Thus it appears that nature as known and encountered today is largely a socio-cultural 
construct, as it has been transformed physically and appropriated culturally. Nature is 
rarely “really natural”- there is almost always some human and social intervention 
(Eichberg, 2000). For example, the dichotomy between what is natural and unnatural 
is artificial as human involvement, such as the planting of trees, has long been part of 
“nature” (Clayton and Opotow, 2003). Similarly, writing about “the end of nature”, 
suggesting that there is no more nature in the traditional sense, McKibben (1989; 
p.5 8) states that “by changing the weather, we make every spot on earth man-made 
and artificial”.
This raises the question of where the perceived boundaries of nature versus non­
nature might lie. Evidently, these boundaries are neither clear-cut nor necessarily a 
reflection of scientific assessments.
Herzlich (1973) shows how even scientific assessments of physical assessments of 
states of the body are partly socially constructed. Her findings indicate that health and 
illness are neither always clearly defined nor unambiguous entities. Rather, the results 
reveal the notions, categories and kinds of language through which both health and 
illness are socially constructed. In that sense, it is shown that judgements about health 
are not straightforward assessments of one’s physiological state. Instead they are the 
result of evaluations of complex relations between individuals, society and nature. For 
example, Herzlich’s interviewees state that good health results from harmonious rela­
tions between self and nature and that living in the countryside is healthy, whereas 
illness results from the “unnaturalness” of city life such as air pollution and noise.
Exposing the fallacy of the dichotomy of “the natural” versus “the social”, Herzlich 
proposes that so-called natural objects inevitably become social from the moment they 
begin to signify something for human beings. In line with SRT it is evident that repre­
sentations of an object arise in a social context, through social communication and 
interaction (Gervais, 1997). In this sense, the boundaries between man and nature do 
not correspond to some fixed reality but rather are social products.
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In light of this, a constructivist approach (such as SRT) provides a useful challenge to 
the dichotomy between nature and society, illuminating the existential meanings, for 
social subjects, of particular representations of nature. In turn, this may elucidate not 
only where, but also why boundaries of naturalness are constructed the way they are. 
Since these are social and societal judgements these questions cannot be answered by 
positivist science alone. Indeed, Gervais (1997) argues that the social values which 
nature embodies and symbolises are probably far more important in structuring such 
representations than any physical attributes.
As representations of nature can be understood as socio-cultural patterns they need to 
be seen in their social, cultural and historical contexts. Hence building on Moscovici’s 
(1977) approach, Gervais proposes that there is a need for a more social and societal 
approach to nature because:
“A social psychology o f  nature can only succeed in constituting itself as a 
science i f  it ceases to endorse a naturalistic view, that is i f  it views nature 
as being constituted symbolically rather than merely given. ”
(Gervais, 1997; p.65)
7.5.5 The need for a social psychological approach to nature
Since the advent of the environmental movement in the late 1960s environmental is­
sues have become more and more prominent in policy, as the environment and nature 
have been increasingly perceived as threatened by the by-products of industrialisation. 
Lately, it has been suggested that the development in western societies of a ‘green 
consciousness’ reflects one self-conscious strategy to combat the alienation between 
man and nature (Katz et al, 1991). This movement was an important factor in the so­
cial construction of the environment, leading to changes in society’s ecological 
awareness (Graumann et al, 1990), by providing a technological and progress-critique, 
which crystallised in relation to nuclear power and later biotechnology (Kroemker,
2004). Since such concerns are societal problems, a more social psychological ap­
proach to nature is needed. Moreover, as nature and environment are (partly) social 
constructions the attributed meanings require investigation (Graumann et al, 1990).
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Yet, like risk discourse in general, environmental discourse is a fairly recent phe­
nomenon. Risks to nature are not new, for example, floods are as old as humankind, 
and even in the Middle Ages protection measures for water and air were put into place 
(Schneidmueller, 1989). However, as discussed earlier, in each era, nature has a par­
ticular symbolism in society. The prevalence of a risk discourse in relation to nature 
today can be largely explained through the move away from religious towards scien­
tific discourse. Science enlightened the essence of these problems (Graumann et al, 
1990), and as shown in Chapter One, scientists’ role in creating as well as solving 
them.
Just as other risks are also culturally constructed (Douglas et al, 1982), the environ­
ment has a strong socio-cultural constructive dimension, as societies differ in their 
social representations of environmental risks. For instance, Waldsterben (i.e. “dying 
forest”) in Germany does not “exist” in France (Graumann et al, 1990). Graumann et 
al suggest that this may reflect a romantic bond with the German forest. Moreover, the 
popularity of the “Waldsterben” discourse may also be attributed to the relative preva­
lence and visibility of the German greens since the 1980s. This group likely played a 
significant role in changing Germany’s representations of nature by actively cultivat­
ing images of and communication about dying forests, acid rains and environmental 
destruction more generally. This indicates how environmental problems can be his­
torically, socio-culturally and politically constructed, rather than merely given by sci­
ence per se. The recognition of this is no mere matter of semantics- rather the ways in 
which nature is represented likely will influence how society attends to environmental 
problems.
Clearly, the relationship between society and nature is not straightforward. Yet 
equally, the relationship between the social construction and the individual experience 
of the environment and the perceived tension between individual and society is not 
unambiguous as supposed individual experiences of the environment (such as cogni­
tion and perception) are largely contingent upon the societal construction of the envi­
ronment (Graumann et al, 1990). Nature does not just confront the human observer- 
rather there is generally a complex interaction between both. Hence different cultural 
and social forms must be taken into account when investigating nature (Eichberg, 
2000). When saying “nature”, complex feelings and emotions are involved. For ex­
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ample, nature is filled with social figures and mythical images, such as the lonely 
rider in the prairie, Tarzan, the witch in the dark forest, or the gardener. In that way, 
nature provokes humans to express an image of themselves as saying “nature” means 
to say something about one’s own identity (Eichberg, 2000).
Similarly, writing about Thoreau’s (1854) Walden, Kettle (2004; p. 14) proposes that 
“his real subject is not nature but the life o f  human beings ”. This may explain the re­
cent interest of psychology in studying the relationship of nature and identity, which 
for instance, suggests that people’s engagement with nature contributes to the con­
struction of social roles (e.g. Clayton and Opotow, 2003; Enticott, 2004). This is un­
surprising, given the ways in which socio-cultural factors influence and construct na­
ture representations. Unfortunately, this research avenue is in its infancy- the exact 
relationship between nature and identity is still unclear. Nevertheless, the importance 
of nature is becoming increasingly acknowledged in mainstream psychology. Hillman 
(1995; p.xxiii) questions:
“Sometimes I  wonder ...how psychology ever got so o ff base. How did it 
cut itself offfrom reality? Where else in the world would a human soul be 
so divorced from the spirits o f  its surroundings? ...Psychology, so dedi­
cated to awakening the human consciousness, needs to wake itself up to 
one o f  the most ancient truths; we cannot be studied or cured apart from  
the planet. ”
7.6 Conclusions Chapter Seven
In conclusion, our brief introduction to nature shows that, rather than being solely ma­
terially constituted, nature is in many ways socially constructed. In order to be able to 
account for the various important socio-cultural symbolisms that nature represents it is 
vital to investigate the concept from a social rather than an individual perspective. 
Thus there is an apparent need to move away from the positivist conception of nature 
to a more constructivist approach.
Unfortunately, past research has been largely in the tradition of individualistically ori­
ented environmental psychology which means that empirical research into the broader 
symbolisms and values that nature incorporates has been neglected. But since today’s
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environmental problems affect and concern the individual as well as society as a 
whole it is clearly legitimate to study these issues from a more social psychological 
viewpoint (Graumann et al, 1990).
In line with Sjoeberg’s (2000; 2002; 2003) findings our focus groups results show that 
nature representations play an important role in lay risk perceptions of GM food. Yet 
thus far, nature representations and conceptions of naturalness have rarely been exam­
ined in depth and it is unclear what the concept of nature or messing with nature actu­
ally means for people. This is the aim of our free associations task which is presented 
in the following chapter.
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8 FREE ASSOCIATIONS TO NATURE, FOOD AND GM FOOD
Our comparison of the expert and lay mental models showed that, in contrast to ex­
perts, lay participants’ risk perceptions of GM food are influenced by the way they 
view nature, and more specifically, by the way the natural and the unnatural are con­
trasted. This has previously not been well explained, as the perception that “GM is 
unnatural ” usually presents the culmination of an argument against GM.
This chapter presents the results of a free associations task which examines these con­
cepts in more depth. The aim is to establish a comparative judgement by contrasting 
GM foods against other food and nature-related “things”, and thus to provide a frame 
of reference. To investigate why GM is considered as unnatural, connotations of the 
“natural” are studied by looking at other familiar objects. By viewing GM food in the 
context of other reference points, it is possible to see the likely anchors and frames 
people use to make the judgement that GM foods are “unnatural”.
Using a larger sample than in the first research stage, 188 participants were asked via 
a split ballot internet survey to freely associate to the stimulus words ‘natural things ’ 
and ‘natural foods', or food in general’ and ‘GM food’. Results were first analysed in 
EXCEL, providing frequencies of word associations, in order to be able to prepare the 
data for the subsequent analyses. The resulting data set was then analysed with corre­
spondence analysis to summarise the detailed differences between the stimulus words. 
It is striking that associations to natural things, natural food, and food in general have 
many commonalities, while GM food stands alone and provides a stark contrast espe­
cially in comparison to natural food associations. As a third step, a cluster analysis 
was utilised to establish clusterings of word associations, showing which associations 
tend to be mentioned together. The resulting word clusters satisfactorily validate the 
findings of the correspondence analysis.
8.1 Research procedure- Part II
We first outline the research procedure before looking at the findings. To elicit free 
associations, we utilised an internet survey. The internet is an increasingly used 
method of social research and is becoming more and more acceptable, as the success
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of for instance YouGov (1997) for political polling indicates. Here, polls showed ex­
actly the same trends as on conventional polls during election period and also accu­
rately predicted the final outcome of UK general election 1997. Further, it is more 
cost and time effective than face-to-face techniques, providing a good response rate in 
a limited amount of time as well as a higher quality of responses (Mehta and Sivadas, 
1995). Lastly, online surveys cut out any interviewer effect.
Emails were sent out to various social scientific departments of the LSE, explaining 
the aims of the research, providing the researcher’s details to verify her identity, and a 
link to the internet survey. These were followed up by two reminder emails sent two 
and four weeks after the initial contact.
Navigation to and of the survey was made easy with clear instructions at the top of the 
page. To secure as many responses as possible, instructions and the survey were kept 
short. In order not to make the respondent more self-aware of his/her identity, all 
socio-demographic variables were placed at the end of the survey28. Instructions given 
to participants were as direct as possible, and incentives were offered for completion 
of the survey (please see table 8.1). Per stimulus word, five spaces (with a rating scale 
ranging from very positive to very negative) were provided.
Table 8.1 Instructions for the internet survey
This survey constitutes an essential part of my PhD research at the London School of Economics. 
Completion of the survey should not take longer than about 10 minutes, and two rewards (of £100 and 
£50 respectively) will be given to respondents chosen at random. The survey is anonymous, so results 
are strictly confidential. Hence if you would like to participate in the prize draw, it is essential that you 
include your email address at the end of the survey. Likewise, if you would like to be informed of the 
results of the study, please also provide your email address.
This is a free association task, so there are no right or wrong answers as the same object (such as red 
wine) can mean very different things to different people. I am interested in mapping the contours of 
people’s feelings and thoughts that are associated with particular topics.
So, thinking about food in general29, please list seven associations. Additionally, could you please in­
dicate whether each association has a very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative mean­
ing for you by selecting one o f the buttons below each association. Please remember that for research 
purposes, each section o f the survey must be completed in full.
28 The software used was written by Steve Bennett (Institute of Social Psychology, LSE). It consists of 
two scripts written in the PERL language that receive the data from the web survey page, and format it 
into a tab delimited database compatible with SPSS etc.
29 And ‘GM food’ or 'naturalfood’ and 'natural things ’
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The instruction contained three messages: a) information about the stimulus object, b) 
information about what to write down, and c) a request for the ratings. Instructions 
lacked information about how much exactly to write down, which slightly compli­
cated the data analysis. However, not being restricted to a single word (as is common 
in free association tasks) enabled respondents to explain and elaborate their associa­
tions should they feel the need to. For instance, the association ‘cooking ' in relation to 
‘natural fo o d ’ was surprisingly rated fairly negatively. Here it helped that respondents 
explained this by stating e.g. “I  don’t know how to cook natural foods ” (male respon­
dent, 32).
A split-ballot task was chosen, as a problem when presenting respondents with more 
than two or three word association tasks is the fact that they tend to produced less 
valid associations in later tasks, degrading the quality of the data (Wagner, 1997). Al­
though administered at random, it was ensured that an equal number of responses to 
condition A and B were received, by including an equaliser component in the script. 
The survey was run for eight weeks (January and February 2005) when it was decided 
that the number of responses was sufficient for the planned analysis.
8.1.1 Participants
A different sample to the focus groups was used, as a) the number of focus groups 
participants was not sufficient, and b) they would have been primed on the task that 
followed. Internet surveys are limited to the extent that to date random sampling is not 
possible as no comprehensive online directory of email names exists. Moreover, even 
an online directory would not capture all the public. Hence a convenience sample of 
188 participants (predominately students) who either had attained or were in the proc­
ess of attaining a higher educational degree (MSc/PhD) was used. The mean age of 
participants was 27 years (SD 7.7 years); two thirds of participants were female and 
one third male.
8.1.2 Pilot study
The study was piloted with twenty participants. No problems were experienced in re­
lation to the question wording, however the number of associations originally de-
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manded (ten associations per stimulus word) was found to be too large as several par­
ticipants did not come up with this number. Hence associations were limited to seven 
words per stimulus word, which Wagner (1997) agrees is the most feasible amount. 
Results of the pilot study were not incorporated in the final analysis.
8.2 Data analysis
The resulting data was analysed in three phases: a preliminary EXCEL analysis fol­
lowed by correspondence analysis (CORA) and lastly, cluster analysis. The first re­
search stage shows the frequencies of associations and ratings, i.e. which words are 
associated with which stimulus words and their average ratings and was essential in 
order to prepare the data for further analyses as suggested by Wagner (1997). The sec­
ond research stage explains within each stimulus word, which associations are rela­
tively more strongly associated with which rating. Leaving out the ratings, the final 
analytical stage explores which associations tend to be mentioned together. Both 
CORA and cluster analysis are explained in more detail in the relevant sections.
8.3 Phase A: Preliminary EXCEL analysis
The preparation of the word associations for further analysis was conducted with 
SPSS and EXCEL. The problem of often having not single words, but rather whole 
sentences as associations was solved by categorising the words through a theoretically 
informed categorisation scheme, after reading and examining the whole answers in 
detail. Lengthy associations were reduced to their keywords, e.g. “I  associate food . 
with culture as food is different for different cultures” (female respondent, 28) was 
coded as ‘culture \ It is acknowledged that some detail may have been lost in the 
translation. Especially in relation to the stimulus word ‘natural things’ respondents 
answered in a very image-revealing way. However, since the aim of the research was 
not to investigate images of nature in detail, but rather, to examine in detail what is 
considered natural versus unnatural, the condensed version of results serves this task 
well.
Also to have a more manageable number of associations, data were further coded. For 
example, fam ily’, ‘mother’, \grandmother’, ‘spouse’, ‘babies’ and ‘friends’ were
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coded as ‘family and friends ’, keeping the most frequently and all-encompassing as­
sociated words.
Further, as in the ALCESTE analysis of the first part of the thesis, synonyms were 
homogenised and reduced to their stem, in order to clean the data for analysis and 
make it more manageable. For example, fa t \  fatty \  and fattening’ were all coded as 
fa t ’. Ratings were kept as on the internet survey itself, and comments were removed 
manually for separate analysis.
After this preparation, data was exported into EXCEL for the first analysis, so that 
data could be inspected for word frequencies and the remaining synonyms found and 
replaced. To develop the more refined coding frame for the further analyses data was 
examined in detail, and basic frequencies of words were calculated. The hence 
cleaned data was imported into SPSS for use with CORA and cluster analyses. The 
following section begins by looking at our EXCEL results presenting the forty most 
frequent associations for each stimulus word, with the mean rating of each associa­
tion.
8.3.1 Results preliminary EXCEL analysis
8.3.2 Condition A: Natural things and natural foods
Table 8.2 shows that the most frequent associations to the stimulus word ‘natural 
things’ are words describing physical features of the environment, such as weather 
conditions or types of animals. More interesting for the present analysis however, are 
various states of nature, representing nature on the one hand very positively in terms 
of purity, harmony and beauty, but on the other hand, more negatively in images of 
death, and unpredictability.
Second, assorted activities such as eating, smiling, and recreation are seen as ‘natural 
things’. In agreement with Fredrickson et al (1999) the experience of being in nature 
is often mentioned, implying that associations to nature extend far beyond the physi­
cal aspects.
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Thirdly, words related to people (such as family and friends, love, and sex) are associ­
ated with natural things, indicating that respondents tend to see themselves and hu­
manity as being part of rather than separate from nature, or in the words of Schultz et 
al (2004) as being “connected to nature”.
Fourthly, ‘natural things’ often evoke emotive associations, not only directly men­
tioned as ‘emotions ’ but equally, in respondents’ descriptions of the meanings of their 
associations, such as 'spring awakening, freshness ’ (female respondent, 42). Here it is 
evident that nature is not only represented in material terms but rather that the concept 
has important symbolic and affective dimensions for participants.
Overall, 'natural things’ are generally rated positively or very positively, with few 
exceptions, e.g. 'weather ’ largely received neutral ratings. The prevalence of the asso­
ciation of 'natural disasters’ is likely the result of the timing of the research (Jan-Feb
2005), just after the devastating and well-publicised tsunami in South East Asia.
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Table 8.2 Frequency table 'Natural things ’
Association ‘natural things’ Rating of association* 
(mean)
Frequencies
1 weather 3 46
2 tree 2 45
3 animal 2 41
4 landscape 2 31
5 sea 1 27
6 water 2 25
7 flower 1 23
8 sunshine 1 20
9 love 1 17
10 sex 1 17
11 natural disasters 5 16
12 life 1 13
13 family and friends 2 12
14 emotions 3 11
15 earth 1 10
16 sky 2 10
17 recreation 2 9
18 eating 2 8
19 green 2 8
20 cotton 2 8
21 health 1 8
22 rocks 2 8
23 air 1 6
24 death 4 6
25 people 2 6
26 dirt 4 5
27 smiles 1 5
28 volcanoes 3 4
29 harmony 1 4
30 beauty 1 4
31 environment 1 4
32 nature 1 4
33 UN 3 3
34 fresh 1 3
35 blood 3 3
36 G reenpeace 2 3
37 Pleasure 1 3
38 Purity 1 3
39 Relaxation 2 3
40 Uncontrollable 3 3
♦Ratings for associations were assigned by respondents, and coded as follows:
very positive = 1; positive = 2; neutral = 3; negative = 4; very negative = 5
Moving on to associations to the stimulus word 'natural fo o d \ the most frequent as­
sociations in table 8.3 show that there is a very high frequency of food products which 
are only of limited relevance to the present study. But interestingly, there is also a va-
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riety of associations related to the ways of food production, including 'straight from  
the farmer ’, ‘as nature intended’, ‘home grown’, ‘organic’ and ‘not processed’ indi­
cating an idealisation of natural foods. These traditional methods of food production 
are rated positively and hence clearly distinguished from negatively rated modem ‘in­
tensive farm ing’ techniques. Thus in agreement with Zwart (2000), respondents’ con­
cern with food today often centres around issues of food production, and it appears 
that the perceived naturalness of a food is a result of the way it has been produced, 
rather than the end product per se.
Respondents have clear representations of what is natural versus unnatural in relation 
to food. This is shown in the way natural and unnatural foods are contrasted. While 
the former receive strongly positive mean ratings of associations, associations such as 
‘processedfood’, ‘chemicals’, and ‘McDonalds’ (which can be interpreted as indus­
trially produced, or unnatural, foods) are unsurprisingly rated negatively. Despite not 
having been primed for GM food in the present research condition, respondents also 
associate ‘G M food’, and surprisingly, this association is rated neutrally.
Further, natural foods are characterised as ‘healthy ’, fresh ’, ‘green ’, as well as ‘rare ’ 
and ‘expensive’, and associated with the activities farm ing’ and ‘cooking’. Apart 
from food per se, it is clear that this stimulus word (like ‘natural things *) also repre­
sents ‘purity ’ and ‘harmony ’, essentially how things ought to be.
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Table 8.3 Frequency table 'Natural food’
Association'natural food’ Rating of association* 
(mean)
Frequencies
1 fruit and vegetables 2 183
2 food product 2 99
3 meat and fish 2 47
4 health 1 31
5 organic 2 19
6 de-naturalised foods 5 11
7 not processed 2 10
8 straight from the farmer 2 10
9 taste 1 10
10 purity 1 9
11 expensive 4 8
12 farming 3 8
13 culture 1 7
14 Fairtrade 1 7
15 Fresh 1 6
16 Homemade 1 6
17 Mcdonalds 5 5
18 rare 4 5
19 as nature intended 2 5
20 vegetarian 3 4
21 cooking 4 3
22 harmony 1 3
23 my garden 1 3
24 nutrition 1 3
25 processed food 5 3
26 raw 2 3
27 supermarkets 4 3
28 tasteless 4 3
29 artificial 4 2
30 big 2 2
31 colour 2 2
32 big 3 2
33 countryside 2 2
34 environment 1 2
35 ethics 3 2
36 EU 4 2
37 goodness 2 2
38 meal 2 2
39 nature 1 2
40 virtuous 4 2
♦Ratings for associations were assigned by respondents, and coded as follows:
very positive = 1; positive = 2; neutral = 3; negative = 4; very negative = 5
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8.3.3 Condition B: Food in general and GM food
Similar to associations to ‘natural fo o d ’, table 8.4 indicates that when participants 
think about food in general a large number associate various food and drink prod­
ucts. Yet thinking about food also evokes a broad range of related activities, such as 
cooking, eating, going to a restaurant, shopping, travel and work. Being associated 
with social events, enjoying the company of family and friends, sharing a meal and 
celebrating, shows how eating is perceived as a social act.
Moreover, food brings to mind a range of (mostly positive) emotions, such as ’pleas­
ure ', 'love ‘satisfaction and ‘comfort ’. Evidently, food is an affective and sensory 
experience. Although the vast majority of associations are positive, food is not always 
perceived positively. From an individualistic perspective, associations such as ‘fat’, 
the 'risk o f  weight gain ’ and ‘eating disorders ’ show the concerns some participants 
have in relation to food. Thus while food can be both a source of pleasure or reward, it 
can also be regarded as a foe threatening health and the maintenance of a desirable 
body shape (Crouch et al, 2000).
Moreover, from a more societal perspective, participants are also concerned with the 
unequal distribution of food, and famine. In sum, our results show that food is far 
more than nutrition. Rather it is an emotive concept laden with a particular socio­
cultural significance.
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Table 8.4 Frequency table ‘Food in general’
Association ‘food in general’ Rating of association* 
(mean)
Frequencies
1 food product 2 81
2 fruit and vegetables 2 54
3 meat and fish 3 40
4 drink 2 33
5 family and friends 2 26
6 culture 2 23
7 pleasure 1 22
8 social event 1 21
9 cooking 2 19
10 health 2 18
11 taste 1 18
12 fat 5 15
13 meal 2 11
14 hunger 4 10
15 diet 2 9
16 home 1 9
17 nutrition 2 9
18 essential 2 9
19 energy 2 8
20 relaxation 2 8
21 life 2 7
22 organic 1 7
23 satisfaction 1 7
24 risk of weight gain 4 6
25 mcdonalds 3 6
26 unequal distribution 5 6
27 comfort 2 6
28 celebration 1 6
29 delicious 1 6
30 company 1 6
31 colour 2 5
32 creativity 1 5
33 supermarket 3 5
34 restaurant 1 4
35 eating 2 4
36 eating disorders 5 4
37 emotion 2 4
38 famine 5 4
39 fresh 1 4
40 love 2 4
♦Ratings for associations were assigned by respondents, and coded as follows:
very positive = 1; positive = 2; neutral = 3; negative = 4; very negative = 5
In comparison to the other food stimulus words, table 8.5 shows that GM food does 
not bring to mind as many food products; when it did, those were generally ‘soya ’ and 
'tomatoes \  both well publicised GM food products. Also, GM food evokes the broad-
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est range of associations, and compared to the other stimulus words, these tend to be 
rated rather negatively.
Table 8.5 Frequency table 'GM food’
Association ‘GM food’ Rating of association1' 
(mean)
Frequencies
1 fruit and vegetables 3 66
2 food product 3 30
3 unnatural 5 30
4 science 2 22
5 helping third world 2 21
6 unhealthy 5 21
7 multinational companies 4 19
8 progress 2 15
9 potential benefit 2 14
10 environmental risks 5 14
11 dangerous 5 13
12 uncertainty 4 12
13 profit 4 11
14 exploitation 5 10
15 future 3 10
16 government lies 5 10
17 unknown long-term consequences 4 9
18 tasteless 4 8
19 big 3 8
20 not necessary 4 8
21 contamination 4 8
22 Greenpeace 2 8
23 supermarket 3 7
24 confusion 4 6
25 EU vs. US 4 6
26 GM animals 5 6
27 insufficient research 4 6
28 innovation 2 6
29 capitalism 4 6
30 cheap 3 5
31 chemicals 4 5
32 food tampered with 4 5
33 labelling 3 5
34 lack of control 5 5
35 m ass production 4 5
36 political debate 3 5
37 suspicious 4 5
38 forced on public 5 5
39 bad 5 5
40 irreversible 4 5
♦Ratings for associations were assigned by respondents, and coded as follows:
very positive = 1; positive = 2; neutral = 3; negative = 4; very negative = 5
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Being described as unnatural, dangerous, unhealthy, tasteless, and unnecessary the 
characteristics of GM food are clearly distinguished from the characteristics of other 
foods. A remarkable group of GM food associations concerns their risks, both to the 
environment and to human health, as well as the exploitation of the third world.
However, GM food is not always rated negatively. Various associations are rated 
positively and it is evident that GM foods are perceived to have substantial benefits, 
such as helping the third world. This indicates respondents’ ambivalence towards the 
issue which starkly contrasts with our focus group findings of the first research stage.
Notably, GM food, in contrast to both food in general and natural food, does not 
evoke similar food-related associations. Rather than thinking about the social signifi­
cance of food, or home and family, respondents’ thinking about GM food is anchored 
in images of on the one hand future, progress, and science, and on the other hand gov­
ernment lies, profit and capitalism.
Rather than being perceived as a “food” with all the social significance this entails, 
GM foods are perceived as belonging to the realm of science and progress- a complete 
opposite to homemade, organic food. And while science and progress in general are 
viewed positively, it seems that they do not have a space in the realm of food which is 
much preferred to be traditional, how it “used to be”, and how nature intended. The 
generally positive associations to food indicate that participants like and enjoy the 
food they currently have and would rather not have it altered by science. This implies 
that rather than the technology per se, it may be its application to food that is prob­
lematic.
Moreover, similar to the results of our first research stage, a range of associations are 
concerned with the public understanding of science and the treatment of the public by 
government and industry. Participants lack trust in government ( ‘government lies’), 
and feel confused and suspicious, often mentioning a feeling of being manipulated 
and forced into GM. Thus these issues clearly are a significant part of lay participants’ 
representations of GM food, which cannot simply be divided from the food risk per 
se.
v
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Interestingly, the stimulus word GM food evokes the widest range of additional com­
ments by participants, often explicitly stating their lack of knowledge:
“I  know very little about GM food, so could not make detailed comments 
I'm afraid. I  don't know i f  and how GM is positive, however, what I  do 
know is that I  don't agree with this way o f  'progress' as it is too risky for  
us, the environment and future generations. ”
(female respondent, 47)
Thus in accordance with our previous focus group results, it is evident that lay repre­
sentations of GM food incorporate far wider issues (often of a social and societal na­
ture) than the scientific aspects alone.
Summing up, our preliminary stage usefully describes respondents’ associations, pro­
viding the frequencies and mean ratings for each association. This effectively allowed 
the data to be “cleaned” to pave the way for the further correspondence and cluster 
analyses.
8.4 Phase B: A background to correspondence analysis
Correspondence analysis (CORA) is an exploratory technique for analysing multi-way 
frequency tables, i.e. cross-classifications of two or more categorical variables. When 
a cross-tabulation has large numbers of rows and columns, it can be difficult to pick 
out all the important patterns in the data. CORA can help to summarise detailed dif­
ferences between groups/conditions, and is used to reduce the dimensionality (i.e. the 
complexity) of a cross-tabulation. The technique aims to convert a table of numbers 
into a plot of points, usually on two dimensions, i.e. to represent the raw data in a low­
dimensional space so that it is easier to identify the key features (Bartholomew et al, 
2002).
Relationships between a row category and a column category may be assessed accord­
ing to the proximity of their profile points on the biplot. Proximities must be inter­
preted with caution. If a point of row category one is closest to point of column cate­
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gory two, we cannot say anything about the magnitude of their association in absolute 
but only in relative terms. For instance, it can be said that a pair of row-column cate­
gories (e.g. ‘environmental risks ’ and ‘negative ’ in the GM food biplot) that are close 
together are more strongly associated than a pair of categories that are further apart.
It is often possible to interpret and/or label the dimensions obtained from a CORA. 
This is done by examining the positions of row/column categories along each dimen­
sion and thinking about what row/column categories that appear close together have 
in common, and what distinguishes those that appear far apart. By attempting to inter­
pret the ‘meaning’ of each of the dimensions the underlying structure of the data can 
be better understood. To interpret the biplots, dimensions can be named, but naming 
the dimensions in a CORA is always an arbitrary business. In our findings, dimen­
sions are not always readily classifiable hence as suggested by Wagner (2001) we of­
ten focus on clusters of points, rather than dimensions. Any categories plotted close to 
the point where the two axes meet are deemed not to be particularly associated with 
any other category. Moving away from the origin where we can see clusters of points 
we can speak of a positive association. The closer the points are to each other in a 
cluster the greater the relative association. In sum, CORA can put the detail provided 
in the descriptive EXCEL report into some broader perspective.
8.4.1 Selection of words for CORA and cluster analyses
The preliminary EXCEL analyses prepared the word lists for further selection re­
quired for the quantitative analyses. The data of stage one was inspected for the rele­
vant words. The relevant words are those with a bearing on the stimulus and with a 
reasonable frequency in the sample to expect contingencies (Wagner, 1997). Hence, 
for each stimulus word, a fairly large number were excluded, for example, in relation 
to food, all food and drinks products (which, when combined, made up the most fre­
quent words) were excluded30. In relation to the stimulus word nature, word associa­
tions of the physical aspects of nature were excluded from further analysis. The main 
reason for cutting off words with particularly high frequencies is that in a CORA high 
frequency words are assigned an often unduly high mass, separating them more than
30 In relation to natural food associations, as the first part of the thesis, codings were condensed to the 
extent that pesticides, hormones, GM, and chemicals were all coded under 'de-naturalised foods
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may be desired from less frequent words in the resulting correspondence space (Wag­
ner, 1997).
The problem that once the very frequent words were excluded, there was not clear 
cut-off point was alleviated by including the twenty most frequent words per stimulus 
word. This is an arbitrary cut-off point but trying various word numbers for the 
CORA showed that this was the most feasible amount- any more and the resulting 
correspondence space was not interpretable anymore. Also, in order to have visual 
clarity in the correspondence spaces, lengthy codes such as 'family and friends ’ were 
abbreviated to fam ily '.
The results of both CORA and correspondence analysis are presented separately be­
fore we summarise our conclusions at the end of the chapter.
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8.4.2 Results correspondence analysis
8.4.3 Condition A- Natural foods and natural things
Figure 8.1 shows the biplot resulting from associations to natural things31. Dimension 
1 follows the line of positive to negative ratings, while dimension 2 is more difficult 
to classify, hence as suggested by Wagner (1997) it makes sense to look at the clusters 
of associations. At the centre is a cluster about nature which is rated very positively, 
and at either extreme, associations are rated more negatively, especially ‘natural dis­
asters ’. Yet despite being aware of nature’s darker sides that need to be respected, it is 
shown that generally, respondents represent nature as a realm for positive activities 
and with life-giving properties.
Figure 8.1 Biplot natural things
Row and Column Points 
Symmetrical Normalization
Dimension 2 
(29%)
sky •
love •
sm iles*  
family 
eating* 
health •  
sex
sunshine
, earth  
very po>i
life
positive^
green
people
very negative
natural d isasters
itive
sation
•  emotion
1 rocks 
neutral
negative
•  dirt
Dimension 1 (54%)
* association 
rating
31 The relevant correspondence tables showing associations with detailed ratings for all stimulus words 
can be found in Appendix D.
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Regarding ‘natural foods ’, similar to above, figure 8.2 indicates that dimension 1 goes 
from positive to negative evaluations, with natural states such as ‘purity’ and ‘har­
mony’ being viewed very positively contrasting with man made variations of our 
food, such as ‘de-naturalised foods’. Dimension 2, rather than just describing charac­
teristics of natural foods, implies a value orientation in respect to how food should be: 
‘straight from the farmer ’ and ‘as nature intended ’. This contrast between the positive 
and the negative associations might allow respondents to distinguish themselves from 
others and so acquire a moral identity of their own:
“By accepting certain labels and rejecting others, the contemporary food  
consumer is allowed to develop a moral Self to live a morally examined 
life and to take sides in the political conflicts o f the present”
(Zwart, 2000; p. 125)
Figure 8.2 Biplot natural food
Row and Column Points 
Symmetrical Normalization
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8.4.4 Condition B- Food in general and GM food
Regarding food in general, figure 8.3 shows that dimension 1 goes from positive to 
negative ratings. Again, there is a strong clustering of positive and very positive rated 
associations, centring around the social as well as material significance of food. For 
example, socially food is associated with pleasure and culture, and more physically 
with nutrition, energy and life. Dimension 2 also incorporates both these aspects, with 
the social significance of food outweighing any physical practicalities. Negative asso­
ciations focus mainly on diet, and weight gain- associations that may be a reflection 
of a society pre-occupied with slimness and looks.
Figure 8.3 Biplot food in general
Row and Column Points 
Symmetrical Normalization
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Nevertheless, as with associations to ‘natural things ’ and ‘natural foods ’, positive and 
very positive associations are clearly predominant. Interestingly, associations to these 
three stimulus words have several commonalities, which is not surprising for the food
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related associations. However, associations to food in general and natural things also 
share similarities- in both conditions ‘family (and friends) ’ and ‘life ’ are very positive 
associations. The association of ‘health’ is shared between all stimulus words apart 
from GM indicating that respondents view being healthy as our natural state, which is 
changed by GM into an unhealthy and unnatural state.
Hence these findings contrast sharply with respondents’ GM food associations as 
shown in figure 8.4. GM food shows two clusters, the larger one being rated nega­
tively but a significant other cluster rated positively, showing a clear duality of asso­
ciations in contrast to our focus group findings. Moving from negative over neutral to 
positive associations to GM food, dimension one shows participants’ ambivalence 
about the issue, indicating that participants were able to see both risks and benefits, 
albeit not in equal measure.
Figure 8.4 Biplot GMfood
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Clusterings that can be observed in the negative realm along dimension 2 focus of the 
perceived characteristics of GM food, their risks, as well as public trust in the behav­
iour of government and industry.
As GM foods are perceived as 'unhealthy ’, they strongly contrast with the importance 
of *health ’ established in relation to the other stimulus words. As could be expected, 
there is a duality especially between associations to GM and natural foods. GM foods 
are tasteless as opposed to (generally) tasty, unnatural as opposed to as nature in­
tended, a source of contamination as opposed to purity, and exploitation as opposed to 
fair-trade.
On the other hand, GM foods are also associated with progress which is perceived 
positively, and science which is perceived rather ambivalently. This shows that as in 
our focus groups, respondents clearly are not technophobic. In turn, this hints at the 
notion that there may indeed be something special about food risk perception, which 
may be the result of the social significance of food established for the other stimulus 
words, which is simply not shared by GM food.
In sum, the CORAs show that associations to GM food are very different to other 
stimulus words which share a lot of commonalities. Further, GM foods characteristics 
contrast to those of other foods in the perception of what is a natural versus an unnatu­
ral food, with participants distinguishing between naturally and industrially produced 
foods.
8.5 Phase C: A background to cluster analysis
As a third step, data was examined with cluster analysis to investigate which associa­
tions tend to be mentioned together. Cluster analysis groups cases or variables (in our 
case associations) in such a way that those allocated to a particular group are in some 
sense close together. One can then examine the clusters and ask what those which ap­
pear to be similar have in common. The present research uses hierarchical (as opposed 
to non-hierarchical) cluster analysis, which means that the clustering process yields a
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hierarchy in which subsets of clusters at one level are aggregated to form the clusters 
at the next, higher level.
One of the most frequently used graphical representations of results is the dendro­
gram, or tree diagram. The dendrogram is interpreted as follows: stimuli are assem­
bled according to their decreasing similarity rated on a scale ranging from the left to 
the right of the diagram. Thus the already classified groups of stimuli are in turn clas­
sified into other groups until all responses are assembled in a single group whose de­
gree of similarity can be read of the diagram. The resulting hierarchical cluster tree is 
a hierarchy of groups that fit together.
For the present study, various measures of cluster analysis were tried out and com­
pared. The different measures often gave similar clusters, indicating robustness, i.e. 
that one can have confidence that they are reflecting some aspect of the data faith­
fully. Present findings are based on the Centroid method, using the Jaccard similarity 
coefficient. An outline of the procedure for cluster analysis using this method is pro­
vided in Appendix E. As variables are binary, a measure of similarity (or distance) 
could be based on the proportion of respondents on which two variables match. The 
Jaccard measurement does not presuppose that the fact of mentioning an item is 
equivalent to not mentioning it hence variables that match purely on the criterion of 
being ‘not present’32 are excluded from the calculation. This means that when calcu­
lating the similarity coefficient between two variables (i.e. associations), respondents 
who mention neither of those two variables are excluded from the formula. There is 
no need to go into the details of the algorithms here as the method is used in a purely 
exploratory fashion to suggest possible clusterings33.
8.5.1 Results cluster analysis
8.5.2 Condition A: Natural things and natural food
Looking at figure 8.5, in the dendrogram for ‘natural things’ the cluster analysis re­
veals six clusters, which only meet at the final stage, indicating that they are relatively
32 Such similarity indexes are more relevant when subjects must explicitly indicate that they accept or 
reject a suggestion, which was not the case in our study.
33 For technical details, please see for example Everitt, Landau and Leese (2001).
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separate from one another. Cluster 1 centres around family. The very first agglomera­
tion of the cluster occurs between the associations ‘love ’ and ‘family ’ indicating that 
they are more similar than any other associations. Natural disasters being part of this 
cluster may signify that when thinking about natural disasters, participants readily 
think about the human costs of say, the tsunami, rather than the physical forces of na­
ture per se.
Slightly similar in its characteristics, cluster 2 also focuses on people as well as the 
more negative sides of nature, such as death and dirt. Cluster 3 seems to be organised 
around important aspects of life, highlighting the prerequisite of eating for health, and 
of health for a good life. Clusters 4 and 5 focus on the physical aspects of nature, and 
are hence of lesser relevance for the present study. Despite including physical aspects 
such as ‘sunshine’ it is clear that cluster 6 focuses on recreation and activities in na­
ture, evoking pleasant imagery. Hence although respondents often associate nature 
with its physical characteristics, it is evident that representations of nature go far be­
yond these aspects, incorporating social and affective dimensions.
Figure 8.5 Dendrogram using Centroid Method: Natural things
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
C A S E  0 5 10 15 20
Label Num +---------+--------- +--------- +--------- +
1 Love 2 — i— ;-------------------------------------
1 Family 4 — *
1 Sex 3 ---------------------- -------- - ---------
1 Natdisast. 5 ----------------------
2 Death 16  .----
2 People 17  *
2 Emotion 9 -----------------------------------------
2 Dirt 18 -------------------------------------
3 Life 6 ------------------------ -----------------
3 Green 10 ------------------------
3 Eating 8 ------------------------------------------
3 Health 13 --------------- *----------
4 Cotton 12 ------------------------------------------
4 Rocks 14 ----------------------------
5 Earth 7 ------------------------------ -----------
5 Air 15 ------------------------------
6 Sunshine 1 ---------------------------- ----------
6 Sky 11 ----------------------------  —
6 Smiles 19 ---------------------------------------
6 Recreation 20 ------------------------------------------
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Examining associations to ‘natural fo o d ’ in figure 8.6, five clusters can be deter­
mined, with the first and second clusters focusing predominately on the perceived 
characteristics of natural foods. The third cluster is organised around various kinds of 
food production methods, and looking back at the CORA, it is evident that the asso­
ciation of ‘de-naturalised foods ’ (a very negatively rated association) is included to 
put natural foods into context by offering a sharp contrast. Rather than farming cul­
ture, cluster 4 centres around food preparation culture, with ‘McDonalds ’ being in­
cluded as a negative example which is relatively loosely associated.
Cluster 5 is the largest and most interesting. It seems to present an idealised version of 
how natural foods should be: pure, straight from the farmer, fresh- as nature intended. 
Especially the former associations are closely related indicating that food which
comes straight from the farmer may be perceived as pure and healthy, although tech­
nically this is not necessarily the case (Enticott, 2003).
Figure 8.6 Dendrogram using Centroid Method: Natural food
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
C A S E  0 5 10 15 20
Label Num +--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +
1 Taste 4 — .----------------------------------------
1 Expensive 8 — I
1 Rare 1 5 ------------------------------------------
1 Cooking 18 --------------
2 Vegetarian 17 ---------------------------- -------------
2 Harmony 19 ----------------------------
3 Farming 9---- -------------------------- --------------
3 Fairtrade 11 --------------------------
3 De-natural 3 -----------------------------------------
3 My garden 20 -----------------------------------
4 Culture 10 ------------------------------------------
4 Homemade 13 --------------------------
4 Mcdonalds 14 ------------------------------------------
5 Purity 6 ----------------------------
5 Straight fr 7 ■- ---------------------
5 Fresh 12 ----------------------------
5 Not proc. 5  1------------------------
5 Nature int.16  *
5 Health 1 ---------------- ------------------------
5 Organic 2 ----------------
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8.5.3 Condition B: Food in general and GM food
Examining associations to ‘food in general’ in figure 8.7, it makes sense to discuss 
words in terms of two clusters, and regard the separate words above as outliers. Clus­
ter 1 seems to be organised around aspects of nutrition, the mainly physical side of 
eating, as well as society’s food culture- food as food per se with all the nutritional 
aspects that come with it, and food as culture, as being part of relaxation.
Cluster 2 is by far the largest cluster. It is theoretically useful to identify these associa­
tions as one cluster, as they have a range of common characteristics, focusing on the 
social significance of food in contrast to the more nutritional aspects of cluster 1. 
Here, food is associated not only with health, but also with a range of enjoyable social 
events. Overall, when looking at the complete dendrogram, although it is evident that 
associations to food can be of a practical or physical nature (one has to eat), as sug­
gested by Rozin (1999) the social dimensions (such as the pleasures of sharing a meal 
and having dinner with one’s family) prevail.
Figure 8.7 Dendrogram using Centroid Method: Food in general
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
C A S E  
Label Num
Home 12
Life 18
Essential 14 
Energy 15 
Weightgain 17 
Organic 19 
1 Hunger 9
1 Relaxation 16 
1 Culture 2 
1 Fat 8
1 Diet 11
1 Nutrition 13
2 Pleasure 4 
2 Cooking 7 
2 Health 6
2 Soc. event 3 
2 Family 5
2 Taste 1
2 Meal 10
2 Satisfact. 20
5 +. 10 15 20 25
J
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Regarding associations to GM food in figure 8.8, it makes sense to look at six clusters 
that only meet late in the analysis, indicating relatively loose associations between 
them. The first cluster can be readily identified as focusing on science and progress, 
with these words being closely associated.
The second cluster centres on the characteristics of GM food, for example, the un­
natural is closely associated with the unhealthy, the unknown (consequences) with the 
dangerous. In the third cluster, it is evident that helping the third world and multina­
tional companies are closely associated, yet only by referring to the CORA does it 
become clear that while the former is clearly viewed positively, the latter tended to be 
assessed as negatively. In turn, this may indicate why the same cluster also incorpo­
rates concern about uncertainty- GM may be able to help the third world but the in­
volvement of multinational companies makes the end result questionable. This inter­
pretation would corroborate findings of the focus groups, where industry was simply 
not trusted to deliver their promises of feeding the third world.
Figure 8.8 Dendrogram using Centroid Method: GMfood
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
C A S E  
Label Num
1 Science 3 
1 Progress 9
1 Future 12
2 Unnatural 1 
2 Unhealthy 6 
2 Dangerous 2
2 Unknown 15
3 Third world 4 
3 Companies 5
3 Uncertain. 11
4 Big 16
4 Contamin. 19
5 Env. risks 8 
5 Profit 10 
5 Exploit. 14 
5 Not neces. 18
5 Greenpeace 20
6 Benefits 7 
6 Tasteless 13 
6 Govt, lies 17
0 5 10 15 20 25
J
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Furthermore, albeit small, cluster 4 is interesting in that it resonates with previous 
Eurobarometer analyses (1996; 1999) whereby GM food is associated with adultera­
tion, infection of some kind, and monstrosity. As established by Gaskell, Allum and 
Stares (2002), these are common menacing images of GM food, held by about 25 per­
cent of Europeans34. This is unsurprising because especially tabloid-style newspapers 
covered biotechnology issues in a menacing way (Wagner and Kronberger, 2001) and 
these of course are a resource for representing the issues for the people who read these 
papers.
Cluster 5 addresses the potential risks of GM food, which are both of a moral (exploi­
tation and profit) as well as of a scientific nature (environmental risk). Hence it is not 
surprising that (albeit fairly loosely related) Greenpeace is associated with cluster 5, 
as it may have been this group who shaped respondents’ awareness of the environ­
mental issues surrounding GM food. Implying a value orientation, the perception that 
GM food is not necessary is not only related to the environmental risks, but equally to 
exploitation and the quest for financial profit.
Cluster 6 is not readily identifiable under a particular thematic area. However, it 
seems that both the perception of potential benefits and the perception of GM food as 
being tasteless are quite closely related, maybe indicating that both the positive and 
negative aspects of GM foods are weighted up to some extend. Relatedly, the problem 
of lack of trust ( ‘government lies ’) may make it more difficult for participants to actu­
ally believe agents advocating the benefits of GM.
To sum up briefly, the above cluster analyses largely confirm results of the CORAs, 
as both group together similar clusters. Thus present findings appear to validate each 
other, as well as providing a different way of clustering the associations which helps 
to make better sense of the clusters.
34 For instance, the knowledge quiz in the Eurobarometer survey contains the statement 'genetically 
modified animals are always bigger than ordinary ones ’ which 25 percent of Europeans considered to 
be true (Gaskell et al, 2002).
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8.6 Summary of analyses and Conclusions Chapter Eight
In conclusion, our findings show that the descriptive EXCEL analysis, CORA and 
cluster analysis are best considered jointly to give as full as possible an impression of 
word association relationships. The first research stage showed the frequencies of as­
sociations and ratings, i.e. which words were associated with which stimulus words 
and their average ratings. The second research stage explained within each stimulus 
word, which associations were relatively more strongly associated with which rating, 
while the final research stage explored which associations tend to be mentioned to­
gether. In agreement with Wagner (1997), no method taken by itself is the one and 
best way for the analysis of free associations data but applied together, we could see 
remarkable patterns emerging.
We can draw four main conclusions. First, our analytical approaches show how par­
ticipants represent the natural and how the “natural” and the “unnatural” are con­
trasted. Food in general, natural foods, and natural things overall are rated very posi­
tively, with GM food offering a sharp contrast in several ways. When looking at other 
negatively rated food associations, such as ‘de-naturalised fo o d ’ and ‘intensive farm­
ing’, it becomes evident that the way of food production (rather than the end product 
per se) is an important decision point when judging a food to be natural or unnatural. 
Being perceived as a product of science, rather than of nature (as food “ought to be”), 
clearly contributes to GM food being represented as unnatural.
Second, maybe because GM food is anchored in images of science and progress, it is 
not attributed the kind of social significance which our results highlight for the other 
stimulus words. It is clear that rather than solely providing nutrition, food has impor­
tant socio-cultural dimensions which are not shared by GM food. Also, eating is con­
sidered a natural activity, and by being unnatural GM disturbs this natural order of 
things, and may in turn signify danger.
Third, like food nature has a strong social dimension. Nature and the natural mean far 
more to respondents than the physical aspects according to the positivist paradigm and 
established by environmental psychology. Rather, nature representations incorporate a 
wide range of affective and symbolic elements. Looking at these (generally very posi-
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tive) constructive elements of nature highlights why participants may be so averse to 
the unnatural. In relation to food at least, the unnatural clearly contrasts with respon­
dents’ socio-cultural values. Moreover, because nature tends to be perceived as pure 
and harmonious, a technology such as GM which is regarded as contaminating may 
upset this balance, putting the world as known at risk.
Fourth, the quantitative analyses of associations to GM food in many ways validate 
the qualitative analyses of our first research stage. However, some interesting differ­
ences could be observed, too. It is clear, that in addition to its risks, our free associa­
tions respondents also perceived GM foods to have significant benefits, indicating 
their ambivalence towards the issue. This shows the added value of quantitatively ori­
ented research that allows for a larger sample size. Regarding our focus group find­
ings it is possible that group dynamics resulted in a polarisation of opinions, starting 
of negatively and becoming fairly one-dimensional. In contrast, our free associations 
task is likely to have benefited from limited group and researcher influence. Neverthe­
less, it should be noted that even this larger sample was fairly specific in terms of 
their characteristics. The following chapter compares and contrasts the findings of 
both research stages in more detail.
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9 DISCUSSION
The research reported in this thesis was conducted in two parts. The overall aim of the 
first research part was to explore expert and lay perceptions of GM food risk using the 
mental model approach to risk communication, developed at the Carnegie Mellon 
University (Granger Morgan at al, 2002). The Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) 
approach offers a systematic procedure for finding out what people know about a risk, 
and what they actually want to, and potentially need to, know about it. The approach 
appreciates that existing knowledge is likely to influence the reception and under­
standing of any new information. Hence in order to devise effective risk communica­
tions, the CMU approach first establishes existing expert and lay knowledge about a 
risk. However, because of the underlying positivist and rationalist assumptions of this 
approach, we synthesised the CMU approach with social representations theory (SRT) 
to “socialise” mental models.
The CMU approach had not been applied to gene technology generally, and regarding 
GM foods specifically, only few studies directly compare expert and lay risk percep­
tions in detail. Thus, the first part of the research investigated expert and lay risk rep­
resentations of GM food in depth, in order to explore how risks are understood by 
both groups.
The exploration of the CMU approach led us to focus on the non-scientific issues 
within the GM food debate and how, if at all, the CMU approach might deal with 
those. One of the significant non-scientific issues was lay participants’ concern that 
GM is ‘messing with nature'. This is an empirically unexplored area, in contrast to 
for example trust, hence in the second part of the thesis, “nature” was investigated fur­
ther. The aim of the second study was to explore what people actually mean when 
they say that ‘GM is unnatural ’ and what frames and anchors they use to make this 
judgement. For this, we utilised a free associations task to show what attitudes, im­
ages and linguistic repertoires guide lay people’s thoughts on and discussions of na­
ture, food and GM.
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The present chapter discusses above results putting them into their theoretical con­
texts. Limitations of the thesis and avenues for further research are explored, before 
conclusions are drawn and implications for risk communication are outlined.
9.1 Summary of findings: Part I
In line with the CMU approach to risk communication, nine scientific experts on agri­
cultural biotechnology were interviewed in order to map GM food risk based on sci­
ence. As a second step, and using a topic guide based on the expert findings, five fo­
cus groups with lay participants were conducted. The transcripts of the elite inter­
views and focus group discussions were explored with ALCESTE to give a first over­
view of the findings, followed by an in-depth analysis with Atlas/ti. Results of this 
analysis provided the basis for constructing expert and lay mental models. These were 
compared and contrasted, showing how expert and lay participants represent GM food 
risk.
9.1.1 Overview ALCESTE analysis
ALCESTE is a tool for determining the main word distribution patterns within a text, 
by obtaining a primary statistical classification to reveal the most characteristic words 
and patterns. The underlying idea is that the meaning of a text can be captured if one 
finds those words that occur together and are produced by as many respondents as 
possible (Kronberger and Wagner, 2000)
Our exploratory ALCESTE analyses highlighted significant expert and lay diver­
gences in risk perceptions of GM food. While experts generally focused on the scien­
tific aspects, lay participants took much broader issues into consideration when dis­
cussing GM food risk. These differences were not solely the result of different levels 
of scientific knowledge, as the inclusion of social and societal considerations for lay 
participants indicated. This was particularly evident in relation to ‘nature’ whereby 
lay people appeared to attribute far wider symbolic meanings to the concept than did 
experts. Furthermore, levels of trust and attitudes to regulation differed greatly be­
tween both groups. While experts largely trusted the regulatory regimes in place, lay 
participants were distrustful, regarding the interplay of science, politics and industry
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as problematic. Finally, the largest cluster of the ALCESTE analyses for the experts 
concerned the public understanding of science, and for the lay participants, the under­
standing of science and politics, indicating both groups’ interest in the issue of science 
and society.
9.1.2 Overview ATLAS/ti analysis
Following from the exploratory ALCESTE analysis which helped to establish general 
discursive categories, Atlas/ti was utilised to investigate the particularities of expert 
and lay discourses of GM food risk in depth. Atlas/ti is a tool for the analysis of quali­
tative data, which speeds up the coding process and provides a more complex way of 
looking at relationships of themes in the data. Of particular relevance to the present 
thesis was its ability to create visual code networks, which formed the basis for our 
mental models.
The findings show that expert and lay people represent GM food risk rather differ­
ently basing their different risk and benefit perceptions on different underlying values 
and norms. In essence, dissimilar representations of the issue are brought into the risk 
assessment. These would need to be acknowledged when designing risk communica­
tions. The results of the Atlas/ti analysis are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Thus 
the following summary only focuses on the issues whereby expert and lay participants 
differ significantly, and which at the same time demonstrate the limitations of the sci­
ence-based mental model approach. We highlight three specific areas: a) scientific 
uncertainty/ambiguity, b) trust, and c) non-scientific issues, such as values related to 
nature.
9.1.3 Scientific uncertainty
With regards to the uncertainties about the risks and benefits of GM food, the findings 
show that there are notable areas of expert disagreement. For instance, while most ex­
perts focused on the benefits of GM (rather than the risks) there was disagreement 
about what these are and when society will experience them. Likewise, experts dis­
agreed about the potential effects of GM on the environment (an area that lay partici­
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pants were also concerned about), and more specifically, about whether to construe 
these environmental impacts as “harm”.
Hence unsurprisingly a particular area of concern for lay participants is scientific un­
certainty, as important and relevant information is perceived to be missing. Scientific 
uncertainty poses a problem, because in the words of Rosa (1998) lay participants re­
gard GM food risk as a “post-normal risk”, opening up questions that are both un­
known and unknowable. For the CMU approach, it is a challenge how to proceed on 
such issues, where even for the experts, unequivocal information is simply not avail­
able.
Looking back at Funtowicz and Ravetz’s (1990) distinctions between different types 
of uncertainty as outlined in Chapter One, GM food risk falls into their categorisation 
of “border with ignorance”, i.e. uncertainty about model completeness and uncertainty 
due to lack of knowledge. Renn et al (2002) categorise GM food risk as “ambiguity” 
as distinct from uncertainty. In both frameworks, the technology falls in the most 
problematic type of risk conflict. For Renn et al such risks can only be resolved 
through participatory discourse rather than science single-handedly. Accordingly, it is 
likely that the provision of scientific information alone as suggested by the CMU ap­
proach would be insufficient to clarify, let alone resolve, the conflict over GM food.
9.1.4 Trust
Yet inadequate risk assessment is not only due to inadequate scientific knowledge- 
scientific facts are often uncertain. Rather the findings indicate that judgements about 
uncertainty in science reflect the trust in the agents addressing the uncertainty. Lay 
participants expressed the desire to be able to trust experts, but did not consider this to 
be possible in the present societal climate. Participants had a strong sense of recre­
ancy, i.e. perceiving government, science and industry to have failed to carry out their 
responsibilities with the vigour necessary to merit societal trust (Freudenburg, 1993). 
In line with previous research35, the findings show that trust and risk both cannot be
35 The relationship of trust and risk is addressed here only in passing as the concept has received copi­
ous amounts of attention in the literature (e.g. Slovic et al, 1991; Kasperson, 1992; van Ravenswaay, 
1995; Siegrist, 2000).
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seen in isolation. As suggested by Luhmann (1979) they are two sides of the same 
coin. If scientific advice is not trusted, people perceive an increasing exposure to risks 
of both individual and societal nature.
There was not only lack of trust but a culture of suspicion, as lay participants felt that 
they had been lied to, and conspired against, hence the motivations of scientists, gov­
ernment and especially industry were strongly questioned. GM was perceived to exist 
and to be promoted for all the wrong reasons, thus lay participants want to know who 
is setting the agenda for science, based on which underlying criteria.
In this way, one cannot distinguish the communication from the communicator, as 
regardless of the content of the communication, trust in the message, communicator 
and intentions seems to be a pre-requisite for successful communication. As such, 
trust (or lack of) presents a significant problem to risk communication exemplifying a 
further limitation of the CMU approach. Even if the communication could address all 
the issues the public is worried about, the perception that the information source is 
unreliable is problematic- whom to trust to tell the truth? If trust is lacking, it is doubt­
ful whether the message can reach recipients as intended at all. Focusing primarily on 
the development of the communication content the CMU approach neglects this vital 
issue.
9.1.5 Non-scientific dimensions in risk perceptions
In addition to trust-related issues, the application of the CMU approach demonstrates 
that major distinguishing factors between expert and lay participants are often related 
to various other non-scientific factors, such as values. For lay participants, these is­
sues are pressing and important, while experts, at least when talking about GM food, 
tend to neglect them.
For example, experts generally believed in technological solutions to societal prob­
lems, while lay participants did not necessarily think that technological innovation 
will solve the world’s problems. Clearly, these are value, rather than knowledge, re­
lated concerns. Values are associated with people’s views about the contribution of 
science and technology to the quality of life, and with the extent to which they are
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prepared to support developments such as GM foods (Gaskell et al, 2004). Hence our 
results indicate that GM is controversial, in part, because the technology engages with 
people’s beliefs and values.
Furthermore, although in contrast to lay participants, experts mostly perceived the 
current regulation as satisfactory, even experts disagreed about a number of regulatory 
issues. For instance, while most experts anchored GM food risk in the risks of other 
novel foods, arguing that the end products are substantially equivalent, others did not 
find this a valid basis for assessment. Hence it is not surprising that controversy is ap­
parent particularly in the area of regulation. Moreover, even for experts, there were 
problems of risk definitions such as shown in the discussion of what constitutes harm 
to the environment. This indicates the social construction of both risks and benefits as 
various scientific ‘facts’ can be interpreted in different ways by different groups. In 
turn, these interpretations likely are based on different underlying values and norms. 
Within regulation at least, science cannot easily be divided from values. While sci­
ence may be able to determine what the risk is, whether it is perceived as being worth 
taking (i.e. its acceptability) is determined by societal values.
9.1.6 “Messing with nature”
A frequent value-related concern is lay participants’ perception that ‘GM is messing 
with nature ’ and is ‘unnatural \  issues which find no place in purely scientific think­
ing. While experts spoke about the environment in largely physical and/or spatial 
terms and focused on the agricultural application of GM, for lay participants, nature 
had broader connotations, many with affective overtones. When discussing GM food 
risk lay participants were concerned with the relationship of humanity and nature, the 
prevailing perception being that one should not change nature in unnatural ways. Of­
ten participants used ‘messing with nature ’ as a clinching argument which required no 
further elaboration. In this sense, nature is associated with a deontological position in 
that it is wrong to mess with nature in any circumstances.
This was coupled with an idealistic view of nature, where everything fits together in 
harmony and hence should not be disturbed. This romantic rather than Darwinian rep­
resentation of nature may serve group identity, justify environmental advocacy or
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simply serve the attitudinal function of evaluating GM (Bauer et al, 1999). Experts on 
the other hand appreciated that modem agriculture and food production is no longer 
natural, however, it is doubtful whether this viewpoint could alleviate public fears at 
all, as lay participants perceived GM as another step in the wrong direction.
In particular, lay participants rejected the idea of mixing species that could not occur 
through natural selection. In this way, plant to plant transfer might be acceptable but 
combining plant and animal genes would transgress natural boundaries. It is a cultural 
taboo36, whereby mixing different species is perceived as unacceptable, which relates 
back to the fear of monstrosity as suggested by Wagner et al (2004). Participants have 
a moral concern about interfering with nature, and of transgressing natural boundaries 
by unnatural means. By changing the nature/essence of our food, GM food transcends 
those natural boundaries, making it appear risky. In comparison to other alterations of 
food (such as pesticides) the taboo here is that the essence of the food is changed by 
inserting a foreign element, rather than something being added on, which can be 
‘washed o ff. In that sense, the perceived contamination goes to the core and cannot 
be readily decontaminated.
In relation to contamination, food may be a special issue in the way its risks are per­
ceived because incorporating dangerous substances into the body, such as through eat­
ing is often more profound than many other types of behaviour involving risks as it 
breaches the boundary between the body and the external world (Rozin and Fallon, 
1987). Some further reasons for the particularities of food risk perception are eluci­
dated in the second part of the research.
Due to its food-specificity, for lay participants, the risk of GM food was frequently 
anchored in BSE risk. In this context, Slovic’s (1987) characterisation of the dimen­
sions of risk shows that both risks have various dimensions in common, such as their 
involuntariness and dreaded consequences. BSE also clearly contributed to the de­
struction of public trust in regulation. While experts viewed the case of BSE as an ex­
ception, lay participants saw it as representative illustration of what is wrong with our
36 Indicating the cultural and social construction of boundaries and taboos, in eastern cultures the mix 
of species is often viewed more positively, as man-animal combinations (such as the sphinx or various 
Hindi godly creatures) are seen as possessing the wisdom of both creatures.
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food today. Food production seems to have become stigmatised in the UK due to 
BSE, foot-and-mouth, the addition of hormones, and other scandals. As suggested by 
Zwart (2000), lay participants were concerned with the unnaturalness of modem food 
and food production methods in general, not only the application of GM. These find­
ings provided the basis for the second research stage which aimed to contextualise 
GM food representations by looking at other food- and nature-related ‘objects’.
9.2 Conclusions Part I
With reference to Fleck (1935), the results indicate that expert and lay participants 
often employ different thought styles based on different underlying values when 
thinking about GM food risk, making communication between the scientific and the 
more intuitively common sense language challenging. Evidently, these barriers need 
to be broken down to facilitate more productive communications.
Reflecting back on the problems of risk communication outlined in Chapter Two, it is 
evident that the only problems that the CMU approach could help to alleviate are 
those related to the content of the message. In effect, in relation to GM food risk, all 
that the approach can do is to show how the lay mental model differs from those of 
the experts. But understanding expert and lay risk perceptions in line with the CMU 
approach is only a valuable first step and not sufficient to resolve the social contro­
versy over GM food.
The controversy arises precisely because GM food risks are in part social. They are 
representations that have socio-cultural and value dimensions. If one looks at the dif­
ferent dimensions of GM food risk, it is apparent that the scientific dimensions are 
less problematic than the social and moral ones. For lay participants, a far wider range 
of issues come into play beyond the scientific risk of GM foods, which indeed is not 
the greatest concern. The gap between expert and lay knowledge may be a challenge 
to effective communication but not necessarily the major one.
Rather, there are two other key hurdles to risk communication: problems related to 
trust and lay concerns about non-scientific issues, such as social values and concep­
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tions of nature. Because these are social and societal issues, they cannot be resolved 
through the application of the science based CMU approach alone. Thus the following 
section shows how, for the study of GM food risk, the CMU approach benefited from 
being synthesised with social representations theory.
*
9.3 Conceptual implications for risk communication
Recognising that GM food risk is not just a scientific reality but, at least in part, a so­
cial construction has two important conceptual implications for risk communication. 
Firstly, it means that one needs to move beyond the information deficit model towards 
an approach that appreciates the social correctness of lay views. Secondly, character­
ising risk representations as social, i.e. shared, means appreciating their social and 
cultural origins. In turn, this implies that individual attitudinal change approaches 
alone may be insufficient for addressing this risk.
9.3.1 From mental models to social representations of GM food
The CMU approach assumes that risk perceptions are individual and factual. Yet the 
results show that the issues lay people are particularly concerned about are societal 
and representational. This is illustrated by Wagner and Kronberger (2001) who argue 
that rather than material coping focusing on the technical risks, lay participants cope 
symbolically by putting GM food into its wider societal context to try to understand 
what it all means for humanity and nature.
This shows the benefits of synthesising the CMU approach with SRT. By characteris­
ing representations as social, SRT indicates that they are symbolic and always influ­
enced by culture, the wider social environment, memories and so on (Moscovici, 
1984). Hence it is appreciated that GM food risk emerges socially and collectively, 
rather than scientifically and individually. When looking at GM food from a SRT 
viewpoint, it becomes clear that representations are more than a system of images in­
herited from culture. Rather they are the result of lay participants’ confrontation with 
and coming to terms with the social object “GM food”.
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For example, there is no scientific link between BSE and GM food at all, but lay par­
ticipants still make that link. Thus it can be argued that individuals do not make the 
judgement after reading scientific literature alone but rather through communication 
with others. Therefore GM food risk representations are social in part because they 
derive from ongoing interaction within society, within interpersonal communication, 
the mass media and societal institutions, rather than from individuals forming their 
thoughts in isolation and on the basis of scientific knowledge alone.
9.3.2 IVfoving beyond the information deficit model
The finding that individuals are not forming their thoughts on the basis of scientific 
knowledge alone presents a challenge for the CMU approach. The CMU approach is 
comparable to the information deficit model in that it assumes that problems in risk 
communication are solely due to a science-deficit in lay people. Consequently, the 
approach aims to provide the public with more facts as agreed by experts, with these 
facts tailored to the particular audience. It is still primarily a top-down approach be­
cause it seeks to bridge the expert-lay gap by bringing public opinion more in line 
with that of the experts.
But lay people have moral and ethical concerns that cannot be answered by science 
alone. Rather than a knowledge deficit, the problem is a moral/ethical deficit. Thus 
since the CMU approach discounts all the non-scientific issues which are of major 
importance for lay participants the approach by itself is insufficient to effectively 
communicate about the risks of GM foods. In agreement with Joffe (2003), the fact 
that GM is perceived as unnatural indicates that people’s anxieties based on society’s 
values are at least as important as cognitive strategies and errors in information proc­
essing for representing this risk.
Whilst the CMU approach can be criticised as a top-down approach regarding lay risk 
perceptions as (potentially) incorrect beliefs that need to be corrected, SRT does not 
define these perceptions as inherently faulty but instead regards them as socially cor­
rect in their own sense, because they are functional in everyday life. In this way, SRT 
changes the perspective on lay knowledge from “deviant” to legitimate risk represen­
tations.
251
Thus SRT offers an alternative to the information-deficit model by showing that 
rather than erroneous knowledge, lay participants’ extra-scientific concerns express 
ways of understanding GM food. For example, participants’ feelings of being con­
spired against and lied to do not have a scientific but rather a societal basis, emerging 
from past and present political, social and technological developments. These are 
concerns which no amount of scientific evidence could refute and which cannot be 
alleviated with the provision of more information alone as the CMU approach would 
suggest.
Accordingly scientists cannot by themselves be the driving force for a risk communi­
cation as it is essential to include other factors apart from the scientific risk in a com­
munication. In order to communicate it also needs to be established what ‘facts’ are 
on the ground. Indeed, it seems impossible to communicate GM food risk effectively 
without understanding what constitutes risk for lay people. In this sense, as suggested 
by SRT it might be beneficial to first study lay people in order to understand the 
common sense knowledges of GM food. This would not only be valuable for lay peo­
ple trying to get their concerns understood but equally, may be beneficial for scientific 
experts and policy makers because
“Ordinary people’s reactions to current environmental issues sometimes 
remind us o f  fundamental values or plain wisdom that can he forgotten in 
‘sophisticated' policy analysis. ”
(Kempton et al, 1995; p.2)
9.3.3 Changing risk beliefs
The recognition that risk representations are social rather than individual phenomena 
presents a further challenge for the CMU approach because the approach aims to 
change individual beliefs. But reflecting on the controversial areas in expert and lay 
mental models of GM food, it is evident that individual beliefs are not the main obsta­
cle to communicating about this risk. Rather, the issue is one of norms and values 
which are collectively shared and socially constituted. Hence the specific beliefs 
emerge out of the normative and value positions. In this way, representations of GM 
food are the outcome of group processes and legitimised as such.
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In turn, this has implications for the stability and resistance to change of risk represen­
tations and for the way risk can be communicated. Because GM food risk representa­
tions reflect the cultural and social environment of which people are a part, it becomes 
clear why changing them is much harder to accomplish than changes in individual 
attitudes.
By recognising the social origins of risk representations, SRT gives a better under­
standing of the intersection between individual and group beliefs than the CMU ap­
proach alone and at the same time, potentially a better chance of devising ways of 
changing beliefs and attitudes. A necessary precursor to any intervention is to under­
stand why the risk is represented in a particular way (Breakwell, 2001). Taking sys­
tematic account of the personal and cultural concerns of the target audience (Break- 
well, 2001), SRT may provide this vital insight. For example, to develop risk commu­
nication interventions, it seems that one would need to address the socio-cultural 
bases of people’s risk representations.
In this way, when compared to the CMU approach, SRT may offer a better direction 
for risk research as it can indicate where risk beliefs come from and how best to 
communicate and (if this is the aim of the risk communication) change them.
9.3.4 “Socialising” mental models of risk
To reflect back on our research framework, for the study of risk at least, it seems that 
it is not useful to adhere to one particular methodological approach single-handedly. 
Theories and methodologies are rarely “right” or “wrong” per se. Rather one has to 
look at how they fit in the particular context.
For the in depth exploration of expert and lay GM food risk representations, it is evi­
dent that SRT can offer a valuable addition to the CMU approach by contextualising 
risk perceptions and thus effectively “socialising” mental models. Rather than focus­
ing on the perceived “deficiencies” of the lay public and viewing them as (cognitive) 
limitations of human nature, SRT takes a more holistic approach, highlighting the im­
portance of the social context of risk beliefs.
253
Thus in the case of a societal risk such as GM food which is part of society’s collec­
tive consciousness the framework can offer a different, bigger and more complete risk 
representation than mental models alone. Looking at lay representations as another 
construction of reality and from a perspective that recognises their sense-making 
value, their social, if not their scientific correctness is apparent.
In this regard, SRT provides a superior conceptualisation of beliefs and value systems 
to mental models. The CMU approach works well only as long as lay people are 
solely concerned about the scientific facts of a risk, and as long as experts can provide 
answers to those. Yet in the case of GM food, where facts are often still unclear, un­
der investigation, and changeable, or when lay people raise questions about non­
technical issues, the CMU approach alone is insufficient.
Accordingly, for the study of GM food risk at least, it is clearly beneficial, and even 
necessary, to move from the prevalent individualistic to more social approaches. By 
providing a sociological form of social psychology and moving away from the cogni­
tive and individualistic biases of mental models, SRT helps to progress in this direc­
tion. Thus far, it is still a novel approach to risk communication, but the present thesis 
shows how this framework can be applied in practise.
9.4 Overview of findings: Part II
Regarding non-scientific risk dimensions, the first part of the research showed that 
one reason lay participants resist GM foods, is because they regard them as ‘unnatu­
ra l’, and as going ‘against nature \  Although previous studies (e.g. Sjoeberg, 2000; 
2002; 2003) indicate that ‘messing with nature ’ is an important concept in explaining 
perceived risk, this issue had not yet been investigated in depth. The free associations 
task of the present study aimed to remedy this shortcoming, by looking at the ways in 
which nature and naturalness are constructed in relation to food.
Thus the objective of the second part was to establish what people mean when they 
say that GM food is unnatural and what frames of reference and anchors are used to 
make this judgement. This was done by putting GM food perceptions into the context
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of other food- and nature-related ‘objects’. 188 lay respondents completed an internet- 
administered free associations task. Using a split-ballot design respondents were 
asked to freely associate to the stimulus words food in general and GM food, or natu­
ral things and natural food. The resulting data was analysed with correspondence and 
cluster analysis. The findings are discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. Thus in the fol­
lowing section we focus on contextualising GM food representations by looking at the 
importance of the social significance of food, the contrast between the natural and the 
unnatural, and what nature actually means for people.
9.4.1 Food is a social concern
Associations to food in general' evoked a broad range of activities, such as ‘eating’, 
‘cooking’, and ‘going to a restaurant’. Also, food was often represented in terms of 
positive emotions, such as ‘pleasure ’ and ‘love ’. Being associated with social events 
and culture, family and friends, as proposed by Rozin (1999) the social significance of 
food is evident and far outweighed its nutritional aspects. The results show that food 
is not just food. Rather, eating is a cultural activity that can be a source of pleasure as 
well as of concern. In line with Herzlich (1973) food is not solely a material but rather 
a social object because of what it signifies for human beings. This social significance 
associated with food may indeed make food risk communication particularly chal­
lenging, as it is a further issue that goes beyond the scientific dimensions of the risk.
Associations to GM food offer a stark contrast to all the other stimulus words. By and 
large GM food associations are rated more negatively. Few associations are connected 
to the socio-cultural symbolisms of eating. Essentially, GM food was simply not asso­
ciated with eating and any of its broader meanings. Rather than food-related images, 
GM food representations were anchored in images of future ’, ‘progress ’, and ‘sci­
ence ’, as well as ‘government lies ’ and ‘capitalism ’. Couching GM food in scientific, 
social and political terms shows that these are social, rather than individual, represen­
tations, emerging through society and culture.
As in the first part of the research, respondents associated GM food with significant 
risks- to human health, the environment and third world exploitation. On the other 
hand, in contrast to the focus group participants, the results also showed that respon-
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dents were often ambivalent towards GM food, perceiving both risks and benefits 
(such as ‘helping the third world9) of the technology.
Thus rather than being anti-science, participants were concerned with one particular 
technological application of science that is likely to influence society’s food produc­
tion and consumption processes. Maybe because food is a social object, science does 
not seem to have a place in the realm of food, which as the positive associations to 
‘natural fo o d ’ indicate is much preferred to be natural and pure.
9.4.2 The natural versus the unnatural
GM food characteristics visibly contrast with those of food in general and natural 
food. GM food was perceived as ‘unhealthy', and ‘unnatural' in contrast to ‘healthy ' 
and ‘as nature in te n d e d Strikingly, for all other stimulus words ‘health ' is an impor­
tant association signifying that health is natural, and that food in general is associated 
with being healthy. Also, ‘eating' is considered a ‘natural thing'. In this way, GM 
may stop this activity from being natural. The perceived unnaturalness of GM thus is 
a challenge to what people think food ought to be, contrasting with its natural state. 
Hence “the unnatural” is a characterisation of those situations, beliefs and actions that 
are other than normal in some negatively evaluated way. In this sense, “the unnatural” 
is counter to a framework of normative assumptions, i.e. beliefs and expectations of 
how things ought to be.
This implies that GM food is judged against a background of norms, values and as­
sumptions about the nature of humans and their relationship with the environment. 
For instance, the naturalness of food is associated with harmonious relations between 
humanity and nature. On the other hand, the unnaturalness of GM food is the result of 
humanity “messing with nature” through the application of science. Thus judgements 
about the naturalness of food clearly are not simple assessments of the physical es­
sence of food. Rather they are the result of evaluations of complex relations between 
individuals, society and nature.
Wagner et al (2001) suggests that positive evaluations of natural foods are not solely 
based on nutritional concerns, rather the more important aspects may be the ideologi­
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cal and value conflicts it reflects. For example, the contrasting associations to natural 
food such as on the one hand ‘McDonalds' and (de-naturalised fo o d ’ (rated very 
negatively) and on the other hand fair trade ’ and *organic ’ (rated very positively) 
show that respondents make an ethical judgement against the unnaturalness of modem 
food production and consumption methods. Likewise, rather than reflecting health or 
environmental aspects, concerns about the unnaturalness of GM food may be more 
accurately seen as ways of expressing values, as GM food is associated with for ex­
ample exploitation and capitalism. These are not material dimensions of the food per 
se but respondents associate these issues with GM food. In this sense, food is a moral 
and political issue symbolising of a broad range of societal concerns.
When compared to other foods it is evident that the dominant images of GM food rep­
resent attempts to construct a clear distinction between the natural and the unnatural. 
Saying that GM food is unnatural is an ethical judgement presenting a metaphor for 
saying that “GM is a harmful intervention”. Despite its ambiguity, the concept of the 
natural vs. the unnatural provides a common socially constructed anchor for under­
standing GM food risk, with which participants drew the boundary between what is 
acceptable and unacceptable.
This drawing of boundaries provides a basis for separating the “good” from the “bad”. 
Identifying the natural with the good is reassuring in our complex and uncertain world 
and simplifies the GM food issue, enabling people not to think about other issues. 
Contrasting GM foods to other foods by describing GM as *unnatural ’ offered an un­
ambiguous evaluation for participants, legitimising their judgement that GM is not 
right, and explaining why GM is not wanted. Rather than measurable scientific as­
sessments, perceiving GM food as unnatural and contaminated are social representa­
tions of GM food.
Moreover, the lack of commonalities of associations to GM food and other stimulus 
words show that these constructs are perceived as contrasting realms. In effect there is 
a perceived dichotomy between technology (in our case GM) and nature. As sug­
gested by Luhmann (1993), the technology here is viewed in terms of it being distinct 
from nature. Nature is what emerges and passes of its own accord. Technology is the 
making of an object or a state deviating from what nature would have brought forth
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itself. Nature might fail to achieve its state of perfection if its normal course is dis­
turbed, but a technology can exist- or not (Luhmann, 1993). In that way, for lay peo­
ple it makes sense to resist the application of GM technology to our foods.
9.4.3 Affective and symbolic dimensions of nature
In contrast to most previous research which imposed researchers’ definitions of na­
ture, the free associations task allowed participants to construct their own definitions 
of the concept. This showed that there is much more to nature than its physical es­
sence. Rather, associations highlighted the symbolic and affective dimensions of the 
concept. Thus from a psychological perspective, nature has to be viewed as being 
symbolically constituted rather than merely given, indicating that previous approaches 
to nature (such as those from environmental psychology) are insufficient to investi­
gate what people really mean when they speak about ‘messing with nature ’.
Frequent associations to natural things were states of nature, such as 'purity ' and 
'harmony \  as well activities such as ‘eating’ and *smiling\ and words related to 
'people ’ and 'love', essentially all very positive images. Hence 'messing with nature ’ 
goes against some fundamental values, against some fundamental part of people’s be­
lief systems. It is a partly social rather than purely physical concern that describes for 
example the destruction of harmony and the contamination of purity. Thus by moving 
from a positive to a negative condition 'messing with nature ’ may signify danger.
Looking at values related to nature, with reference to the value-belief-norm model by 
Stem et al (1994; 1995) as outlined in Chapter Seven, it seems that egoistic, altruistic 
and biospheric values all play a role in GM food risk representations. When thinking 
about GM food people are concerned with the personal costs (e.g. that it is ‘danger­
ous ' and ‘unhealthy ’), with the costs to others (e.g. that it is a form of 'exploitation ’) 
as well as with the costs for all living things (e.g. the 'environmental risks ’ and ‘un­
known long-term consequences’). As suggested by Kortenkamp (2001), in the present 
results the separation between these environmental values is not unambiguous but 
rather a combination of all. Clearly, these issues need to be investigated in more 
depth, as how our relationship with nature is perceived is likely to influence how we
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solve societal and environmental problems, and how to proceed with other novel 
technologies.
9.5 Conclusions Part II
In contrast to the focus group results of the first research stage, the findings of the free 
associations task show that lay participants, also associate GM food with significant 
benefits. Thus lay people’s resistance to GM food is unlikely to be solely due to the 
lack of perceived benefits as suggested by Gaskell et al (2004). In turn, this leads to 
the question of whether there is something special about food risk that may not be 
shared by other risks. With the free associations results highlighting the social signifi­
cance of food as well as the importance of the construction of naturalness in relation 
to food, it seems that as suggested in Chapter Two, food risk may indeed be a special 
issue for risk communication.
Reflecting back on constructions of nature and naturalness in relation to food it is evi­
dent that these are social representations as they are the emerging property of social 
interaction and communication. The social and affective dimensions which both food 
and nature symbolise are at least as important in structuring people’s representations, 
as any physical attributes. Because food is a topic of great social significance, con­
cerns about food are social issues that go far beyond its scientific-nutritional aspects. 
Rather than being anchored solely in nutrition, food is more often represented in terms 
of its social relations, and shown to be a concept laden with affect.
GM food was not represented in terms of socio-cultural factors related to eating. 
Rather than being represented as a food with all the social significance this entails, 
GM food was perceived as a scientific application. And because of that, it has no 
space in the realm of food, which is preferred to be ‘as nature intended' and ‘straight 
from the farmer \
The representation of GM as unnatural is the result of social and societal norms and 
values rather than any scientific information. This implies that an in-depth under­
standing of the science of GM would not necessarily change lay participants’ repre­
sentations of the issue. Indeed, a better understanding of the scientific dimensions of
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GM food would be insufficient to resolve the controversy as lay concerns about GM, 
food and nature cannot be easily put in scientific terms. Both food and nature are so­
cial and representational, rather than solely material, issues because of what they sig­
nify to respondents. Therefore, a constructivist approach, such as SRT, provides a 
useful challenge to the dichotomy between nature and society, by showing that (and 
how) lay people’s understandings of food and nature are, at least in part, socially con­
stituted.
Thus the present findings echo an important lesson for risk communication as pro­
posed by Leiss and Powell (1997; p.220): "There is always more to an issue that what 
science says ”. Especially food is no ordinary commodity. Because it has a high status 
in culture as well as human nutrition it cannot be approached as a mixture of chemical 
compounds (Leiss et al, 1997). Lay people have more complex associations, such as 
about natural goodness and purity which cannot be adequately addressed from a tradi­
tional positivist framework. By ignoring these broader societal considerations, and 
implicitly denying their legitimacy, the communicators of GM may actually have am­
plified anxieties and mistrust (Leiss et al, 1997).
9.6 Limitations of the study and avenues for further research
Before looking at what these findings may imply for risk communication, we briefly 
outline some limitations of the present study which in turn open up avenues for fur­
ther research.
Regarding representations of GM food, we do not make any claims that representa­
tions are captured completely. But completeness is not always necessary- as stated in 
Chapter Three we take a more pragmatic view, focusing on the purposes and func­
tions of GM food representations for risk communication. We present particular rep­
resentations of GM food risk at one particular point in time. It is appreciated that as 
representations differ from one culture to another at the same point in time and from 
one point in time to another within the same culture (Farr, 1993b) it is not possible to 
replicate a study of social representations because they are particular and not univer­
sal.
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Looking back at the CMU approach to risk communication, the findings established 
that this approach does not work for GM food, but what about other technologies? 
Does the approach not work for value-laden technologies in general? Or does the 
CMU approach work for other technologies and not for food? The present research 
indicates that food may indeed be a special issue due to its social and moral signifi­
cance. Clearly, there is the need to apply the CMU approach to other technological as 
well as food risks.
Regarding nature, as the present results established ‘messing with nature ’ as an im­
portant dimension in lay GM food risk representations, there is a need to investigate 
this concept in relation to other technologies. For example, is this risk dimension as 
relevant in relation to white or red (as opposed to green) biotechnologies? Is it a risk 
dimension that is unique to food or general to technological innovation? Different 
risks may elicit different moral dilemmas.
Finally, nature in general has been insufficiently researched empirically, not just in 
relation to risk perception. As nature cannot be seen in rational/objective terms alone, 
a purely psychological perspective is insufficient. However, as shown in Chapter 
Seven, empirical research that approaches “nature” from a constructivist perspective 
or that combines both positivist and constructivist stances is still rare. The present 
findings stress the need for a more social psychological approach to nature that can 
incorporate the symbolic and affective dimensions of the concept. Evidently, there is a 
need to further investigate these issues in order to move beyond the exploratory re­
sults of the present study.
9.7 Practical implications for risk communication
Despite these limitations we can tentatively suggest a range of further implications for 
risk communication. We reflect back on the risk debate within the overall frameworks 
positivism and constructivism, before looking at what the present findings may mean 
for risk evaluation and risk communication. Recognising the validity of lay risk per­
ceptions of which non-technical dimensions such as values are an integral part implies
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that these have to be incorporated in the risk assessment. But incorporating moral and 
ethical dimension in addition to the scientific aspects of the risk poses various chal­
lenges to risk evaluation, and in turn, risk communication.
9.7.1 How to evaluate risk?
The present findings established that risk is in part a social construct. As such, it can 
never be fully objective as the positivists suggest. Risk is difficult to communicate 
precisely because it is always to some extent socially constructed. GM food risk, 
rather than being a neutral product of science, is intimately connected with values, 
morals, ethics, societal power relations and the wider social, cultural and historical 
contexts. This means that the risk cannot be reduced to its scientific dimensions as a 
range of other aspects, many of which were highlighted by our lay participants, need 
to be included in its evaluation. Science done cannot provide the answers to concerns 
over GM food as science cannot be the sole proprietor of moral reason.
In their chosen field of expertise, experts have, by definition, better knowledge than 
non-experts or novices. Yet they are not necessarily experts in other areas, and may 
even be inhibited to appreciate viewpoints not in line with their paradigm by being 
caught in the “prison of presupposition” (Markova, 1982). Most experts have only 
limited ability to appreciate the complexities that exist outside their own areas of ex­
pertise, while the real world is rarely sufficiently orderly to handle problems that stop 
within the boundaries of one’s own discipline (Freudenburg, 1992). Thus experts 
must acknowledge their own methodological assumptions, but as science is the defin­
ing paradigm of our age, this is often forgotten.
Science is not value-free, some active judgement is always involved, as expert dis­
agreements in the present study indicate. Thus it is a simplification of the issue to ac­
credit experts with objective and the lay public with subjective risk perception as even 
expert assessments of GM food risk incorporate an interpretative element. GM food is 
not just an objective or a subjective risk but a combination of the two. At least in rela­
tion to GM food risk, the objective and the scientific or the subjective and the moral 
can hardly be divided as both dimensions make up the representation of the risk.
262
9.7.2 Non-scientific dimensions in risk evaluation and communication
Thus rather than attempting to separate the subjective from the objective, it needs to 
be questioned how the “subjective” can be usefully included to improve communica­
tions. Taking lay perceptions and their divergent non-scientific reasonings seriously 
raises the difficult question of how to address what are effectively differences in 
moral reasoning between expert and lay people. Clearly, risk communication and con­
flict resolution are likely to be particularly challenging if stakeholders are speaking 
from different moral perspectives (Slovic and Peters, 1998). In these cases, scientific 
risk communications are only part of the solution for conflicts as a clearer understand­
ing of the “facts” is unlikely to resolve the underlying value disagreements.
Hence it is becoming increasingly clear that the deliberation of science-based issues 
and the formulation of policy can no longer be based on purely positivist risk assess­
ments. The public controversy surrounding GM food has shown that it is no longer 
possible to leave a societal risk solely in the exclusive realm of experts and politi­
cians. Public resistance has led to the recognition that the increasing pace of scientific 
development brings advances that raise novel complex social and ethical questions, 
which cannot be answered by science alone. Consequently it is vital to clarify how 
these subjective dimensions should be incorporated in a risk evaluation as the current 
uncertainties in risk assessment may also lead to uncertainty in policy making and 
vice versa.
Yet although the importance of including various dimensions apart from the scientific 
risk is evident, it is still unclear how ethical and moral dimensions should be incorpo­
rated in a risk communication, and what significance should be attached to these di­
mensions. Current research indicates that the public desires to include other factors 
apart from the scientific facts in policy making. While around 50% of the publics in 
Canada, the US and Europe prefer to see science policy made on the basis of scientific 
expertise and on the grounds of a scientific assessment of the risks and benefits, the 
other half of these publics want to see either more public engagement and/or the privi­
leging of ethical and moral issues in decision taking (Gaskell et al, 2005). Thus there 
is a clear need to consider the ethical, legal and social implications of technological 
innovation in addition to the science per se.
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9.7.3 Accommodating alternative rationalities
Our findings showed that the questions the public wants answered are often not tech­
nically about risk, but rather about non-scientific issues such as about values, trust as 
well as political and social control, and power relations in a democracy. And in a de­
mocracy, the public has the right of having their concerns taken seriously.
Thus in the case of societal risks involving moral and ethical concerns wider stake­
holder inclusion is necessary to understand the social sides of technological innova­
tion. As suggested by Funtowicz et al (1990) this democratisation of science may 
need to have extended peer communities and extended facts. This further democrati­
sation of science inevitably leads to challenges of public participation, where to date 
many unanswered questions remain. It is questionable how democratic risk communi­
cation is today and how democratic it should be as a more participatory model has a 
range of likely problems.
Looking back at Fischhoff s (1995) historical stages in risk communication, we are
tlireaching the 7 stage- ‘all we have to do is make them partners \  The question that 
arises is whether we are or should be equal partners, i.e. are all risk perceptions 
equally valid? It is still unclear how this partnership should evolve, to what extend 
expertise should be democratised and what role the public should play with regards to 
risk management. Should the democratisation of science follow the democratisation 
of the political system? A foremost problem is the tension between the need to rely on 
expert facts and the need to incorporate public values and preferences.
In essence, the major challenge is how to accommodate and integrate alternative 
forms of rationality. Many questions remain unanswered. For example, what weight 
should be attached to various stakeholders’ opinions, especially if these are without 
formal qualifications on the subject matter? Although this would bring about a de­
mocratisation of science, and bring science in the public debate, would this new form 
of practice still be science as we know it? At what stage of technological development 
should a risk communication take place, who are the interested parties, how and 
where should communications take place? Importantly, how are results implemented
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into policy making? Also, as the public is not a homogenous group, could one com­
munication work for all?37
At present, participative two-way dialogue is still in its infancy stage, and it remains 
to be seen how it will be developed and applied. It has to be established who the new 
participants are, how interactions should be managed and evaluated and importantly 
how non-scientific conflicts, such as those about values, should be resolved. Although 
increased public participation and the inclusion of alternative rationalities has the 
drawback of making risk management far more cumbersome, on the other hand, it 
could ensure that conflicts are resolved earlier on, making it cost-effective, especially 
when aiming to introduce an expensive new high technology. Commenting on the 
public controversy over GM, Bruce (2005) contends that:
“I f  nanotechnology is to avoid a similar waste o f  investment, we must find  
better ways o f incorporating basic values and seeing where there are syn­
ergies with society and disjunctions. ”
(Bruce, 2005; p.21)
9.8 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, the present thesis established how different people make sense of a par­
ticular new technology, namely the genetic modification of foods, and showed that lay 
perceptions can be viewed as rational in their social-cultural contexts. Regarding lay 
perceptions as justified implies that they have to be taken seriously. In turn, taking lay 
views seriously means that it is impossible to avoid confronting the issues as they are 
posed in society, not only how they appear in science-based risk assessments. Thus in 
the words of Leiss et al (1997; p.223) one important lesson for risk communication is 
that: “risk messages should address directly the ‘contest o f opinion ’ in society ”.
37 At present, various research projects of the 6th framework programme aim to address a range of the­
matic areas within the science and society realm. For instance, the PATH (Participatory Approaches in 
Science and Technology, executed from 2004-2007) project investigates how to best represent a di­
verse and diffuse public as well as ‘silent voices’ (such as those of future generations).
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As the GM food controversy has shown that public resistance can hinder the introduc­
tion of a new technology it is evident that new ways of risk assessment and risk com­
munication have to be found. There is a clear need for some democratisation of sci­
ence involving more and better public consultations. In light of the potential introduc­
tions of other new high technologies which can be very costly public opinion has to 
be gauged before investing, and public fears have to be understood, in order to shape 
the trajectory of the technology in a more acceptable way.
Today, risk communication strategies are undergoing many changes, and in relation to 
the ever evolving societal risks, will likely continue to do so. Risk perception has 
come a long way since the public were simply described as “irrational”. The long 
prevalent information-deficit model has become discredited as it is understood that 
solely providing scientific information is insufficient to alleviate lay concerns. Rather, 
it is now acknowledged that communication needs to be a two-way process incorpo­
rating lay views that may not be in line with orthodox science. The difficulty is how 
to proceed when scientific rationality which has been the dominant marker for deci­
sion making in the past century is questioned from a moral or ethical perspective for 
which traditional science does not have the answers. Although there are still compet­
ing paradigms, boundaries seem to be blurring with the recognition that risk is at least 
partially a social construct. Clearly, although positivist science cannot simply be re­
placed as the dominant paradigm, it needs to be complemented. Regarding GM food 
risk at least, the technical, rational understanding of truth and knowledge needs to be 
supplemented with social, cultural, moral and ethical dimensions to provide a more 
complete representation of the risk.
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APPENDIX A: EXPERT INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE
Expert interview topic guide
This interview is divided into two parts. First, I would like to ask you about the current and potential 
developments related to GM foods in general Second, I would like to ask you some more specific ques­
tions about particular issues.
Current developments
• What are the current developments in relation to GM foods?
• What do you regard as the most important developments?
• What are the potential developments?
• What do we know about the risks and benefits for the consumer?
• What do we know about the risks and benefits for the environment?
• How certain are you about... ?
• What are the areas of uncertainty?
• What, if any, issues are you personally concerned about?
Particular foods
• How far advanced are future developments, such as particular pharmafoods?
• What are their risks and benefits?
• The research by Dr. Pusztai’s research indicated that GE potatoes harmed rats. 
What do you think about these findings?
• Do you see any problems related to specific GM foods, such as GE salmon?
Allergenic potential of GM foods
• Is there the potential for consumers to develop new food allergies (or any other 
illnesses) in relation to GM foods?
• In which ways could the genetic modification of foods enhance allergenic po­
tential?
• How much (if at all) more research is required to facilitate better risk assess­
ments?
Genetic interactions
• Do you think that organisms produced using GM techniques may have unexpected 
novel properties in addition to those which are being deliberately introduced?
• What, if any, is the evidence that unexpected effects can arise from the use of 
GM techniques?
• Can these unexpected effects be adequately addressed by the current regula­
tory system for foods produced from or containing GMOs?
Food safety/regulation
• Is the current regulation in place sufficient to ensure the safety of GM foods?
• What is your perspective on the use of substantial equivalence a basis for GM 
food risk assessment?
• How are GM foods labelled at the moment?
• What is your opinion on the labelling of GM foods?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Thank you very much for your interview.
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APPENDIX B: FOCUS GROUP TOPIC GUIDE
Focus group topic guide
This focus group is part o f my PhD research on risk perception o f GM foods. I ’m interested in how you 
think about these issues. Don’t worry about whether your ideas are right or wrong. I'm interested in 
everything you think about this and want you to say everything you think relevant to these issues. We ’re 
beginning with some very general questions, before I move on to some specifics.
Introduction
• When I bring up the word GM foods, what kinds of thought does this bring to 
your mind?
• What is your opinion on GM foods?
• What are your hopes and concerns in relation to GM foods?
Basic prompts:
Anything else?
Can you tell me more?
Don ’t worry about whether i t ’s right, just tell me what comes to mind.
Can you explain why?
Who else has some thoughts about this?
You’ve been discussing several different ideas- what haven't we heard yet?
Risks of GM food
• What have you heard about GM food risks, for yourself, for others, for the envi­
ronment?
• How significant a risk are GM foods in your opinion?
• Do you think GM food poses risks for public health?
• Do you think GM food poses environmental risks?
• Do you think the introduction of GM crops might have an impact on biodiver­
sity?
Benefits of GM food
• What do you know about the benefits of GM foods, for yourself, for others, for the 
environment?
• What do you think about potential benefits, e.g. nutritional, financial?
• Through GM scientists are trying to develop draught resistant crops. This would 
for example make it possible to grow these crops in very dry climates. What is 
your view on such issues?
• Do you think GM crops might be beneficial for the environment?
• Have you heard of the development of herbicide tolerant and insecticide resis­
tant crops, what are your views on...?
Risk assessment and management
• What do you know about the UK regulatory procedures with regards to GM 
foods?
• What areas are you uncertain about? What kind of information would you like to 
have?
Is there anything you would like to add which hasn’t been addressed?
Thank you very much for your participation.
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APPENDIX C: ALCESTE REPRESENTATIVE ECUs
Elite interviews: Representative ECUs
Cle selectionnee: (A) Regulation
380 56 what processes have been #involved in the #production of 
#foods not #simply what are the final #ingredients. the #label is not 
ttcompulsory, it_s voluntary in most cases, where they #derive from 
maize and #soya, #currently in #europe you do have to '#label. but you 
only #label when there is #detectable dna from the #gm #origins.
443 42 you can think of #gm_j?roducts or #products ttderived #using
#gm_technology that would be advantageous in #terms of #lower #proc- 
essing #costs, and subject to the economics of the #food #chain that 
might be passed on to the #consumer in #significant measure.
356 35 but there have been #gm_foods on the #market, including
#gm_ingredients, #therefore #gm_foods, and there are at the moment. 
DAB: anything that #contains maize and #soya #derivatives and flour 
or #oils which is used #extensively in #food #processing.
266 33 then of icourse people always #argue that #usa has not had
any of the sort of #food #scares, such as #bse, #foot_and_mouth, and 
#others. and #therefore there is just a more #positive #acceptance in 
the #usa. well, it #slightly #depends on what you mean with 
#gm_foods.
358 33 but from a #consumer_s #point of #view they are concerned
not only about the #composition but about the #origins of the 
#gm_ingredients. the result of this is being that #retailers, at 
least in the #uk, have sought non_gm_sourcess of maize and #soya from 
which to get their #derivatives to go into their #processed #foods.
448 31 so that would be a #similar example, my #view is that the
ttanalysis of risk should emphasise the #nature of the #product rather 
than the #process. secondly, what is the ttcomparative for #relative 
risk? and it #seems to me the most logical #comparator would be 
#equivalent #products generated by #conventional #breeding.
444 28 well, the #usa, and I believe Canadian agencies as well, em­
phasise the #nature of the #product not the #process by which it is 
generated, and #therefore if a #product can be shown to be identical 
in #respect of not being distinguishable #relative to the #compara- 
tive #product from a #non_gm #breeding programme, then there is no 
ttrequirement to #label as such.
360 26 and that_s why a lot of #processed #foods will #say no
#gm_ingredients or no gmo, because they feel under their sourcing 
they can #provide that. although that #depends on the adequacy of the 
#testing. well, you have to ttdefine then what a #gm_food is. because 
I have not even #included.
274 25 and as soon as it became #clear that a #significant #pro-
portion of people did not #want them and were very very vocal in op­
position to them on #simple grounds, it was #fairly #obvious that the 
#retailers and #manufacturers were loosing the battle.
350 25 the ending of #substantial_equivalence as a baseline for
whether or not to review a #novel #food, which has been #gm, is in
the #current #eu legislation, which is being passed as we speak.
447 22 the most #obvious one here is #food #irradiation. if you 
look at the #product, you might come to one #set of conclusions in 
#terms of public #acceptance, if the focus is on the #process it 
turns out in #terms of public #acceptance, the public does not want 
it.
462 22 where I do think it becomes a problem is where you have
this issue that there is no #simple dipstick #test at the #point of
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purchase for the #consumer or the #food #retailer to #say whether 
something is #indeed #gm or not.
268 19 equally then there are various #products, which #contain
the #oil of #gm_j?roducts so you can quite legally #sell #foods #con- 
taining #gm_soya and so on. but of #course what happened is that all 
the #larger #retailers have done their utmost to try and ensure that 
they do not #sell such #products.
348 19 well, #currently with #gm_foods there is #european legisla­
tion, which is recasting for the #foods the final #food #products the 
#basis under which they are #tested. previously this assessment had 
been #based on #substantial_equivalence, those #equivalent to 
non_gm_food ttequivalents.
434 19 the problem with that is then of #course that from a regu­
latory perspective the only way that you can ascertain whether a #ca- 
nola #oil is #derived from a #gm #bred #canola plant or not there is
no #simple dipstick in the #supermarket to #test it.
446 19 and where you have a #processed #product like #sunflower
#oil or a #canola #oil, there is no #simple dipstick #test. and that
then creates a regulatory issue and there is some disagreement be­
tween the #uk #govemment, perhaps one or two #others, and the #eu 
right now.
362 18 so there is #extensive pervasion of #gm_ingredients, not
just in #terms of the #food #product but also #terms of the actual 
#processing agents. #gm_foods do exist it_s just a question of how 
one #wants to ttdefine it. not much, they are #novel, they are new, 
there have been no clinical trial undertaken, no large samples taken, 
no #control #groups so we do not know anything.
133 17 well, before this skilful #campaign was #exercised, there
was a #gm_product that was on sale in the #uk in #safeway #shops and 
in ttsainsbury #shops. and it was small cans of #tomato_j?uree, promi­
nently #labelled _made with gm_tomatoes_. and it was on sale for 
three years, alongside #conventional cans of #tomato_j?uree.
182 17 ttfood #products. and #therefore they #say in their #press
release, this gives the #possibility of #manufacturers avoiding hav­
ing to #say _may #contain #peanuts_. does it? think about it. does it 
leave that #possibility? RB: but now they #say _we can #test to show 
that there isn_t any peanut there_.
Cle selectionnee: (B) Risk
66 70 and that_s #somewhere #else in the #body but there is no
#evidence at all that they are #put #into the #gene #material. if 
they were, you know you and I after #eating #potatoes for 400 years, 
might expect to #find #potato #genes in our #guts.
455 35 now the #question then becomes, is there, because of the
#potential to #put in a #gene from a #different #species #into a 
crop, does that #create any special #hazard?
202 34 #you_ve #inserted one #gene in a particular #place. or
maybe two, but one is the typical thing. #actually, with the 
golden_rice it_s three or four, but never mind. you_re splitting spe­
cific #genes and #putting them #into specific #places in the #dna. so 
you_re #targeting very precisely.
577 34 but the #question is how much research do you need to do
before you make a #decision? and that_s a political #question, that_s 
not a science #question. the other point I_d like to make is that if 
#you_d #actually want to do some of these #experiments which are very 
important in #risk #assessment say for example #you_d want to #assess 
how #gene #transfer from a crop to a #wild #plant would #affect the/
702 34 and of course the #greenjparty and all those groups jumped
on that, but every test that was done subsequently has #shown that 
there were no allergies #related to starlink. always when you_re #in-
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serting a new ttprotein #into a #plant #you_ve got to ask the #ques- 
tion is there the #potential for an allergic response.
179 31 we can never evade all #risk ttcompletely. we can #take
#precautions but. so the #precautionary principle is really the other 
side of the coin of #risk #assessment. in other #words, we #assess 
the #risk, we ttidentify the #hazards that could lead to that #risk, 
we address them and try and solve them, try to #put in #measures that 
will prevent or #minimise them #happening, and it_s only when you 
have real,
510 31 it may be #dangerous with some #proteins. yes, I_ll give
you an example of that. there_s a lot of interest in ttputting #leci- 
thin #genes which are #toxic #into #potatoes for example, to #protect 
the ttpotato against insect attack.
505 28 it_s crazy when people say _oh, these new #dna #sequences
or #proteins are going to pose a #danger_. it is #actually #highly 
#unlikely. there are very few #proteins that are #toxic to human be­
ings, there are some, but they are mostly in crops that we do not 
#eat, or in #plants that we do not #eat.
65 24 but they are being #phased #out. now those have been added
but you can ttactually #track them quite carefully, you #heard #john 
heritage_s talk about his work, there is quite a lot of other work 
where people have traced radioactive labelled #genes through the 
#gut. well you can certainly #find bits of the #protein, and you 
#find bits are transported through the #gut wall, and you can #find 
them also in the #body.
69 23 and one particular one had been #introduced #into this
icom, and when they modelled it in three dimensions, they thought 
there might be an allergen present, as far as I_m #aware there is no 
#actual laboratory #evidence that it is an allergen, it is purely on 
the basis of #computer modelling.
215 23 and the #technique was to include an #antibiotic #marker,
you see, so that the #plants which had #taken, which were going to be 
successful, were resistant to the #organisms that were #affected by 
this #antibiotic, and the others that weren_t resistant,
113 20 but it_s all dynamic, your #risk #assessment needs to be
constantly updated and revised in the light of new knowledge, your 
#risk #communication is both before and after #decisions on #risk 
#management, and it_s still ongoing.
218 20 I_m not #aware of any problems of just ordinary gm_foods
#affecting people_s #genes or so. this was a set of #experiments to 
#assess the possible #value of #lecithin for gm.
512 20 so there are #dangers in #putting these #toxic #sequences
#into food #plants because they might get #into the human food chain, 
even though they are destined for industrial #purposes.
572 20 and he #put the pollen on the food #plant and he #found
that the larva died, now there was a huge amount of publicity about
that, poor #john was besieged in his lab for weeks by the #media. but 
all he had done was he #found a #hazard, a #potential #hazard, but it 
was no more than a #potential #hazard.
580 20 but they only/ just #managed to get permission to do that
in the usa, and they had to #put in a huge #number/ of #safety #meas- 
ures to #carry #out those #experiments.
456 18 my argument would be that relative to the creation to new
cultiva by wide crossing such as making #rice with a #wild #variety 
or even a #wild #species of #rice, where you_re #actually not #intro- 
duce one novel #gene, but mixing 50.
578 18 fix? of that #wild #plant in europe you could not do those
#experiments because the #regulatory ttsystem would not allow you to 
deliberately #put a trans #gene #into a #wild #plant and then #put it 
#out and see how it behaves.
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201 17 right. that_s the analogy I_m going to use. what they do in 
gm is to #cut a #gene #out of the #dna of #somewhere; something, and 
then that_s if you like the donor, then you go to the host #dna and 
you #cut and copy and paste what you #cut from the other one #into 
that #dna.
Cle selectionnee: (C) PUS
85 21 that is rice enriched with pro #vitamin_A, which would
#play a tremendous #part in preventing blindness in #children in 
southeast_asia. but there is #work going on, and this is with #micro 
#nutrients. A lot of the #problems with #world hunger. it_s not just 
quantity, it_s #quality and ttparticularly the lack of #micro #nutri- 
ents like #vitamins.
154 21 now they were beaten, perhaps because they did not have the
#internet in those days, I do not #know. but I #think that has 
#played a very #big #part.
171 19 the 8th of april is tuesday. so you see, we made a #mis-
take. #mistakes can happen. I #know #acnfp #pretty #well, I #know
some of the #people who are on it, and I #think they do a thorough 
and effective #job.
651 19 both #to #give supplements and #to #increase much more
mixed #diets #to fortify, so this isn_t a #problem that we do not 
#know how #to #solve very easily. I do not #know maybe golden_rice 
might #help. but if you #really wanted #to #improve #diet #people who 
have #vitamin_A #deficiency also #usually suffer from a range of 
other #micro #nutrient #deficiencies.
306 17 we #ought #to be #try #to #address both in terms of medi­
cines and #food_production the #world_s #really #big #health #issues.
and #private #companies, I certainly do not blame them, that_s not 
their #role, they can not #really.
752 17 I mean #george is one of my #favourite #social #scientists,
#george is very #objective and serious about it and isn_t involved in 
confusing campaigning with #social #science. anything you could do 
#to #challenge that and make #sure they are being more #objective 
would I #think #help. I wonder whether that_s because #george is not 
#part of their mafia.
91 15 not #true! what happened was, as #part of the, this was be­
ing done in conjunction with the #scientists at the #university of
nebraska which is the research center which #knows more about #aller- 
gens than #anybody else I #know the #people.
314 15 #well in the uk I have been #extremely #impressed at the
way the #fsa has gone. I mean, I ttthink it has done #extremely #well. 
,#nothing in life is ttabsolutely foolproof, but I happen #to have 
quite a lot of confidence in the #fsa. I do not #think in this #coun-
try we have a civil service such as defra, who are very #quick #to
#leam the lessons of previous food #problems.
169 14 I #think he is blind and selfish and a #politician. RB:
#well, the one I #spoke about was not a #committee, it was a research 
department which specialises in #allergy and they were #scientists 
doing tests.
191 14 but I #think there is no reason that I #know of no #factual
reason why #gm_crops should not be grown in the uk. RB: #well, this 
again is a #myth.
700 14 the #big #issue could be about #allergies if #people do not
test #things #sufficiently. but again I #think there are tests
#around now #to #check this out and it has #to be done on a lease by 
#case basis.
279 12 #well, as you #know although I was #originally a #scien-
tist, I now #work in the #social #sciences, and in the moral #phi- 
losophies, and I rather like #arguments about what is #necessary.
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304 12 #well there are lots of #issues. I mean, my own view is
that we have got the position now in the #world where short_term #to
medium term #commercial interests in #food_production are far more 
#important than #long_term #considerations,
714 12 so we just have some soundbites. I have great #arguments
with robin grove white, he accused me at the #last #meeting of being
arrogant. I_ll #send him a letter saying _you might #think I_m arro­
gant but I #think the way you_re deciding #things for other #people 
is the height of arrogance.
67 11 so we are back #to a #public #perception #issue in which
#people #think that gm genes will behave differently in kind from or­
dinary genes. and there is #absolutely no evidence for that at all. 
DB: oh #well, there was no evidence that it was going #to be #aller- 
gen even for #animals.
88 11 then there is #work on removing we hear a lot about the
possibility of #new proteins in gm #possibly being #allergen. now 
that_s #possible and there is a #famous #case where it was in #fact 
discovered as #part of the routine of #checking these #things.
136 11 they had a very #complex network of listings on the #inter-
net, which #somebody tipped me off about, and I watched how this was 
being plotted, it started in january 1999 and by may it had done its 
#job. it still #continued but it had #really done its #job by then, 
the whole of the #public #perception had being turned #right #around.
153 11 #well of course! but the #argument is. _not now but some­
time in the future_ is an #argument for* never, isn_t it? we never 
#know everything about anything, the same #argument was used in the 
first two #decades of the #last #century by the #people who #try #to 
prevent the legalisation of milk pasteurisation we do not #know the 
#long_term effects, it might be harmful, and so on.
190 11 oh, #greenpeace is very #wealthy. #well, for the #existing
foods, the #existing ones, #well, the field_trials are #partly #to 
ttdetermine this, predominately #environmentally. #well I #think as I 
have said that the testing needs #to go on, #to #continue, #to be 
#improved and #monitored #to see what happens.
Cle selectionnee: (D) Environment
536 4 9 it_s there all the time, but it_s not economically a #seri-
ous #pest in most cases there are only #small patches of it. but 
#herbicide #tolerance is the #main transformation that is #available, 
and #that_s the #main #type of #crop being #grown in the usa very 
#widely.
96 31 now #that_s another #way of doing it. and then there is
#research #going on on gm_foods that can #grow in #conditions that 
have been inhospitable to those #crops. #crops that can #grow on 
#salty #soils, making a #whole #lot of #land #available without en­
croaching on the wild #environment. #crops that will #grow on alumin­
ium #rich #soils, again making a lot of #arable #land #available that 
previously was not #arable #land.
534 30 those #crops are #widely #grown in the usa and there is a 
#small #amount of #bt #maize #that_s #grown in spain at the #moment 
on a commercial basis, but it_s only a very #small #amount.
533 25 so you can spray the #whole #field when the #crop is #grow-
ing with that particular #herbicide to kill the #weeds but the #crop 
itself is completely unharmed, the other #main #type of #crop that is 
being developed is #insect_resistant #crop using the #bt gene.
308 23 yes. the bit in me that is also rather keen on #biodiver-
sity is a #little bit #worried about that, not so much the #salty 
bit, quite a lot of ttarable #land has #become to #salty because of 
the #way the #crops have been #grown, so it would be quite useful to 
be #able to reclaim those #lands for #arable production.
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540 22 whether #farmers would do that we do not know, my intuition
tells me that they would not, they would #use the #trait to its maxi­
mum #ability. but we_ll have a bit more information of that later on 
in the #year when the #farm #scale evaluation #trials #results will 
be published in September, 2003.
546 22 it_s also #relevant to the #way in which our own #climate
is #changing where #crop growth is being #reduced often now because 
we have certain #years with very #long #drought periods.
437 21 #primarily at/ the #moment they are related to #pest #re-
sistance, #bt, and #secondly, #herbicide #tolerance. and/ then there 
are other #whole #series of products at some stage in the pipeline 
potentially/ #available, which you might #call output #traits, that 
is food quality, nutritional value and so/ on.
555 21 the answer to that/ is that first of all they can #charge
royalties on the #hybrid, so they will #charge #farmers for/ saving 
those #seeds every #year, and #that_s easy #money for them.
561 21 you_d still need to put phosphates #onto the #fields #form
time to time, but you do not have to put #nitrogen #onto the #fields. 
and that would have #enormous #benefits for #farming profits, as you 
would not have to put so many #inputs into the #farm in order to make 
#money.
640 21 #under the current #conditions of #what_s #under #offer and
taking into account the alternatives that are #available. because 
it_s not #herbicide #tolerant #crops or carry on as we are at the 
#moment that isn_t the choice that we face.
673 19 A #lot of it is described on the horizon scanning report of 
the aebc. clearly #there_s #stuff #going on now such as #herbicide 
#resistant ftcrops, #insect #resistance, #fungal #resistance, virus 
#resistance, #drought #tolerance.
725 19 there_ve been a #whole number of #studies done about the
#separation #distances between gm and non_gm_crops and all of the 
#industry is now saying that if it is #agreeable that #cross #polli- 
nation would be acceptable for the ttorganic #industry at say 0. 
9percent,
474 18 so for #example, the #bt ttcotton and some of the other #bt
#crops there is now some very clear evidence to demonstrate that what 
was #predicted is happening and that is that the #crops can #grow 
with #reduced #pesticide #inputs that has major #benefits in terms of 
the/
573 18 what followed after that was a #whole #series of #studies
which took three #years to complete where an #enormous number of #re- 
searchers #went out into the #field and they looked at #pollen that 
was actually coming from #bt #maize that was #grown in the/
674 18 and then #stuff #that_s being worked on for #industrial
#crops, pharmaceuticals, and quality #traits, like the control of 
ripening, the control of colour, the control of taste, #changing the 
colour of #flowers, lengthening shelf life.
7 17 now #that_s the reason that US # farmers have #gone that
#way and also in #south america. the other big development is the
#insect_resistant varieties of #maize, #mainly, and #cotton.
75 17 just one or two #applications at the most of a single #her-
bicide which is more readily broken down in the #soil, is less per­
sistent and less toxic, and so #that_s a #benefit. it also #means 
that the #farmer does #not have to #use tilage which in turn mini­
mises #soil erosion.
726 17 then it_s manageable within sensible #distances of say
twentyO metres, the #organic ttmovement are basically saying we want 
0. lpercent not 0. 9percent, and they_re only saying 0. lpercent be­
cause #that_s within the #limits of measurement, the only #crop where 
it_s #serious is ttoilseed #rape.
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Focus groups: Representative ECUs
Cle selectionnee: (A) Industry
459 26 V: but it would still be a #third_world ttcountry, it
wouldn_t change that much, if they #wanted #to do it, they would have 
done it already. P: also, there are other #ways of #helping the
#poor, they could do it in another, #better #way.
648 21 C_mon! P: in the #end, they #want #to #make the #poor #de-
pendent of their products, their #seeds, their #crops, so they can 
#make more #money. I #think saying _oh we will #help the #poor_ is 
just an excuse so that #people ttaccept all that stuff S: and even the 
#poor #countries are rejecting gm there must be a treason for it!
563 20 D: #that_s just this #argument the #companies use #to #make
their products more ttaccepted! #there_s not a grain of truth in that, 
if they #wanted #to #feed the #poor, they could do it #easily without 
gm! just #give them some of the #money that is being used for re­
search at the moment and they could happily grow their own foods!
663 20 if #countries #wanted #to #help they could, say #spend less
#money on the military, on #wars and so on, and #invest the #money 
elsewhere, until they do that, I have no #reason #to believe that 
they really #care about the ttpoor #people.
741 20 I #think they_re #producing it for a #reason, and that
#reason is not #to #help the #poor. maybe it will #benefit the #poor 
as well, but #that_s not the aim behind it I #think SG: #that_s just 
a #selling technique S: they wouldn_t bother #spending all this
#money on research, on persuading the public, etc.
161 18 all the #money #that_s being #invested, I #think #that_s a
#way #to avoid #thinking more #seriously about the #way that we allo­
cate ^resources. it_s another #way of shortcutting a-lot-of very #se- 
rious and #deep problems.
622 18 EF: but there are other #ways #to #help the #poor. for ex­
ample, the #amount of #money .that is #spend in the #usa on pet food 
every year is •
208 17 and I do not #think #that_s going #to change. J: but how
can you unpick that? MI: you can not there are always lots of #people 
who #want #to #make #money, tteveryone #wants #to get richer, we #live 
in a #society where #everyone #wants everything now and all the time.
624 17 6 #billion. so with the #amount of excess #money of the
#usa on pet food alone, not #to mention #make up, etc. you could 
#feed #everyone #easily! it_s not a ttmatter of inventing a new food, 
a new technology and all this #nonsense! it_s basically a lie saying 
_oh we do it for the ttpoor ttpeople, for their health and all #that_.
742 17 if they wouldn_t potentially gain a lot from it A: I mean, 
have you ever heard of ttcompanies ttinvesting ttmoney solely #to tthelp 
the ttpoor or the ttenvironment? #that_s ttnonsense, I just do not 
ttthink it happens. T: #there_s enough food in the ttworld ttto ttfeed 
tteveryone, we have so many surpluses already.
623 15 10 ttbillion, and the ttamount ttyou_d need ttto ttfeed ttevery­
one is
653 15 DE: but it might tthelp, although we do not know that yet
for sure T: if they could ttguarantee that it would tthelp ttpoor ttpeo­
ple in the #long_term, then yes, that would be a ttbenefit S:
309 14 they are always saying _oh we can ttfeed the #world_ but you
have ttto remember that the ttcompanies who are doing this gm are not 
charities, they do not ttcare about ttfeeding the ttworld, they ttcare 
about ttmaking ttmoney. and this ttargument. I feel they are ttusing it 
ttto ttmake us feel guilty, I ttthink #that_s despicable.
659 14 EF: yes, aids is a good example actually, the ttcompanies
have well not a cure ttexactly but something ttto ttmake ttpeople with
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aids #live #better and longer #lives and what do they do? do they 
ttwant #to #help, do they actually #supply them with the medicine?
162 13 #instead of #thinking how can we distribute the food ttbet-
ter, how can we #make it #available #to those who need it most, how 
can we #help the #poor #countries grow their own food, what 
#long_term #solutions are there?
165 13 it_s all done for #profit, I do not #think they really
#care about the #third_world. otherwise they could have done some­
thing there with all the #money they_re #investing in gm_food! G: 
yes, this #feeding the #world is #nonsense.
610 13 EF: it_s a nice #idea, but the problem is that the #usa
#companies who ttproduce the gm food have the #patents on the tech­
niques T: and they do not #give them #to other #people EF:
660 13 no, because they can not pay for them! #that_s absurd,
these #companies have so much ttmoney, they could afford ttto tthelp if 
they really ttwanted ttto, but all they ttcare about is ttprofit.
209 12 and the ttworld is overpopulated as it is. too many ttpeople
ttwanting too much ttmoney. MI: not for all ttpeople on this earth. A: 
this is not going #to work, at least not in the #long_term.
Cle selectionnee: (B) Food
105 56 you know when I go to a tttesco ttsupermarket and I ttlook at
the ttingredients and I tend to do that a lot it ttreads like a chem­
ises prescription as opposed to a ttfood store because it has ttloads 
of ttadditives of all ttsorts of kinds.
492 43 you ttbuy tinned spagetti, you can be sure they ttcontain gm!
V: I have one question: spagetti is not made from ttsoya ttbean is it? 
S: not yet! MW: but ttgenerally ttprocessed ttfoods do ttcontain gm.
509 38 DI: if it was the same ttprice would you ttbuy it? C: then I
would ttbuy only ttorganic. P: me too. #1 think all #gm_foods ttshould 
be # label led at least #ALL: yes, ttdefinitely D: I want to have the 
ttchoice!
218 36 I_ve just started to ttcheck out every ttlabel, and I feel
you should not have to do that just because you want to cook a ttmeal. 
when you ttbuy your ttfoods, your vegetables, your ttgrains, and so on, 
you should not have to be ttlooking at every ttlabel to see whether it 
has these ttadditives or gm in it.
221 30 so now you_re not ttlooking at your basic needs anymore, you
have to process all this technical information, to be tthonest I_d 
ttprefer if it wasn_t like this. it_s very complex with a lot of lay­
ers going on now. D: and I tttry to ttbuy ttorganic whenever I can but 
it_s very ttexpensive.
507 30 often it_s twice as ttexpensive than other ttfoods! N: yes,
if I could ttafford it I would only ttbuy ttorganic, but I_m a student. 
V: the taste of ttorganic ttfood is just better, that_s it. D: yes, the 
taste is much better and also you know where the ttfood comes from, 
how it_s been ttproduced.
2 90 26 MG: you can not see it even if it_s a raw ttproduct, and
less so in a final ttprocessed ttproduct. RB: but they say it is #la-
belled MG: I_ve never seen a ttlabel SB: I_ve always just ttassumed
that it actually is not happening yet, that it_s not commercialised 
yet RB: some ttsupermarkets have signs like _this is not gm_.
602 26 T: it_s all done to cut the ttcosts of food_production,
isn_t it? I do not trust their ttmotivation at all. I ttprefer the
natural ttfoods. I would like to only ttbuy ttorganic ttfood but they 
ttcosts twice as much!
510 23 C: exactly, I want to decide myself what to ttbuy and I can 
only do this if ttfoods are properly ttlabelled. P: I think after time 
I might ttbuy gm, too, first I would resist but then you get used to 
it I ttguess, it may be ttcheaper, and I do not really ttread any ttin­
gredients, I_m too lazy for that.
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603 22 S: yes, ttorganic ttfood is too ttexpensive T: and you know
why? it_s so that only few people can ttafford it and so that the
ttrest all have to ttbuy gm!
511 21 I do not ttread what is says on the ttpackets. DI: I would
ttprefer to have the ttchoice as ttwell. S: I do not think anybody
really ttreads the ttlabels in the ttsupermarkets! DI: I do! S: if you 
have time. MW: if you do ttread it, you will be very surprised what_s 
in our ttfoods.
94 19 and if you were to ttlabel #gm_tomato in a ttsupermarket I_m
sure that ttnobody would want to ttbuy them. I think they were trying
to sneak them in ttprocessed ttfoods, and they_re ttprobably doing that 
right at the moment.
247 19 J: it_s like it was with #bse. G: it_s like the marie an-
toinette concept of if there is no bread let_s feed them brioche. MI: 
ttwell, she said that but she did not have enough brioche for all of 
the people! G: yes I am. J: yes, I always ttlook at the ttlabel, and 
when I ttbuy some ttchocolate it seems to have all ttsorts of things in 
it, like ttadditives, gm.
333 19 so #therefore I would not want #gm_foods on the ttsupermar­
ket ttshelves, unless they can be declared safe. SB: from an econo­
mises point of ttview, if the #gm_food is ttcheaper than normally 
ttproduced ttfood, you can be absolutely certain that we are all eating 
it already I:
491 19 V: do you think so? I think we do but we do not know about
it. MW: ttwell, so many ttproducts here ttcontain ttsoya and this is
ttgenerally gm ttsoya, so I ttassume we are actually eating a lot of gm.
155 17 D: but say with the #gm_food that ttnobody wants are we go­
ing to feed that to the poor? the ttrich can eat ttorganic ttfood, and 
the poor have to eat gm, which is ttproduced by the ttrich and which 
makes them even ttricher at their ttcost!
588 17 now is the time when we can still ttchoose but I think we
won_t be ttable to do that for much longer, ok, maybe we would still 
have some ttorganic but it would be too ttexpensive and most people 
just couldn_t ttchoose to ttbuy it, they would have to ttbuy gm.
576 15 T: completely tasteless. EF: also, gm are often not as nu­
tritious as real ttfood. S: what are the ttguidelines for #gm_food, I
have no idea. DE: if a ttproduct had less than 0. 9percent of
gm_ingredient it doesn_t need to be ttlabelled here in the ttuk, in the 
usa it_s different.
844 15 C: I_d ttbuy #gm_foods because I_ve got no ttchoice SG: I do
not bother to ttlook A: I do not necessarily think #gm_foods are more 
dangerous than non_gm_foods but I do not like these ttassociations.
Cle selectionnee: (C) Nature
352 34 for ttexample, ttputting a ttcompletely ttforeign ttgene, say
from some ttanimal ttinto an ttapple I find tttotally unacceptable, for 
the reason that it is ttunnatural beyond belief it ttsimply could not 
tthappen if ttnature had her way.
451 25 and in the end we have super insects, super weeds. V: how 
ttdangerous is it for the ttfields, the grounds, will it ttchange the 
ttsloil content? organic ttfarming is ttdifferent and much better than 
ttartificial, ttmodified ttfarming MW: I ttmean the ttfertilisers will be 
washed down in the ttground and get ttinto the ttground ttwater, and the 
more we have of them the ttworse it will be for our tthealth.
45 24 I just do not like that. it_s ttartificial to ttput these
things ttinto our ttanimals, but that_s ttdifferent from ttgm. MI: it_s 
ttdifferent but both are ttunnatural. ttmilking a #cow 24 hours a ttday, 
their tits ttstart to ttgrow bacteria on them, it_s tthorrible, ttleading 
to infection, this could transmit to tthumans.
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144 23 it_s all the #result of #pollution, #allergies in #children
these #days have #increased lOfold over the #last 20 #years. A: 
that_s just so true, I #mean with #asthma #especially.
438 23 it_s not #normal, it_s not #human, it_s not the biological
way to ttgrow things. MW: but #traditional agriculture also #uses
ttplant #breeding, they also splice a #plant and then #grow it ttdif- 
ferently, with #bigger #fruits or something.
27 22 for #example, some #types of #gm #vegetables and #plants
have been #created to #resist more the aggression of #chemicals, so 
that they can be sprayed more often and #grown more vigorously.
379 22 this is a #level of #modification which is more or less
common and acceptable, on the other #hand, once you #start having the 
german shepherd with a #sheep or whatever, this is ttdifferent, it_s 
ttunnatural as it couldn_t tthappen in ttnature, and so it should be in 
a ttdifferent ttcategory of ttgm.
439 22 the ttdifference with #gm is that ttforeign ttgenes from prac­
tically every other ttspecies can be ttincorporated and that_s ttdiffer­
ent. this could be ttdangerous but if ttgenetically we are all the 
ttsame and we share 95percent with ttplants then it should not make a 
ttdifference.
441 19 S: I ttworry very much about ttcross ttcontamination of
ttplants, the seeds of ttgm ttplants can wafts ttmiles ttinto other terri­
tories of ttfields which are not ttgm and that_s ttpolluting them then.
591 19 D: on the other tthand, there is no #immediate ttdanger to
us, is there? I ttmean, ttsmoking 2 packs of cigarettes a ttday will 
ttkill me first before any ttgm!
674 19 DE: I just know they are ttrelated, you ttmix them #up. for
ttexample, they can ttput ttchemicals in the ttgenes to make tttomatoes 
ttlast ttlonger. they are basically ttputting something in that just 
should not be there, and we already have so many ttproblems with 
ttchemicals in our foods, ttpesticides and all this ttstuff.
44 17 I do not ttdrink ttmilk anymore because I know the ttcows are
injected with tthormones and I do not like that. I do not tteat 
ttchicken anymore because I know they ttput god knows what ttinto them 
to make them ttgrow faster and ttbigger.
305 17 on the one tthand I think it_s ttcomplete #tampering with
ttnature, on the other tthand, ttmaybe it_s just evolution with a help­
ing tthand. what I ttmean is that ttgene ttmodification is tthappening 
ttnaturally but now we_re doing it ttartificially. I do not know.
555 16 you tteat that now thinking it_s a ttnormal tttomato and what
might tthappen in 5 ttyears? you just do not know! the bad ttgenes might 
get ttincorporated ttinto our ttbodies.
628 16 H: but that doesn_t ttmean it_s tthealthier and it doesn_t
ttmean it_s better! T: no of ttcourse not, it_s just the way ttlife
ttmoves on, progress tthappens. H: but it_s a ttdifferent conversation 
of whether we_re moving along to something better or ttworse.
268 15 but what can you do, you have to get on with your ttlife. G:
this was also a big ttproblem in ireland. the ttfarmers really suffered 
as a ttresult of ttchemobyl, ttsheep were ttdying or had to be ttkilled, 
ttsame with foot_and_mouth, can you ttimagine what ttgm might do?
431 15 on the other tthand, if they stick with only ttinserting
ttplant ttgenes as is done in tttraditional ttplant ttbreeding it_s the 
ttsame thing, that should not make any ttdifference to the tthealth ttef- 
fects of the foods, but adding ttanimal ttgenes is ttdifferent, I do not 
know why they are doing it and I do not really think they should al­
though it may not be harmful.
575 15 I ttmean why do it in the first place? D: ttgm also just
doesn_t tttaste right, you can #taste the ttdifference ttimmediately, 
the ttfruits are full of ttwater and ttstuff.
5 14 I like ttnatural things and that technology is surely not
ttnatural. they just #mix ttgenes and ttchemicals and nobody knows what
278
will #happen. you #put things ttinto your ttbody and they ttmix with 
your ttgenes.
Cle selectionnee: (D) Science and politics
81 20 at the ttmoment I do not ttknow that and unfortunately we
have a tthistory here in the uk with the ttgovemment not tttelling the 
tttruth. so why should I ttbelieve them now? it_s the ttlack of ttknowl- 
edge that ttscares you the most, the ttfact that you ttreally do not 
ttknow #what_s in your food, whether it_s been modified, how has it 
been modified?
485 16 DI: there isn_t any ttclear ttinformation. V: maybe not for
us, but I think they ttknow, they have the ttfacts. DI: I do not ttknow 
about that. I think there are just too many unanswered ttquestions for 
all of us ttreally. I do not ttknow, perhaps there is more ttinformation 
on the #internet.
593 14 they ttknew well before that but because the tobacco #indus­
try is such a profitable ttindustry they tttried to ttkeep it ttquiet. 
the same ttthing might happen with gm. S: yes, there_s so much profit 
ttinvolved that ttgovernments are unlikely to ttbase their ttdecisions 
ttpurely on ttscience ttfacts.
30 13 I_m not able to ttdecide whether gm is a good ttthing or a
ttbad ttthing, I just do not have the ttinformation. A: I ttagree, the
ttgovemment hasn_t ttreally tttold us the ttdetails.
181 13 and we do not have that for gm. also, I do not think we
tttake ttrisks just like that, medical ttresearch was well planned and
ttregulated. and it always served a ttclear ttpurpose, so I would tttrust 
doctors.
325 13 the ttthing is you can not ttreally ttstop ttprogress. in that
respect, the ttbest ttthing you can do is to have this ttprogress but 
with good supervision, good ttresearch.
690 13 and you do not ttknow if you can tttrust the ttgovemment D:
exactly I do not ttbelieve them! so #what_s the point of more ttinfor­
mation? P: it would be good to get a ttbalanced view, you ttknow the 
good ttthings, the ttbad ttthings and then we could make a ttdecision, 
but I think the ttgovemment has already ttdecided for us!
697 13 so everything you ttfind in the ttmedia, you do not ttreally
ttknow whether this is tttrue or not, and especially with gm there_s a 
lot of conflicting ttinformation ttout there. S: but they can not ttlie 
about the procedures, these are ttfacts.
599 12 I do not ttknow much about it, but the ttthing that ttworries
me is why do they ttkeep it ttquiet? I mean if there are ttrisks tttell
us what they are exactly and then ttlet us make a choice whether we
want to tttake the ttrisk or not!
776 12 I tthate to sound ignorant, but I ttreally do not ttknow much
about it. there are some ttscientists ttout there who ttknow more, but 
they might be ttbiased, they might be ttinfluenced by ttpolitics, by the 
ttindustry D: you do not ttknow what to think B: they also ttseem to
change their ttmind rather frequently A:
134 11 to be honest tonight I_m ttfinding ttout all that ttbad
ttthings ttreally. I mean I do care about it and I_m against gm, but I 
do not ttknow the ttdetails, it_s just a gut #feeling.
341 11 so it_s not ttreally an ttissue of if or when it will happen,
but of how S: but that_s the ttissue of ttregulation! you can not just 
ban and ttstop it RB: the ttthing is ttgovemment and ttindustry work to­
gether.
350 11 it wasn_t very ttclear to me at all RB: I try to ttfind ttout
about it as well in ttscience journals but I ttfind it rather ttdiffi- 
cult to ttunderstand, I_m not a ttscientist I: plus, there is not much 
consensus at this ttmoment in time is there?
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395 11 I think it_s a #question for a lot of people I: the ttques-
tion is basically can we #trust the ttgovemment to put our ttsafety 
first, to ttreally have our ttbest ttinterest at ttheart.
536 11 MW: I think the ttreal danger is the ttcommercial aspect of
the whole adventure, if it was ttpure ttscience, done by the ttbest #in- 
dependent ttscientists without #vested_interests, it would be much 
better, it might be something I could ttagree on.
725 11 it_s amazing! EF: and why do not we hear about it, I think
the ttgovemment doesn_t want us to. P: I would be ttinterested in
ttfinding ttout more about it but I do not ttreally ttknow how to D: we 
have to ttknow the ttfacts.
77 10 and the ttstate needs to ttdecide to what extent it should be
developed and what is the roadmap, at the ttmoment these ttdecisions 
are tttaken by the companies and I do not think that_s right because 
they only have their ttcommercial ttinterests at ttheart.
339 10 ttsay a ttdrug that might be ttfine for a sporty male, may be
fatal to a little old lady or a baby, how do we ttknow this is not go­
ing to be the ttcase with gm_foods? S: I ttagree that should be better 
ttregulated and these ttthings should be stopped MG: and with this in 
ttmind, how can we tttrust the product?
695 10 H: but how are you going to ttfind the right ttinformation?
how are you going to ttdecide whether it_s good for you or ttbad for 
you? S: yes you do not ttknow that until you have some outcomes,- we 
just can not tttell now.
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APPENDIX D: CORA CORRESPONDENCE TABLES
Correspondence Table: Natural things
Association
Rating
very positive positive neutral negative very negative Total
Sunshine 17 3 0 0 0 20
Natural disasters 0 1 1 3 13 18
Love 15 2 0 0 0 17
Sex 9 8 0 0 0 17
Life 8 3 2 0 0 13
Family 7 5 0 0 0 12
Emotion 0 5 3 2 1 11
Earth 5 5 0 0 0 10
Sky 6 4 0 0 0 10
Recreation 5 4 0 0 0 9
Eating 4 4 0 0 0 8
Green 5 1 2 0 0 8
Cotton 2 4 2 0 0 8
Health 5 3 0 0 0 8
Rocks 1 3 3 1 0 8
Air 4 2 0 0 0 6
Death 0 0 2 3 1 6
People 2 3 1 0 0 6
Dirt 0 0 1 4 0 5
Smiles 4 1 0 0 0 5
Total 101 60 16 13 15 205
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Correspondence Table: Natural food
Rating
Association very positive positive neutral negative very negative Total
Health 26 5 0 0 0 31
Organic 7 10 1 0 1 19
De-naturalised foods 0 0 1 2 8 11
Taste 7 3 0 0 0 10
Not processed 5 3 1 1 0 10
Straight from the farmer 6 2 2 0 0 10
Purity 7 2 0 0 0 9
Expensive 1 0 1 4 2 8
Farming 3 2 2 1 0 8
Culture 4 2 1 0 0 7
Fair-trade 4 3 0 0 0 7
Fresh 5 1 0 0 0 6
Homemade 5 1 0 0 0 6
Mcdonalds 0 0 0 0 5 6
Rare 1 0 0 2 2 5
As nature intended 3 1 1 0 0 5
Vegetarian 0 0 3 1 0 4
Cooking 0 1 0 2 0 3
Harmony 2 1 0 0 0 3
My garden 3 0 0 0 0 3
Total 89 37 13 13 18 170
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Correspondence Table: Food in general
Rating
Association very positive positive neutral negative very negative Total
Family and friends 17 8 0 1 0 26
Culture 11 7 4 0 1 23
Social event 14 5 2 0 0 21
Pleasure 15 4 3 0 0 22
Cooking 6 6 3 4 0 19
Taste 14 4 0 0 0 18
Health 9 6 3 0 0 18
Fat 0 0 2 4 9 15
Meal 5 4 1 1 0 11
Hunger 0 1 1 5 3 10
Diet 3 1 2 3 0 9
Home 7 2 0 0 0 9
Nutrition 4 4 1 0 0 9
Essential 1 4 3 1 0 9
Energy 4 2 2 0 0 8
Relaxation 6 1 0 0 0 7
Life 3 2 2 0 0 7
Organic 5 2 0 0 0 7
Satisfaction 4 3 0 0 0 7
Risk of weight gain 0 0 0 5 1 6
Total 128 66 29 24 14 261
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Correspondence Table: GM food
Rating
Association very positive positive neutral negative very negative Total
Unnatural 0 0 3 14 13 30
Science 5 6 8 2 1 22
Helping third world 8 8 2 3 0 21
Unhealthy 0 0 2 5 14 21
Multinational companies 0 1 2 11 5 19
Progress 4 9 2 0 0 15
Potential benefit 5 7 0 2 0 14
Environmental risks 0 0 0 8 6 14
Dangerous 0 0 1 3 9 13
Uncertainty 0 0 0 7 5 12
Profit 0 4 1 1 5 11
Exploitation 0 0 1 1 8 10
Future 0 4 6 0 0 10
Government lies 0 0 0 8 2 10
Unknown long-term con­
sequences 0 0 0 6 3 9
Tasteless 0 0 0 4 4 8
Big 0 1 2 5 0 8
Not necessary 0 0 1 3 4 8
Contamination 0 0 0 3 5 8
Greenpeace 2 4 0 2 0 8
Total 24 44 31 88 84 271
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APPENDIX E: PROCEDURE FOR CLUSTER ANALYSIS
Procedure for cluster analysis using Jaccard’s coefficient and the Centroid linkage 
method
First .a proximity matrix is calculated, consisting of a similarity measure for each pair 
of variables. The similarity measure used here is Jaccard’s coefficient. To illustrate 
how this is calculated, we provide the example of the similarity measure between sci­
ence and progress. This is calculated as the number of respondents who mention both 
science and progress, divided by the following sum: the number who mention both, 
plus the number who mention just science, plus the number who mention just pro­
gress. Note that the calculation excludes those respondents who mention neither sci­
ence nor progress.
The original data file (not presented here) shows that:
8 respondents mention both science and progress,
11 respondents mention science but not progress,
6 respondents mention progress but not science.
Therefore Jaccard’s coefficient of similarity between science and progress is:
8
8 + 11 + 6 
= 0.320
Then the clustering begins. First, the most similar pair of items is identified, that is, 
those with the largest similarity coefficient. In this data set, this is science and pro­
gress,, with similarity = 0.320 as shown above. These two items form the first cluster. 
The proximity matrix now has to be updated, since new similarity coefficients must 
be calculated between the science-progress cluster and the other variables. The new 
similarity coefficients between this cluster and each new variable are calculated as a 
weighted combination of the similarities as they were for science and progress. Five 
pieces of information are needed for this.
First, the labels:
s = Jaccard’s similarity coefficient 
a = science 
b= progress 
c = unnatural
n = number of variables in a cluster.
NB although at the moment we are dealing with merging single variables, one could 
think of those variables as clusters each with n=l. This makes the formula below gen- 
eralisable when we start merging clusters containing more than one variable each.
Now, the five pieces of information that are needed:
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Sac = Jaccard’s similarity coefficient between science and unnatural (= 0.179)
Sbc-  Jaccard’s similarity coefficient between progress and unnatural (= 0.079) 
sab= Jaccard’s similarity coefficient between science and progress (= 0.320) 
na = number of variables in the ‘cluster’ science (=1) 
nb = number of variables in the ‘cluster’ progress (=1)
The new similarity measure between the cluster science-progress and the variable un­
natural is:
/  N
n a
+
(  \ (  \  
” a ” b
^  ac S bc
K n a + n b J (  . V  ab
( i  > 
-0 .179 n ^-0 .079 fl-0 .320+ _
,2 ,2 ,4
= 0.049
(So if there were more variables in cluster a than in cluster b, then when calculating 
the similarity coefficient between cluster ab and new cluster c, the similarity between 
a and c would have a greater weighting than the similarity between b and c.)
This is repeated for all the other variables. The whole process is now repeated: the 
next most similar pair of items (or pair of cluster-and-item, or later, cluster-and- 
cluster) is identified, by finding the largest Jaccard coefficient. The new cluster is 
formed, and the proximity matrix is updated. And the clusters are combined until the 
completion of the analysis.
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